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XA b s t r a c t
In this thesis three policy issues that are of particular relevance in the economic 
debate are analysed using multiregional CGE models. The first of these issues is 
related to the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by 
the government. The second issue refers to the exportation of domestic taxes from 
developed to developing countries. And, the third issue is related to the efficiency 
gains from the elimination of global restrictions on international labour mobility. 
Two types of multiregional CGE models can be distinguished. The first type of 
models disaggregates the national economy into regions, whereas in the second type, 
regions consist of countries or groups of countries. In this thesis both types of models 
are used.
Chapter 2 quantifies the welfare effects of decentralisation in Colombia, using 
a multiregional CGE model. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate to what 
extent will the Colombian population be better off when goods such as health and 
education, are delivered locally as against centrally. A provision scheme based on the 
median voter is considered. Neither multiregional CGE models nor schemes for 
public provision of quasi-private goods have been previously applied when assessing 
the effects of decentralisation. According to the results, the provision of health and 
education by regional governments improves the welfare of the Colombian 
population as a whole, since regional governments provide goods and services in a 
way that better caters to local preferences. More importantly, these welfare gains vary 
from 1.3% to 2.3% of GDP, a substantial magnitude especially when compared with 
the efficiency gains associated to the tax reforms of the early nineties.
Chapter 3 investigates whether developed countries export taxes to 
developing countries, contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and 
welfare; that is to what extent the distribution of gains from trade is being affected 
not by existing tariffs in developed countries, which are already at low levels, but by 
their domestic taxation. An eight-region CGE model for the world economy is used. 
The results indicate that when factors of production are internationally immobile, 
developed regions do not export domestic taxes to developing regions. On the 
contrary, when capital is assumed to be internationally mobile developed region 
export capital taxes to developing regions. Regardless of the assumptions on 
international capital mobility, the effects of import tariffs on welfare and terms of 
trade are larger than those of domestic taxes.
Chapter 4 computes the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of 
global restrictions on labour mobility using an eight-region CGE model. A distinctive 
feature of the analysis is the introduction of a segmented labour market, as two types 
of labour are considered: skilled and unskilled. According to the results, when labour 
is a homogeneous factor, the elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility 
generates world-wide efficiency gains that could be of considerable magnitude. 
When the labour market is segmented and both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, 
welfare gains reduce since the benefits and losses of migration are not evenly 
distributed within each region. When only skilled labour migrates, the world-wide 
efficiency gains are smaller, since this type of labour represents a small fraction of 
the labour force in developing regions.
1CHAPTER 1
In t r o d u c t io n
Since the early 1960s computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been 
widely used by economists with the purpose of supporting the process of decision­
making, especially when analysing public finances and foreign trade at the national 
level. At the regional level, it is only recently that these models have begun to be 
used for impact analysis. Throughout the years, economists have applied several 
modelling approaches in the area of regional economics. These include economic 
base methods, input-output analysis, gravity-type models, shift-share analysis, 
econometric models, and programming models.1 These alternative approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, as they can be combined to produce new model types. For 
instance, in the construction of CGE models, analysts often rely on parameter 
estimates (such as elasticities) that have been previously estimated using econometric 
techniques.
In the early stages of regional modelling, analysts regarded regional models as 
an extension of modelling exercises at the national level. In this sense, models were 
typically developed for single regions (provinces, states, etc.) in order to assess the 
effects of national or regional policies at the regional level. The building blocks of 
these models typically assumed that the national economy was given, without
allowing for any feedback influence. This approach of modelling constitutes a “top-
l
1 For an introduction to these techniques see Glickman (1977), the collection of papers published in 
the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics (Nijkamp, 1986), and Kraybill and Lugani (1992).
2down” approach, since it specifies economic agents in a national model; the results
from this national model are then “stepped down” to the regional level, using various 
s
regional-share assumptions (Kraybill and Lugani, 1992).
Early regional models mainly focussed on the evolution of a rather limited 
number of variables, such as the level of income, production, employment, tax 
revenues and public expenditure, since they were built using the structure of national 
models. Nijkamp et al (1986) indicate that these models 'suffer from a number of 
shortcomings including: a) the lack of horizontal (multiregional or interregional) 
feedback and spill-over effects; b) the lack of a satisfactory theoretical basis for 
including supply effects (e.g. the infrastructural components of a region); c) the lack 
of consistency of separate single region models with respect to the national total 
system; d) the lack of vertical feedback mechanisms between the national and the 
regional economies; e) the lack of specific orientation toward local, regional or 
national policy questions in various fields; and 0  the lack of reliable data.
Trying to overcome these deficiencies, regional modelling has evolved in new 
directions during the last decades. In a first stage, between the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s, there was a development of regional models based on optimality 
concepts, followed by a strong trend towards econometrically specified regional 
models. During the 1970s, a second generation of regional models emerged, which 
incorporated supply constraints into the analysis, so that there were no longer infinite 
resources. From the mid-1970s onwards, a third generation of models emerged with a 
clear multiregional orientation, in which interactions among regions are represented.
In this thesis I analyse three policy issues that have become of particular 
relevance in the economic debate using multiregional CGE models. The first one is 
related to the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by
3the government. The second one refers to the exportation of domestic taxes from
developed to developing countries. And, the third one is related to the efficiency
*
gains from the elimination of global restrictions on international labour mobility. A 
multiregional general equilibrium approach constitutes a suitable framework, because 
it deals explicitly with the interrelationships between different markets and different 
sectors of the economy. In addition, this approach is a suitable tool for analysing the 
effects of policy changes on resource allocation, the structure of distribution, and thus 
on economic welfare.
Two types of multiregional CGE models can be distinguished. The first type 
of models disaggregates the national economy into regions.2 These models have been 
developed for countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia (and more 
recently for Germany and India). They have been used to analyse public finance 
issues such as regional tax incidence (Kimbell and Harrison, 1984; Morgan et al, 
1989; Mutti et al, 1989), spatial incidence of federal fiscal policies (Kraybill et al, 
1992), tax exporting of regional taxes (Morgan et al, 1996), and whether the regions 
of a federal state should obtain the right to levy regional income taxes (Hirte, 1998). 
These models have been also used to analyse trade policy issues such as the impact of 
changes in federal trade policies on interregional trade (Jones et al, 1985), the effects 
of tax energy and inter-provincial trade policies (Jones and Whalley, 1988 and 1989), 
and the role of transportation costs in the evaluation of the effects of tariffs (Wigle, 
1992).
Perhaps one of the major difficulties faced when dealing with these kind of 
multiregional CGE models is that of data availability. A benchmark data set involves 
the assembling of detailed production and demand accounts by regions, of
2 See Kraybill and Lugani (1992) for a survey of this kind of models.
4interregional and international trade flows, and of transactions involving multiple 
levels of government (St-Hilaire and Whalley, 1987). CGE data are assembled in a 
social accounting matrix (SAM), which is a system of balanced expenditure and 
income accounts.3 Input-output tables are a very important part of a SAM, and the 
scarcity of multiregional input-output accounts imposes serious difficulties to 
multiregional CGE modelling. Indeed, only a few developed countries (i.e. Canada, 
Japan and Holland) prepare multiregional accounts on a regular basis.
In the second type of multiregional CGE models, regions consist of countries 
or groups of countries. This type of models have been used to analyse world trade 
(Whalley, 1985), the implications of trade protection on the North-South terms of 
trade (Whalley, 1984), the effects of trade liberalisation proposals (Nguyen and 
Wigle, 1992), the macroeconomic effects of migration flows from Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union into the European Community (Weyerbrock, 1995), the 
effects of removing distortions in domestic factor taxes (taking into account 
international trade flows) (Whalley, 1980a), trade restricting impacts of tariffs and 
selected non-tariff barriers to world trade (Whalley, 1980b), and the North American 
Fee Trade Agreement -  NAFTA (see the collection of papers in Francois and Shiells, 
1994).
In this thesis both the subnational and supranational approaches to regional 
modelling mentioned above are used. In particular, Chapter 2 quantifies the welfare 
effects of decentralisation using a multiregional CGE model for Colombia, a country 
that began a rather ambitious process of state decentralisation in the late 1980s.4
3 See Pyatt and Round (1985) for a discussion of the structure and use of SAMs, and Round (1986, 
1988) for a presentation of several accounting approaches used in the construction of multiregional 
SAMs.
4 According to World Bank (1994), this process has been slow and the pace of decentralisation among 
regions uneven.
5Contemporaneously with the decentralisation effort, poverty reduction became an 
important issue in the government’s agenda, and both decentralisation and poverty 
reduction were brought closer together with the introduction of the Law on local 
government functions and financing in 1993. The strategy to improve the standard of 
living of the population was primarily based on the provision of essential social 
services (such as health, education, housing and drinking water) and the generation of 
employment opportunities by shifting public expenditures towards social sectors. 
Regional governments were thus given the responsibility of delivering social 
programmes and services to the poor.
Chapter 2 examines to what extent will the Colombian population be better 
off when quasi-private goods and services, such as health and education, are 
delivered locally as against centrally. A quasi-private good is a good that has the 
characteristics of a private good, such as excludability and positive marginal costs of 
supply to an additional consumer, but is provided by the government. A provision 
scheme based on the median voter is considered. Neither multiregional CGE models 
nor schemes for public provision of quasi-private goods have been previously applied 
when assessing the effects of decentralisation.
According to the results, the provision of health and education by regional 
governments improves the welfare of the Colombian population as a whole, since 
regional governments provide goods and services in a way that better caters to local 
preferences. More importantly, these welfare gains vary from 1.3% to 2.3% of GDP, 
a substantial magnitude especially when compared with the efficiency gains 
associated to the tax reforms of the early nineties.
Chapter 3 investigates whether developed countries export taxes to 
developing countries, contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and
6to improve their welfare. However, so far in the economic debate the role of domestic 
taxation in affecting the distribution of gains from trade, has been overlooked. Hence, 
the chapter investigates to what extent the distribution of gains from trade is being 
affected not by existing tariffs in developed countries, which are already at low 
levels, but by their domestic taxation.
The issue of tax exporting among countries has not been analysed 
empirically, although Mutti and Morgan (1986) and Morgan et al (1996) have looked 
at tax exporting among regions within the United States. One of the few analyses in 
this area is Whalley (1980a), who assesses the strength of relative price effects in 
international trade caused by the different domestic factor taxes which operate in the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan. Whalley uses a four-region general 
equilibrium model, which incorporates tariff, non-tariff and domestic taxation 
policies of major trading blocks, using data for 1973.
In this thesis tax exporting is investigated using a multiregional CGE model 
for the world economy. In this model there are eight regions: the United States 
(USA), the European Union (EU), Japan (JAP), other developed countries (ODC), 
developing America (DAM), developing Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS) and 
developing Europe (DE). Each region has a production and demand structure, and are 
linked through trade; the data are for 1990. With this regional classification is 
possible to consider from which region(s) developing sub-groups “import” taxes; this 
is an important issue, since developing regions have more commercial ties with one 
developed region than with others, and hence domestic tax policy in developed 
regions may affect one developing region more than another.
welfare. Trade negotiations have mainly concentrated on multilateral tariff reductions
and in giving preferential treatment to developing countries, and hence helping them
4
7The results indicate that when factors of production are internationally
immobile, USA, EU and ODC do not export domestic taxes to developing regions.
»
However, the results suggest some degree of tax exporting from Japan JAP to the 
other regions, although the effects on both welfare and terms of trade are small. 
When capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, USA, JAP, EU, and ODC 
export capital taxes to developing regions. JAP exports labour and income taxes to 
developing regions, although the effects on welfare and terms of trade are small. 
Regardless of the assumptions on international capital mobility, the effects of import 
tariffs on welfare and terms of trade are larger than those of domestic taxes are.
Chapter 4 computes the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of 
global restrictions on labour mobility. This issue has been previously analysed by 
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) within a partial equilibrium framework. They assume 
that the world-wide labour supply is fixed, that full employment occurs in a world 
economy consisting of seven regions, and that differences in labour’s marginal 
product across regions arise from barriers to inward mobility of labour in high wage 
countries.
I use a multiregional CGE model for the world economy (the regional 
classification is the same as in the previous chapter). A distinctive feature of the 
analysis is the introduction of a segmented labour market, as two types of labour are 
considered: skilled and unskilled. The segmentation of the labour market jointly with 
the general equilibrium framework allow us to examine the distributional effects of 
migration between skilled and unskilled labour in each region, and between these two 
and capital.
The results indicate that when labour is a homogeneous factor, the 
elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility generates world-wide efficiency
8gains that could be of considerable magnitude. When the labour market is segmented 
and both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, welfare gains reduce since the benefits 
and losses of migration are not evenly distributed within each region. And, when only 
skilled labour migrates, the world-wide efficiency gains are smaller, since this type of 
labour represents a small fraction of the labour force in developing regions.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a summary of the main conclusions of the thesis.
I
9CHAPTER 2
D e c e n t r a l is e d  P r o v isio n  o f  Q u a s i-p r iv a t e  G o o d s : 
T h e  C a s e  o f  C o l o m b ia
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate to what extent will the Colombian 
population be better off when goods such as health and education, are delivered 
locally as against centrally. Health and education are quasi-private goods', that is 
goods that have the characteristics of private goods, such as excludability and 
positive marginal costs of supply to an additional consumer, but are publicly 
provided. In this case, public intervention could be justified on the grounds of market 
failure, merit wants, externalities, or distributional arguments (Hare, 1988).
Toward this end, I build a multiregional computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for Colombia in order to compare two provision scenarios: one in 
which the provision of the quasi-private goods is carried out centrally, against one in 
which provision is carried out regionally. The literature on the provision of private 
goods by the public sector is mainly normative, since it focuses on the characteristics 
of possible provision rules. In this modelling exercise, a provision rule based on the 
median voter is considered. In this framework, the median voter (either national or 
regional) determines the quantity of the publicly provided private good to be 
allocated to each consumer. 1
1 The term quasi-private was taken from Boadway et al (1994).
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During the last two decades the assignment of tax and spending powers 
between different levels of government has been receiving increasing attention from 
economists and policymakers alike. The main economic argument in favour of 
decentralisation is that it enhances economic efficiency, since regional governments 
tend to be better informed about local preferences than national governments.2
Many developing countries, including the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe, are turning to decentralisation as a way to escape from inefficient central 
governments, macroeconomic instability and inadequate economic growth (Bird, 
1993). Decentralisation can also be justified on political grounds, especially if a 
country’s population is not homogeneous in terms of ethnic, racial, cultural, 
linguistic, or other relevant characteristics are regionally distributed. In Canada, for 
example, the move towards greater decentralisation has been mainly the result of 
political considerations, as some provinces are demanding more independence. In 
China, greater decentralisation has been driven by the need to regain some control 
over national public revenue. And in Ethiopia, ethnic diversity together with the 
belief that decentralisation would help hold national unity have been behind the 
decentralisation effort (Tanzi, 1995).
In Colombia the centralist organisation of the government has been evident 
since the Political Constitution of 1886. Political, administrative and fiscal powers as 
well as the provision of public services were concentrated in the central government, 
leading to a growing dissatisfaction among the regions because of the lack of 
autonomy and deficiencies in the provision of public services. In the early eighties, a 
Commission on Intergovernmental Finances (Departamento Nacional de Planeación,
I
1 See Boadway et al (1994) for a presentation of the pros and cons of decentralisation. For recent 
theoretical models of the costs and benefits of decentralisation see Lockwood (1998a, 1998b), and the 
references therein.
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1981) recommended an increase in the use of local resources for local purposes, 
which in turn resulted in a new legislative framework for decentralising functions and 
finances. The Political Constitution of 1991 introduced some modifications to the 
prevailing territorial order of the country and redefined the functions of territorial 
entities, establishing new parameters to assign and determine transfers from the 
central government to lower levels of government. In 1993, each level of government 
was assigned functions in areas such as health, education,’ housing, drinking water 
and other public services.3
Contemporaneously with the decentralisation effort, poverty reduction 
became an important issue in Colombia. Poverty alleviation programs have been 
typically planned, executed and controlled by the central government. They are 
conceived as a multi-sectoral effort touching health, education, water, sanitation, 
utilities, family welfare, rural development and housing (World Bank, 1994). Given 
the observed decline in rural incomes and the prevailing level of violence in the 
country, the new strategy to improve the standard of living of the population was 
primarily based on the provision of essential social services (such as health, 
education, housing and drinking water), and the generation of employment 
opportunities by shifting public expenditures towards social sectors. Decentralisation 
and poverty reduction were then brought closer together with the introduction of the 
Law on local government functions and financing in 1993, which gave regional 1
1 At the same time, a major change regarding the way transfers were allocated was introduced. Under 
the new regulations central government transfers were no longer allocated according to the population 
of each territorial entity, but based on unsatisfied basic needs, fiscal effort, administrative efficiency 
and, in some cases, in proportion to the potential population to be covered by health and education 
services. Also, the new regulations unified the source of the transfers so that they are now a growing 
percentage of the nation's current income.
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governments the responsibility of delivering social programmes and services to the 
poor.4
The main contribution of this chapter relies on the fact that neither 
multiregional CGE models nor a scheme for public provision of private goods based 
on the median voter, have been previously applied to quantify the magnitude of the 
efficiency gains associated with decentralisation. This chapter develops an 
equilibrium structure in which the quantities of the quasi-private goods to be 
provided by the government, together with the taxes levied to finance their provision 
are endogenously determined. In addition, the provision of the quasi-private goods 
affects the production structure of the economy, since in some regions more (less) of 
the good is produced, so that factors of production reallocate both within and 
between regions. Hence, the multiregional CGE modelling approach constitutes an 
appropriate tool for this analysis, since it allows us to model the interrelationships 
between different regions.
According to the results which follow, the Colombian population as a whole 
is likely to be better off when the provision of health and education is carried out 
regionally as opposed to centrally, since with regional provision each consumer 
group is allocated an amount of the goods that is closer to its preferences. More 
importantly, these welfare gains vary between 1.3% and 2.3% of GDP 
approximately, a substantial magnitude especially when compared with the efficiency 
gains associated to the tax reforms of the early nineties.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review regarding the public provision of quasi-private goods, and the provision rule 
l
4 See Garay (1994) and Fainboim et al (1994) for a description of the decentralisation process in 
Colombia.
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used in the chapter. Section 3 presents the structure of the multiregional CGE model. 
Section 4 presents the quantification of the efficiency gains from decentralised 
provision of health and education in Colombia. Section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks.
2.2 Public provision of quasi-private goods: A brief literature review
The literature concerning the provision of private goods by the public sector is scant. 
Since Arrows’(1971) public expenditure model, this literature has mainly 
concentrated on the characteristics of possible allocation rules, that is how a private 
good “should be” publicly provided (Blomquist and Christensen, 1994; Hare, 1988; 
Munro, 1991). This literature has also analysed issues such as the introduction of user 
charges (Besley, 1991; Balestrino, 1995), and the possibility of private market 
supplementation of the publicly provided private good (Epple and Romano, 1996; 
Blomquist and Christiansen, 1998).
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, Lecture 16) develop three models of public 
provision of private goods, where government intervention is justified on 
distributional grounds. In particular, they consider private goods that are freely 
provided to all consumers in a specified quantity, and cannot be traded by the 
individuals. These three models produce an optimal allocation which coincides with 
that obtained under free market conditions: that is, in the absence of government 
intervention, the level of provision of private goods for each individual is determined 
by the market, at the point where the marginal rate of substitution over consumption
goods equals the marginal rate of transformation between these goods.
I
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Besley and Coate (1991) develop a two-good general equilibrium model 
which shows that universal public provision5 of private goods, such as health,
A
housing and education, can redistribute income from the rich to the poor, even if the 
provision is financed through a head tax. Besley and Coate’s model is a discrete 
choice model where individuals demand at most one unit of the good, and their 
decision as to whether to consume the good in the public or private sectors is based 
on quality considerations. These authors assume that the government provides a fixed 
quality level of the good (at zero price), which is typically not too high, and that the 
public provision is financed through a head tax. Under these circumstances, 
individuals with higher incomes may decide to pay for the good supplied by the 
private sector which offers a better quality level, rather than consuming the good 
provided by the government. The benefits from public provision will be mainly 
enjoyed by individuals with lower incomes. Nonetheless, the authors also find that 
universal provision schemes of private goods involve a dead-weight loss for the 
society as a whole. Besley and Coate’s provision rule does not state how the fixed 
quality level and the head tax are determined.
The literature surveyed tells us the general features of possible provision rules 
in a normative sense. In practice, however, the government has to rely on surveys or 
other sources of information to infer the preferences of the population. The provision 
rule could be the result of a voting process. Since all consumers can benefit from the 
provision of the goods and services, the evident rule would be unanimous consent; 
however, it will take a long time to achieve unanimous consent and it encourages 
strategic behaviour (Mueller, 1989). In democratic societies, the majority rule is 
commonly chosen to make collective decisions. This rule introduces some
5 Universal provision means that everybody is eligible and provision is free.
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redistribution, since some individuals are going to be worse off than they would be if
the other outcome had been chosen. The possibility of distributional gains also 
*
creates an incentive to form coalitions. Under the majority rule an equilibrium 
outcome is obtained when voter preferences are single-peaked. If these preferences 
can be depicted along a single dimension, as with an expenditure issue, the 
equilibrium lies at the peak-preference for the median voter (Mueller, 1989). It then 
follows that the median voter rule can be an alternative provision rule, where the 
demand for the good being provided by the government is determined by the median 
voter income. In order to apply the model empirically it is necessary to assume that 
the quantity of the good being provided is that demanded by the consumer with the 
median income (see Inman, 1978).
In the modelling approach used in this chapter, the quantity of the quasi­
private good provided by the government is determined by the median voter 
provision rule. As Oates (1993) puts it, in the median voter framework the 
equilibrium level of local services is faithfully mirrored by the median of the 
preferred levels of outputs of local residents. That is, under decentralised provision, 
each regional government will determine the provision level of the quasi-private 
good according to the corresponding demand of the median voter. As one would 
expect, some individuals will be consuming more (or less) than they would have 
done being the good privately supplied. The public provision of the quasi-private 
good is financed by taxes, which results in transfers from consumers with high 
incomes to consumers with low incomes. Finally, the provision rule and the tax 
regime used to finance the provision of the good must be considered jointly, because 
of the distributional effects they have on the population.
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In what follows, I describe the structure of the multiregional CGE model used 
to assess the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by 
the government.
2.3 Structure of the multiregional CGE model
I use a CGE model to capture the welfare gains associated with the regional public 
provision of quasi-private goods, as compared to central provision. In this model the 
national economy is disaggregated into regions, since I am interested in the 
distributional effects among them. In addition, more than one consumer group is 
considered, since there are also distributional effects among consumers.
The model is for a closed economy consisting of R regions, each one with 
demand and production structures. Each region produces two types of goods: those 
that are provided by the public sector, and are thus referred to as the publicly 
provided quasi-private goods (henceforth PPQP); and those that are allocated by the 
market according to supply and demand conditions, and are thus referred to as the 
private goods (henceforth PRI). In the model, the PPQP goods are considered to be 
non-tradable across regions, whereas the PRI goods are considered to be qualitatively 
the same as those PRI goods produced by other regions. There are two factors of 
production, namely labour and capital; for simplicity, intermediate production is not 
considered. Each region has three groups of consumers and its own local 
government. There is also a national government.
2.3.1 Production side of the model
i
A standard production structure is used, where each region produces two PPQP 
goods and three PRI goods. Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
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functions describe the substitutability between labour (L) and capital (K) in the
production of value added for each PRI good in each region, that is,
where VApR1 corresponds to value added of the PRI goods in region r; is a
constant defining units of measurement; 8[ is a share parameter; LrPR1 denotes labour 
inputs in the production of the PRI goods; KpRli denotes capital inputs in the 
production of the PRI; and a \  is the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital in the production of the PRI goods in region r. Each industry in each region 
selects an optimal level of inputs that minimises the cost of producing the goods. 
Regarding the PPQP goods, their production involves only labour. The formal 
equations and notation used in the model are presented in Appendix 2.1.
Factors of production are non-produced commodities in fixed supply in each 
region. It is assumed that both factors are mobile across industries within each 
region. Regarding interregional factor mobility, labour is assumed to be inter- 
regionally immobile since the analysis focuses on the interregional distributional 
effects of policy changes. The analysis excludes all the efficiency issues associated 
with regional labour movements. Capital is assumed to be inter-regionally mobile.
2.3.2 Demand side of the model
Each region has three groups of consumers. These can be thought of as low, medium, 
and high-income groups, since I am interested in the distributional effects of the 
decentralised provision of the PPQP goods within each region. Consumers differ in
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As mentioned earlier, in this modelling exercise the quantity of the PPQP 
goods to be publicly provided (either nationally or regionally) is determined by the 
median voter. Thus, the median voter (in the country or in each region, depending on 
which provision scenario is being considered) determines its optimal consumption 
bundle by maximising his utility function subject to his budget constraint. In 
particular, the median voter’s behaviour is summarised by means of a CES utility 
function defined over PRI and PPQP goods, more formally,
their preferences for both PPQP and PRI goods, and this is the key element to obtain
gains from decentralisation.
U'm -
Mu-»'Mm
[2]
where UrM is the utility function of the median voter, a rMi and a'M j are share
parameters, , is the demand of the median voter for the PRI good i, Q'M ( is the 
demand of the median voter for the PPQP good j, and is the elasticity of 
substitution in consumption between PRI and PPQP goods.
The median voter’s budget constraint is in turn given by income equal 
expenditure (rM= E ^ ) .  Consumer’s income is derived from factor ownership, 
whereas consumer’s expenditure includes the amount spent on both PRI and PPQP 
goods as well as the taxes paid to finance the provision of the PPQP goods.
n  = X  PpR., K j + X  p ;pqp,Qm + t ;  [3]
I i
where the price paid by consumers for the PPQP goods ( Pppgp ) corresponds to a
fraction (<t>r) of the real cost of the good ( Pppgp ). All consumers pay the same
l
percentage, this means that all consumers in each region pay the same price. T„
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denotes taxes paid by the median voter, which correspond to either T„ = I^ t or 
Tm = IrMtr , depending on whether the provision is financed by national or regional 
taxes, respectively; in either case the tax rates t and tr are endogenously determined. 
The median voter will take into account the cost to him of the provision as well as 
the taxes levied to finance such provision. Hence, both the quantity demanded of the 
PPQP goods and the tax rate(s) will be determined simultaneously.
The government takes the optimal quantities of the PPQP goods that result 
from the utility maximisation problem of the median voter to allocate to the other 
consumers. Other consumer groups (in the country or in the region) will in turn 
determine their optimal consumption bundle by maximising their utility functions 
subject to i) their budget constraints and ii) the exogenously determined quantities of 
the publicly provided quasi-private goods. The complete set of equations and 
notation that defines the demand side of the model is presented in Appendix 2.1.
2.3.3 National and regional governments
Regarding the public sector, it is assumed that neither the central government nor the 
regional governments are optimising agents. The government, either national or 
local, provides the PPQP goods at a provision price ( PppgP|), which could be zero. 
This provision price is a percentage (<|>r) of the cost covering price ( P ^p  ), which
implies that the government in charge of the provision, has to cover the difference 
between these prices. In order to do this, a uniform income tax (either national or
regional) is introduced, which is endogenously determined and must be such that the
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zero government surplus condition is satisfied (that is income equals expenditure, 
Ic=Eg). In addition, a third financing alternative is considered which involves a
combination of national and regional taxes: the former is exogenously determined at
a level of 0.05% whereas the latter are endogenously determined. In this case, the
revenues generated by the national tax are transferred to regional governments.
Central government income is given by the revenues generated by the 
provision of the PPQP goods and tax revenues. On the other hand, government 
expenditure is given by the cost of provision of the PPQP goods and transfers to 
regional governments (TRr). Since government income- must equal government 
expenditure, the national tax rate can be calculated as:
If the provision of the PPQP goods is financed by regional taxes, the regional 
tax rate can be determined by equalising government income (i.e. the revenues 
generated by the provision of the PPQP goods, tax revenues and central government 
transfers) and expenditure (i.e. the cost of provision of the PPQP goods) in each 
region (see Appendix 2.1), that is:
h.r.j [4]
h .r
X (P lLh+Pkk L)
[5]
h
2.3.4 Equilibrium conditions in the model
Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. A 
general equilibrium in the model can be interpreted in the usual Walrasian sense as a 
set of prices for which all markets clear.
2 1
In equilibrium, demand-supply equalities hold in each goods and factors 
markets. In the goods market, gross output must equal final demand because 
intermediate production is netted out; specifically, the supply of the PRI goods must 
equal demand. In the case of the PPQP goods, the market clearing condition also 
indicates that supply must equal demand in each region.
Factors of production are assumed to be intersectorally mobile within each 
region; this means that there is only one price for each factor in each region as the 
model does not have sector specific factors of production. In addition, labour is 
assumed to be inter-regionally immobile, which means that there is a different price 
for labour in each region. Under this assumption, there are separate labour 
equilibrium conditions in each region. That is, the region’s endowment of labour 
must equal factor use across industries (i.e. there is full employment in both regions). 
Capital is assumed to be inter-regionally mobile. This assumption implies that there 
is only one price for capital in the model, and this is determined by the market 
clearing condition that capital use across all industries and regions must equal the 
country’s endowment of capital.
Zero profit conditions hold for each industry, in each region. These conditions 
state that in each region the value of sales must equal the industries’ costs. And, 
budget balance conditions must be satisfied for the central government and regional 
governments alike, and also for consumers in each region. Appendix 2.1 presents the 
full set of equilibrium conditions of the model.
Having described the equilibrium conditions that characterise the model, I 
proceed to introduce the benchmark data set to be used in the simulations. In 
addition, the parameters of the model, that are consistent with the data set, have to be
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calculated and these together with the elasticities (that are exogenously specified), 
allow us to reproduce the data set as an equilibrium solution of the model.
In the next section, the model described above is used to assess the welfare 
effects of the decentralised provision of PPQP goods in Colombia. I am particularly 
interested in quantifying to what extent will the Colombian population be better off 
under a provision scheme in which goods and services are delivered by regional 
governments, in comparison to a provision scheme in which goods and services are 
supplied by the central government.
2.4 Quantifying the welfare effects of decentralisation in Colombia
Colombia has like many other countries engaged in a rather ambitious process of 
state decentralisation.6 This process has followed the reforms carried out between 
1988 and 1992 by the Colombian government in order to modernise the economy, 
which included areas such as foreign trade, foreign exchange regime, fiscal 
legislation, the financial sector and the labour market.7
Using data for 1992, in this section a multiregional CGE model for the 
Colombian economy is built in order to quantify the welfare effects of the 
decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by the government. I will be dealing 
with a simplified version of the Colombian economy, in the sense that aspects such 
as foreign trade are not considered.
I
6 In the country there have been two national commissions to study decentralisation: Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación (1981) and Wiesner (1992).
7 See Urrutia( 1994) for a presentation of these reforms.
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2.4.1 Benchmark data set, calibration and elasticities
Colombia comprises 33 provinces (or administrative regions). The complexities of a 
model with 33 regions are of secondary relevance to the problem being studied, so 
that these provinces were grouped according to the geographical classification of the 
country. Colombia is divided in five so-called “natural” or geographic regions: 
Pacific, Atlantic, Andean, Amazonia, and Orinoquia. Due to data constraints, 
Amazonia and Orinoquia are considered as one region. Hence, there are four regions 
of different size. The Andean region accounts for 63% of the country’s GDP, the 
Pacific and Atlantic regions each accounts for 15% of GDP, and the Amazonia and 
Orinoquia (henceforth A&O) region accounts for the remaining 7% of GDP.
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the regional classification, the 
country was also divided into three regions according to the GDP of each province. 
Administrative regions with the lowest GDP were grouped in region one, those with 
medium GDP were grouped in region two, and those with the highest GDP are in 
region three. In addition to the geographic and GDP classifications, provinces were 
classified in five regions according to agricultural GDP, with the provinces with the 
lowest agricultural GDP grouped in region one, and those with the highest in region 
five. Appendix 2.2 presents the regional classifications of the country according to 
the different criteria.
Turning to the commodities in the model, each region is assumed to produce 
three PRI goods and two PPQP goods. The former includes primary commodities 
(including fuels), manufactured goods, and services, whereas the latter corresponds 
to health and education. It is assumed that each region’s PRI goods are qualitatively 
the same. It should be mentioned that in Colombia the majority of education and 
health services are provided by the private sector. However, from the available data it
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is only possible to determine the value of the education and health services provided 
by the government (i.e. 0.4% and 2.3% of GDP, respectively), but not by the private
sector. For this reason, the existence of pure private provision of education and health 
is not considered in the analysis.
The benchmark data set involves data on value added by component by 
industry, and domestic consumption. It was constructed using data from Regional 
Accounts, as compiled by DANE (1995b), and following the methodology presented 
by St-Hilaire and Whalley (1987). In this methodology, each region is treated as a 
separate economy, in which production and demand transactions by commodity at the 
regional level are presented. The data set also includes transactions between regions 
(e.g. commodity trade), payments of taxes by region as well as government 
expenditure. The equilibrium conditions that characterise the model are present in the 
data set, that is the value of final demands for each good in each region must equal 
the value of net supply (i.e., excluding intermediate supply), each consumer group 
satisfies its budget constraint, and budget balance conditions must be satisfied for the 
central government and regional governments alike. A detailed presentation of the 
sources and how the data set was assembled is presented in Appendix 2.2.
Table 2.1 presents the resulting Colombian regional data set using the 
geographic classification (the other two data sets are presented in Appendix 2.2). The 
table presents production and demands by commodity along with consumers and 
govemment(s) income and expenditure accounts. On the production side, labour and 
capital are used to produce the PRI goods in each region; as to the PPQP goods, 
labour is the only factor that enters in their production.
i
/
Table 2.1: Colombian regional data set 
Regional classification according to geographic regions 
(Col$ billion)
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Production side: Primary inputs
Pacific region 
Labour Capital
Value
Added
Atlantic region
Value
Labour Capital Added
Andean region
Value
Labour Capital Added
A&O region 
Labour Capital
Value
Added
Total
Value
Added
Primary goods 389.7 587.0 976.6 507.5 1,029.9 1537.4 1.252.2 2.289.6 3.541.8 288.8 971.0 1.259.8 7.315.6
Manufactures 398.4 451.2 849.5 318.5 360.7 679.2 1.588.9 1,799.5 3.388.4 20.2 22.9 43.1 4.960.3
Services 1.169.7 1,426.1 2.595.8 1,013.8 1.242.8 2,256.6 5.314.3 6.204.4 11.518.7 343.5 411.3 754.8 17.125.9
Education 
Pacific region 17.3 0.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3
Atlantic region 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2
Andean region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.9 0.0 88.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.9
A&O region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 5.4 5.4
Health
Pacific region 102.4 0.0 102.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 102.4
Atlantic region 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.9 0.0 89.9 0.0 0.0 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.9
Andean region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 527.1 0.0 527.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 527.1
A&O region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.7 0.0 31.7 31.7
Total 2,077.3 2,464.2 4.541.6 1.944.8 2.633.4 4.578.2 8,771.5 10.293.5 19,065.0 689.7 1.405.2 2.094.8 30.279.6
Demand side: Final demands
Pacific region 
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
Atlantic region
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
Andean region
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
A&O region 
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Primary goods 234.0 419.9 322.7 368.4 661.0 507.9 848.8 1.522.9 1.170.1 302.7 555.3 401.9 7.315.6
Manufactures 200.8 339.5 309.3 160.6 271.4 247.3 801.0 1.354.0 1.233.5 9.5 18.4 15.2 4,960.3
Services
Education
345.5 911.4 1.338.9 300.3 792.3 1,163.9 1.533.0 4,044.4 5.941.3 101.7 253.4 399.7 17.125.9
Pacific region 2.3 5.7 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3
Atlantic region 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 5.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2
Andean region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 29.6 47.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.9
A&O region 
Health
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.7 5.4
Pacific region 13.9 34.0 54.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 102.4
Atlantic region 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 29.9 47.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.9
Andean region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 71.6 175.3 280.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 527.1
A&O region 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.6 16.1 31.7
Total 796.6 1.710.6 2.034.4 843.6 1.759.7 1.975.0 3.266.4 7.126.1 8.672.4 419.7 839.5 835.6 30.279.6
Consumers income and expenditure accounts
Pacific region 
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
Atlantic region
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
Andean region
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3
A&O region
Cons. 1 Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Income: 
Labour income 
Capital income
364.4
432.2
782.4
928.2
930.6
1.103.9
358.3
485.2
747.5
1.012.2
839.0
.136.0
1.502.8
1.763.6
3.278.6
3.847.5
3.990.1
4,682.4
138.2
281.5
276.4
563.1
275.1
560.5
13.483.3
16.796.3
Total income 796.6 1.710.6 2.034.4 843.6 1.759.7 .975.0 3.266.4 7,126.1 8.672.4 419.7 839.5 835.6 30.279.6
Expenditure: 
Final demand 
Taxes
796.6
0.0
1.710.6
0.0
2.034 4 
0 0
843.6
0.0
1.759.7
0.0
.975.0
0.0
3.266.4
0.0
7.126.1
0.0
8.672.4
0.0
419.7
0.0
839.5
0.0
835.6
0.0
30.279.6
0 0
Total expenditure 796.6 1.710.6 2.034.4 843.6 1.759.7 .975.0 3.266.4 7.126.1 8.672.4 419.7 839.5 835.6 30.279.6
Government income and expenditure accounts
Income:
Provision Education 126.7
Provision Health 751.1
Tax collections 0.0
Total income 877.8
Expenditure:
Cost provision Educ: 126.7
Cost provision Healt 751.1
Total expenditure 877.8
Source: DANE (1995b) and author's calculations.
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On the demand side, consumers demand both types of goods, and it is initially 
assumed that consumers pay the full cost of the goods provided by the government. 
The consumers income and expenditure accounts show that income generates from 
factor ownership, that is consumers own both factors of production, while 
expenditure corresponds to final demand. Lastly, government income is given by the 
revenues generated by the provision of the PPQP goods and tax collections (although 
initially it is assumed that there are no taxes); government expenditure is in turn 
given by the cost of provision of the PPQP goods.
At this point, it is important to mention that in the data set, derived from 
Colombian 1992 data, the PPQP goods are provided according to the preferences of 
each consumer group, with each one of them demanding different quantities of the 
goods. This seems inconsistent with the fact that the observed data is based on a 
period in which the PPQP goods were delivered by the central government. It would 
be ideal to allow the benchmark data set to represent the scenario in which the PPQP 
are delivered by the central government. However, there are problems with this 
approximation, since there is not information available to explain the differences 
between the levels of provision between consumer groups and between regions. The 
benchmark data set in Table 2.1 is therefore used as a starting point to calculate the 
quantities of the PPQP goods provided by central and regional governments.
Once the data set has been assembled, some parameter values, such as share 
parameters and scale parameters, can be directly calculated from the equilibrium 
conditions of the model, following the procedure described in Mansur and Whalley 
(1984). This procedure is known as calibration, and can be understood as the ability 
of the model to reproduce base year data as a model solution. The benchmark data set 
provides information on equilibrium transactions in value terms. The first step of the
27
calibration procedure involves the separation of these transactions into price and
quantity observations. In order to do this, a units convention is widely used, in which 
»
it is assumed that a physical unit of each good and factor is the amount that sells for 
one currency unit (in this case, one Colombian peso). That is, both goods and factors 
have a price of unity in the benchmark equilibrium.
The next step in the calibration procedure is to calculate parameters for 
production functions from the benchmark equilibrium, observations, given the 
required values of pre-specified elasticities. As CES functional forms are used, 
substitution elasticities must be exogenously determined. On the demand side, the 
model involves elasticities of substitution in consumption between PRI and PPQP 
goods. In this case, it was not possible to find econometric estimates, then this 
elasticity was set equal to one in all regions; these elasticities imply Cobb-Douglas 
demand functions. Regarding the supply side, the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital is the key parameter of the value-added functions of the PRI goods 
(see Table 2.2). These elasticities were calculated as weighted averages of the 
elasticities presented in Whalley (1985, p. 100). This elasticity is not required in the 
production of the PPQP goods, since their production only involves labour.
Table 2.2: Elasticities used in the model
Elasticity of factor substitution in the production of the 
PRI goods ( o '  )
Primary
commodities
Manufactured
goods
Services
Pacific 0.70 0.81 1.00
Atlantic 0.80 0.81 1.00
Andean 0.72 0.81 1.00
A&O 0.76 0.81 1.00
l
Notes:
Elasticities of substitution based on those reported in Whalley (1985; p.100).
28
The results of the model are dependent on the values selected for the 
elasticities of substitution. In addition, consumption effects, which also depend on 
the elasticities chosen, determine the welfare effects of any policy change. Sensitivity 
analysis is performed around the values chosen.
Once these parameters have been specified, share parameters can be obtained 
from demand functions. On the supply side, share and scale parameters can be 
obtained from cost functions. The model was solved using a routine I wrote in the 
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software.
2.4.2 Model results
In this section, counterfactual experiments are performed in order to analyse the 
welfare effects of the decentralised provision of PPQP goods, as measured by the 
equivalent variation (EV). In the applied general equilibrium literature, welfare 
measures focus on comparisons between equilibria. The EV is the minimum amount 
that someone who gains from a particular change would be willing to accept to 
forego the change. In the case of an individual who loses from the change, the EV is 
the maximum he would be willing to pay to prevent that change. The measure of EV 
can be written as:
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where 1° denotes the initial disposable income.
In the analysis that follows, two provision scenarios are compared: national 
versus regional. In other words, I move from the scenario in which the provision is 
carried out by the central government to that in which PPQP goods are delivered by 
regional governments.
In the national provision scenario, uniform quantities of the PPQP goods are 
provided to all consumer groups across the country. These quantities correspond to 
the optimal demands derived from the utility maximisation problem of the median 
voter of the country. In the regional provision scenario, uniform quantities of the 
PPQP goods are provided to all consumers in each region, and these quantities 
correspond to the optimal demands obtained from the utility maximisation problems 
of the median voters in each region. It is important to bear in mind that since 
secondary data are used, it is likely that the share parameters in the utility functions 
are not the best. Then, it is assumed that the information contained in the benchmark 
data set reflect consumers preferences.
Since it is assumed that consumers pay a fraction of the cost of the PPQP 
goods, the government finances the remaining part for which three financing 
alternatives are considered: a) a national income tax; b) two regional income taxes; 
and c) a combination of a national tax and two regional taxes. Counterfactual 
experiments were carried out for the cases where the government finances 20%, 50%, 
70%, and 100% of the cost of provision of the goods, although for brevity I shall 
focus on the case where consumers pay 50% and the country is divided in four 
geographical regions. The new tax rate(s) is(are) endogenously determined and must 
be such that the zero government budget surplus condition is satisfied. Tax rates are
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Tax rates are expected to be larger as the percentage of the cost of provision 
of the PPQP goods paid by consumers gets smaller, because the government has to 
cover larger subsidies. In addition, the fact that consumers pay only a fraction of the 
cost of provision of the PPQP goods and that the government finances the remaining 
part, means that some consumer groups pay less than they should pay, whereas other 
groups pay more.
When uniform quantities of the PPQP goods are provided to all consumer 
groups across the country, consumers are allocated the optimal quantities demanded 
by consumer group two in the Atlantic region (the median voter of the country).8 
When the provision takes into account regional differences, uniform quantities of the 
PPQP goods are allocated to all consumers in each region corresponding to the 
optimal quantities demanded by the median voter of each region, in this case 
consumer group two (Appendix 2.3 presents the quantities allocated to each 
consumer group in both provision scenarios).
It is important to mention that when the provision, either national or regional, 
is financed by a national tax, the quantity demanded by the median voter increases as 
the percentage of the cost of provision paid by the consumer reduces, since the cost 
of the provision is covered by all consumers in the country. By contrast, when the 
provision is financed by regional taxes or a combination of regional and national 
taxes, the quantity demanded by the median voter reduces as the percentage of the
I
8 In strict sense, the median quantity would correspond to the average of the resulting quantities of the 
utility maximisation problem of consumer groups two in the Atlantic and Pacific regions because there 
is an even number of consumers in the country. To simplify the solution of the model, it was decided 
to consider only the results of consumer group two in the Atlantic region.
calculated using equation [4] when provision is financed by a national tax, or [5]
when using regional taxation.
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cost of provision paid by the consumer increases, since the cost of the provision is 
now covered only by the consumers in the region.
Table 2.3 presents the tax rates obtained under the three financing 
alternatives, along with the subsidies received by consumers when they pay 50% of 
the cost of provision (Appendix 2.4 reports the results when consumers pay 80%, 
30%, and 0% of the cost of provision). This table shows that when provision is 
carried out nationally, consumers in the Andean region are subsidising the provision 
of health and education for the rest of the country (i.e. there is redistribution among 
regions). The Andean region is the most densely populated region (around 60% of 
the population lives there) and is also the most industrialised one. If, on the other 
hand, provision follows regional preferences, consumer groups two and three in the 
Andean and A&O regions contribute to finance not only the provision of consumer 
group one in their respective region, but also the provision of the poorest consumer 
group in the Pacific and Atlantic regions. In this case there is redistribution within 
regions and among them.
/
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Table 2.3: Tax rates and subsidies when consumers pay 50% of the cost of provision
(Col $ billions)
Provision financed by:
National tax Regional
taxes
Regional 
taxes ànd 
national tax 
of 0.05%
1. Tax rates
National provision
Pacific 0.8% 1.1%' 1.0%
Atlantic 0.8% 1.1% 1.0%
Andean 0.8% 0.3% 0.2%
A&O 0.8% 2.3% 2.1%
Regional provision
Pacific 1.9% 1.2% 1.1%
Atlantic 1.9% 1.1% 1.0%
Andean 1.9% 1.5% 1.5%
A&O
2. Subsidies 
National provision
1.9% 0.8% 0.6%
Pacific
Consumer 1 14.3 7.7 7.9
Consumer 2 7.2 -2.1 -1.5
Consumer 3 4.6 -5.6 -4.9
Atlantic
Consumer 1 12.8 7.3 7.5
Consumer 2 5.8 -2.5 -1.9
Consumer 3 4.2 -4.8 -4.1
Andean
Consumer 1 -5.0 7.9 6.9
Consumer 2 -35.4 -2.0 -4.1
Consumer 3 -47.4 -5.9 -8.5
A&O
Consumer 1 15.1 6.5 7.0
Consumer 2 11.9 -3.3 -2.2
Consumer 3 11.9 -3.2 -2.1
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Table 2.3 (Continued): Tax rates and subsidies when consumers pay 50% of the
cost of provision 
(Col $ billions) *
________ Provision financed
National tax Regional 
taxes
____ __
Regional 
taxes and 
national tax 
of 0.05%
Regional provision
Pacific
Consumer 1 18.4 8.8 9.1
Consumer 2 0.8 -2.4 -1.9
Consumer 3 -5.5 -6.4 -5.7
Atlantic
Consumer 1 13.2 7.3 7.5
Consumer 2 -4.4 -2.5 -1.9
Consumer 3 -8.5 -4.8 -4.1
Andean
Consumer 1 56.9 46.9 45.9
Consumer 2 -17.4 -11.7 -13.9
Consumer 3 -47.1 -35.2 -37.8
A&O
Consumer 1 3.2 2.2 2.8
Consumer 2 -4.8 -1.1 -0.0
Consumer 3 -4.8 -1.1 -0.0
Note:
The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP goods, 
minus the value paid by the consumer and the income tax.
When the provision is financed by regional taxes and carried out centrally, 
taxes are higher in the Pacific, Atlantic, and A&O regions than in the Andean region 
because the cost of provision represents a higher proportion of these region’s income. 
When the provision is carried out regionally, tax rates are lower in all regions 
(compared to regional provision financed by a national tax) because smaller 
quantities of the PPQP goods, more in line with consumers’ preferences, need to be
financed.
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Regarding subsidies, consumer groups two and three in each region subsidise 
consumer group one in both provision scenarios. In this case there is redistribution 
within the regions. As the percentage paid by consumers for the provision of the good 
falls, subsidies increase since higher taxes are required to balance the budget of the 
government. For example, when consumers pay 50% of the cost of provision, and the 
provision is carried out by the central government, consumer group one in the Pacific 
region receives Col$7.7 billion (see Table 2.3); when consumers pay 30% and 0%, 
the subsidy increases to Col$10.5 billion and Col$14.3 billion, respectively (see 
Appendix 2.4).
When the government finances the provision of the PPQP good with a 0.05% 
national tax and regional taxes, tax rates are lower than when only regional taxes are 
used, because the revenues generated by the national tax are transferred back to 
regional governments. It was assumed that 25% of the tax revenues raised by the 
national tax were transferred to each regional government. This percentage can be 
used as a policy instrument in order to redistribute income from the richest to the 
poorest regions. With the transfers the central government helps to cover part of the 
cost of provision of the PPQP goods, so that less regional taxes are needed. In the 
other Financing alternatives there are no transfers from the central to regional 
governments. In this financing alternative, under both provision scenarios the two 
richest consumer groups in the Andean region are not only subsidising consumer 
group one in that region but also helping to finance the provision of consumer group 
one in the other three regions. In this case there is redistribution from the richest
region to the poorest, and from the richest consumer group to the poorest consumer
i
groups.
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Now, let us consider the welfare effects of the decentralised provision of the 
PPQP goods. Both provision scenarios are compared (i.e., central versus regional) 
and the resulting efficiency gains (losses) are presented in Table 2.4 for each region 
and for the economy as a whole.9 As can be seen from the table, whether the 
provision is financed with a national tax, regional taxes, or a combination of a 0.05% 
national tax and four regional taxes, the society as a whole gains from decentralised 
provision(except when the provision is financed by a national tax and the goods are 
provided free of charge). This is the case since under regional provision the quantity 
of the PPQP good supplied to consumers is more in line with their preferences. In 
addition, the welfare gains vary from 1.3% to 2.3% of GDP.10 Notice that when the 
provision is financed with a national tax, the Andean region benefits the most from 
decentralisation, despite the fact that consumers in this region are subsidising the 
provision of consumers in other regions. As the percentage of the cost of provision 
reduces, the Andean region gains become losses since higher taxes are required. The 
Pacific region is worse off because of reduced aggregate consumption. The Atlantic 
and A&O regions are in some cases worse off; the decentralised provision of the 
PPQP goods increases considerably the quantity allocated to these two regions (when 
the percentage of the cost of provision paid by consumers is 30% and 0%), leading to 
a considerable reduction in the consumption of PRI goods; yet, the increased 
consumption of the PPQP goods is not enough to compensate the reduction in 
welfare due to the reduced consumption of the PRI goods.
9 Regional equivalent variations were calculated as the arithmetic sum of individual equivalent 
variations summed across consumer groups. The aggregate welfare change was calculated using an 
arithmetic sum of regional equivalent variations. Problems associated to this procedure are discussed 
in Boadway (1974) and Boadway and Bruce (1984).
10 Welfare gains are similar when 25% of the revenues raised by the national tax are transferred to the 
Pacific region, 25% to the Atlantic region, 10% to the Andean region, and 40% to the A&O region.
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Table 2.4: Welfare effects of decentralisation 
(Col$ billion)
Percentage of the cost of provision 'ftaid by consumers
80% 50% 30% 0%
EV %GDP EV %GDP EV %GDP EV %GDP
1. National tax
Pacific -33.5 -0.1% -50.6 -0.2% -61.9 -0.2% -292.0 -1.0%
Atlantic 78.9 0.3% 38.8 0.1% -2.5 -0.0% 317.7 1.0%
Andean 540.6 1.8% 529.0 1.7% 466.9 1.5% -884.6 -2.9%
A&O 49.1 0.2% 15.8 0.1% -12.5 -0.0% 135.1 0.4%
Total 635.1 2.1% 533.0 1.8% 390.0 1.3% -723.8 -2.4%
2. Regional taxes
Pacific 1.4 0.0% 2.1 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 3.3 0.0%
Atlantic 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
Andean 612.4 2.0% 633.9 2.1% 647.3 2.1% 666.3 2.2%
A&O 28.4 0.1% 24.9 0.1% 22.8 0.1% 19.9 0.1%
Total 642.2 2.1% 660.9 2.2% 672.7 2.2% 689.5 2.3%
3. Regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax
Pacific 1.5 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 3.3 0.0%
Atlantic 195.6 0.6% 199.3 0.7% 400.7 1.3% 593.0 2.0%
Andean 441.9 1.5% 444.9 1.5% 249.9 0.8% 87.3 0.3%
A&O 3.2 0.0% 14.5 0.0% 19.2 0.1% 5.6 0.0%
Total 642.2 2.1% 660.9 2.2% 672.4 2.2% 689.2 2.3%
Note: Totals may not add up because of rounding.
When the provision of education and health is financed with a national tax, 
welfare losses in the Pacific region increase as the percentage of the cost of provision 
paid by consumers reduces. Welfare gains in the A&O region become welfare losses 
as the percentage paid by consumers reduce; these losses are generated by a reduction 
in disposable income, because of higher taxes, since they are contributing to finance 
the poorest consumer in the Pacific and Atlantic regions. In the Andean region, 
welfare gains increase as the percentage paid by consumers increase; this is the result 
of increased aggregate consumption caused by the increase in disposable income 
resulting from lower taxes.
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It is interesting to notice that when the provision is financed with either 
regional taxes or a combination of national and regional taxes, all regions are better 
off as a result of the decentralised provision of health and education. Further, welfare 
gains are larger than when the provision is financed with a national tax alone.
Welfare gains of similar magnitude can be observed when the country is 
divided into three regions according to regional GDP, ranging from 1.4% to 2.3% of 
GDP. In addition, welfare losses of 1.2% of GDP are obtained when the provision is 
financed by a national tax and is free of charge (see Table 2.5). When the country is 
divided into five regions according to agricultural GDP, welfare gains vary between
0.5% and 1.4% of GDP. Welfare losses are also obtained (in this case they amount to 
4.7% of GDP) when the provision is financed by a national tax and consumers pay 
0% of the cost of provision (see Table 2.6). The magnitude of the welfare gains from 
decentralised provision is substantial, especially when compared to those resulting 
from the tax reforms carried out between 1990 and 1992, which have been estimated 
to account for only 0.2% of GDP (see Lora and Herrera, 1994). These results suggest 
that regional differences are very important, not only the number of regions, but also 
the preferences for the goods to be publicly provided. The more different the 
preferences among regions, the better chance for considerable welfare gains.
I
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Table 2.5: Welfare effects of decentralisation 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of the country’s GDP)
m Regional classification according to regional GDP »
(Col$ billion)
Percentage of the cost of provision paid by 
consumers:
80% 50% 30% 0%
I. National tax
Region 1 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Region 2 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% -0.1%
Region 3 1.3% 1.3% 1.1% -1.0%
Total 2.3% 1.8% 1.4% -1.2%
2. Regional taxes
Region 1 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Region 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Region 3 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%
Total 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
3. Regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax
Region 1 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Region 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Region 3 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9%
Total 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
I
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Table 2.6: Welfare effects of decentralisation 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of the country’s GDP) 
Regional classification according to agricultural GDP 
(Col$ billion) «
Percentage of the cost of provision paid by 
consumers:
80% 50% 30% 0%
1. National tax
Region 1 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% -0.4%
Region 2 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% -0.2%
Region 3 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.7%
Region 4 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% -0.7%
Region 5 0.4% 0.3% -0.1% -2.9%
Total 1.4% 1.1% 0.5% -4.7%
2. Regional taxes
Region 1 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%
Region 2 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
Region 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Region 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Region 5 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
Total 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
3. Reeional taxes and a 0.05% national tax
Region 1 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%
Region 2 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1%
Region 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.1 % 0.1%
Region 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Region 5 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
Total 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the same set of counterfactuals were 
carried out using data for a hypothetical economy that differs from the Colombian 
data set in four important respects. First, the hypothetical data set shows a more 
substantial income gap between the regions (the income of the richest consumer in 
region one is assumed to be a third of the income of the poorest consumer in region 
two). Second, output in the richest region accounts for 86% of total output whereas in
Colombia there is less concentration. Third, the relative importance of the PPQP
/
goods in total output is approximately one-third, compared to approximately 3% in 
the Colombian data set. And, preferences for the PPQP goods vary considerably
40
across regions. Using the artificial data set, the efficiency gains from decentralisation 
were much larger than those obtained with the Colombian data. For example, 
assuming that consumers pay 50% of the cost of provision, welfare gains reached 
approximately 8% of GDP when the provision was financed by a national tax, 14% 
of GDP when the provision was financed by two regional taxes, and 9% of GDP 
when the provision was financed by a combination of a national tax and two regional 
taxes.
2.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analyses were carried out on the elasticities used in the model in order to 
evaluate changes in the model’s response to a different set of values. The elasticities 
involved are: the elasticity of substitution in consumption between PRI and PPQP 
goods, and the elasticity of factor substitution in value added of the PRI goods.
First, let us consider the elasticity of substitution in consumption between PRI 
and PPQP goods (denoted (ij,). This elasticity is important because consumption 
effects, which depend on the elasticities chosen, determine the welfare effects of any 
policy change. Uniform values for these substitution elasticities of 0.5, 0.7, 1.2 and 
1.5 are used; the first two values are smaller that the one used in the model, whereas 
the other two values are larger. The results of the sensitivity analyses are summarised 
in Table 2.7. The main predictions of the model do not change, in the sense that 
independently of the financing alternative the decentralised provision of PPQP goods 
generates welfare gains, except when the provision is financed by a national tax and 
consumers pay 0% of the cost of provision of the goods. However, the magnitude of 
the welfare gains is sensitive to the value of the elasticity chosen; in particular, the 
larger the elasticity of substitution the smaller the welfare gains. When the provision
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is financed by a national tax and consumers pay 0% of the cost of provision, welfare 
gains reduce as (J.J, increases. This means that as the goods become more substitutes 
in consumption there is less room for welfare gains as a result of increased 
consumption of the goods.
Table 2.7: Sensitivity analysis
Welfare effects o f the decentralised provision of PPQP goods 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of GDP) 
Elasticity o f substitution in consumption (1^
Percentage paid by 
consumers (PP):
K  = 0.5 Uh = 0.7 r t - i - o Hh=l-2 K = l-5
1. National tax
PP=80% 10.2% 4.3% 2.1% 1.9% 1.1%
PP=50% 8.6% 3.6% 1.8% 1.7% 0.9%
PP=30% 7.2% 2.9% 1.3% 1.3% 0.6%
PP=0% 1.4% -1.5% -2.4% -2.4% -2.4%
2. Regional taxes
PP=80% 11.1% 4.5% 2.1% 1.5% 1.1%
PP=50% 11.7% 4.6% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1%
PP=30% 12.1% 4.8% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1%
PP=0% 12.6% 4.9% 2.3% 1.6% 1.1%
3. Regional taxes and national tax o f 0.05%
PP=80% 11.1% 4.5% 2.1% 1.5% 1.1%
PP=50% 11.7% 4.6% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1%
PP=30% 12.1% 4.8% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1%
PP=0% 12.6% 4.9% 2.3% 1.6% 1.1%
Let us now turn to the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in 
the production of the PR1 goods (denoted a[ ). The central case elasticities varied 
between 0.7 and 1.0 (see Table 2.2). There is no consensus as to the orders of 
magnitude involved; most time series estimates locate these elasticities around one
whereas cross section estimates are often around 0.5 (Whalley, 1985). I use uniform
i
values for these substitution elasticities in the range 0.5 to 1.5. The results o f  the 
model are robust to the value of the elasticities chosen with aggregate welfare gains
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accounting for approximately 2.3% of GDP, as in the central case specification when 
the provision is financed by either regional taxes or a combination of national and 
regional taxes. When the provision of the PPQP goods is financed by a national tax, 
as labour and capital become more substitutes in the production of the PRI goods, 
welfare gains reduce slightly; for example, when consumers pay 50% of the cost of 
provision welfare gains reduce from 1.9% to 1.7% of GDP (see Table 2.8).
Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis 
Welfare effects o f  the decentralised provision of PPQP goods 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of GDP) 
Elasticity of substitution in production of the PRI goods o '
Percentage paid by 
consumers (PP):
o '  =0.5 o ' =0.7 o[ =1.0 O '=1.2 O '=1.5
1. National tax
PP=80% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0%
PP=50% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
PP=30% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2%
PP=0% -2.7% -2.5% -2.3% -2.2% -2.1%
2. Regional taxes
PP=80% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
PP=50% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
PP=30% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
PP=0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
3. Reeional taxes and national tax o f  0.05%
PP=80% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
PP=50% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
PP=30% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
PP=0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%
2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented numerical results on the welfare effects of the 
decentralised provision of health and education using a multiregional CGE model for 
Colombia. Two provision scenarios were compared; one in which goods and services 
are supplied according to national preferences, as opposed to one where goods and
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services are delivered following regional preferences. When the provision is carried 
out nationally, consumers groups across the country are provided with uniform 
quantities of the goods, and these are determined by the median voter of the country. 
When the provision is carried out regionally, uniform quantities of the goods are 
provided for all consumer groups in each region, and these quantities are determined 
by the corresponding regional median voter. In the model, consumers pay a fraction 
of the cost of the PPQP goods, and the government finances the remaining part using 
a national income tax, regional income taxes, or a combination of the two.
The results show that the decentralised provision of education and health 
improves the welfare of the Colombian population as a whole (except in the case 
when the provision is free of charge). It is worth pointing out that not all regions 
benefit when the provision is financed by a national tax; the Andean and the A&O 
regions subsidise the provision of the Pacific and Atlantic regions. When the 
provision is financed by regional taxes or a combination of national and regional 
taxes, all regions benefit from decentralised provision.
The main conclusion that arises from this modelling exercise, is that the 
society as a whole is better off when the provision of health and education is carried 
out regionally as opposed to centrally: with regional provision, each consumer group 
is allocated amounts of the goods that are closer to its preferences. More importantly, 
these welfare gains vary between 1.3% and 2.3% of GDP, a substantial magnitude 
especially when compared with the estimated efficiency gains associated to the tax 
reforms of the early nineties. When the country was divided into three and five 
regions, the welfare gains of decentralisation vary between 1.4% and 2.3% of GDP 
and between 0.5% and 1.4% of GDP, respectively. This result suggest that regional 
differences are very important, not only the number of regions, but also the
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preferences for the goods to be publicly provided. The more different the preferences
among regions, the better chance for considerable welfare gains.
«
Finally, it is worth mentioning that from the policy point of view, 
decentralisation properly implemented can provide important economic and political 
benefits to regions, as local governments deliver services more efficiently and are 
accountable for public spending. Decentralisation not only involves the allocation of 
expenditure responsibility and/or more fiscal powers to sub-national levels of 
government. It also requires the provision of the necessary resources and the 
development of adequate institutional support and public expenditure management 
structures, if the results are to be socially and economically beneficial. The question 
is then, as McLure (1995) puts it, how to do it well, since decentralisation badly done 
can reduce welfare, increase income disparities among regions, and aggravate fiscal 
problems and corruption, among others.
I
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Appendix 2.1: Model equations and notation
Production side o f  the model 
•  Value-added functions
- M ; X kp
Demand side o f  the model 
•  Utility function
1. Median voter
U'„ = x k „  r  ( * »  *  («»., r -  fe -»
i
2. Other consumers
x k . r t a . r " * + k , r  f o r * *
V*M «Pm-I I
Uh = , h * M
Constraints
•  Consumer budget constraint ( I|, = EJ,)
1. Median voter
PlLm +PkKm = ^PpRi,XM j + ^PppQP|QM,j + T"m
> j
where = I'M t if a national tax is used to finance the provision, where
5^ (Pppqp, Pppqp, )Qm.j + ^ T R
j .h .r  r
h .r
If regional taxes are used to finance the provision then = I„ tr , where
[A2.1]
[A2.2]
[A2.3]
[A2.4]
[A2.5]
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tr = -ÜL
( P p m p  PppQPj )  Q h .j  T R
15
Notice that in the expressions for t and tr the summations are over all 
groups including the median voter.
2. Other consumers
PLLh+PKKh =5^ PPWi Xh j + ^  PppQPj Q h . j + Th , h * M
■ j
where,
Thr = IJ, t or Th' = IJ, t r depending on the financing alternative.
• Provision PPQP goods
Q h . j  =  Q m .j
• Central government budget constraint (Ig=Eg)
I PÎPQP, Qh. j + 1  (p; Lh + pk Kh ) t = £  PppQP, Qh.j+ z  TR1'
h .r.j h .r h .r.j r
• Regional governments budget constraints ( I{j = E rG )
I  PÎpop, Q h . j  + X  (P; L h  + PK k L ) t r + TR1' = X  Pppop, Q h . j
h .j h h.j
Zero profit conditions
•  In each region the value of sales must equal the industries’ costs
PpRI.^ ApRI, = Pl^ pri, + PKKpRI
and
pr VAr = P 'lr +P  Krr  PPQP. v  ^ p p o p . — 1 1 ^ p p o p  t a | ( i \ p'PPQ P, L*“'PPQP, 'PPQP,
consumer
[A2.6]
[A2.7]
[A2.8]
[A2.9]
[A2.10]
[A2.ll]
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M arket clearing conditions 
«
• Goods markets: gross output must equal final demand:
r  h ,r
VArPP0Pi =X Q h.j
h
• Labour market
X  L h  =  X  L PRI, +  X  L PPQP,
h i j
• Capital market
^  Kh = ^  Kpr)i + KPP0Pj
h ,r  i,r
Equations fo r  price relationships 
•  Provision price PPQP goods
PrPQP, ~
P 'L r‘ L^ PPQP,
Pr Lrr L “ PPQP
List o f  variables
v Apri Value added PRI good i region r. 
VAppqp Value added PPQP good j region r. 
Labour input PRI good i region r.
Lppqp Labour input PPQP good j region r.
/
K'pr, Capital input PRI good i region r.
[A2.12]
[A2.13]
[A2.14]
[A2.15]
[A2.16]
Kppgp Capital input PPQP good j region r.
U[, Utility consumer group h region r.
XJ,, Demand PRI good i consumer group h region r.
QJ, j Demand PPQP good j consumer group h region r.
I{, Income consumer group h region r.
E^ Expenditure consumer group h region r 
P[ Selling price labour input region r.
PK Selling price of capital.
PPRI Price paid by consumers for PRI good i.
Prpqp Cost covering price PPQP good j region r.
P'pqp Price paid by consumers for PPQP good j region r.
Thr Income tax paid by consumer group h in region r. 
t National income tax rate.
tr Regional income tax rates.
TRr Central government transfers regional government r.
List o f  parameters
y ' Scale parameter value added function, PRI good i region r.
8[ Share parameter value added function, PRI good i region r.
o ' Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, PRI good i region r.
uj Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, PPQP good j region
a[,, Share parameters utility function, PRI good i region r.
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Share parameters utility function, PPQP good j region r.
Hi, Elasticity of substitution in consumption consumer group h region r.
Li, Endowment of labour consumer group h region r.
Kh Endowment of capital consumer group h region r.
Q[,0 Government provision of PPQP good j to consumer group h region r.
Percentage of the cost of provision of the PPQP goods paid by consumers.
/
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Appendix 2.2: Colombian regional data set
1. Regions
Colombia comprises 33 administrative regions (or provinces). The country is divided 
in five so-called “natural” or geographic regions, namely Pacific, Atlantic, Andean, 
Amazonia and Orinoquia. For the central case this regional classification was chosen, 
although due to data constraints, Amazonia, and Orinoqtiia (henceforth A&O) are 
considered as one region." The Andean region accounts for 63% of GDP, whereas 
the Pacific region accounts for 15% of GDP, the Atlantic region accounts for 15.1% 
of GDP, and the A&O region for 6.9% of GDP.
Table A2.1: Regional classification
Andean Region Antioquia
Cundinamarca
Quindio
Santander
Boyacá
Huila
Risaralda
Tolima
Caldas
Norte de Santander 
Santafé de Bogotá, D.C.
Atlantic Region Atlántico
Córdoba
Sucre
Bolivar 
La Guajira
Cesar
Magdalena
Pacific Region Cauca
Valle del Cauca
Chocó Nariño
Amazonia and Orinoquia Caquetá Meta Nuevos Departamentos 11
u Nuevos Departamentos includes Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainia, Guaviare, 
Putumayo, the archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, Vaupés, and 
Vichada.
I 1
11 In the Colombian regional accounts (DANE, 1995b) there is a region labelled “Nuevos 
Departamentos” which comprises nine provinces, since DANE does not publish production accounts 
for each province individually. These regions correspond to those located in the Amazonia and 
Orinoquia.
Further, regional GDP figures for 1992 (as taken from DANE (1995b)) were
used to divide the country into three regions, each consisting of eleven provinces (see 
«
Table A.2.2). The group Nuevos Departamentos was included in region one because 
it comprises the country’s less developed provinces. Region two comprises the 
following 11 provinces, and region three includes the province with the highest GDP, 
which are perhaps the most developed regions of the country. According to this 
classification, regions one, two and three account for 5%, 18%, and 77%, 
respectively.
Table A2.2: Regional classification according to GDP
Provinces GDP
Col$ millions
Provinces GDP
Col$ millions
Región 1 1,712,862 Region 3 25,839,993
Chocó 138,477 Huila 726,300
Caquetá 153,278 Risaralda 795,891
Nuevos Departamentos 11 1,421,107 Boyacá 952,630
Tolima 1,000,601
Región 2 5,962,191 Bolívar 1,325,716
Atlántico 1,373,130
Sucre 252,685 Santander 1,710,033
Cesar 431,442 Cundinamarca 2,041,178
Nariño 501,919 Valle del Cauca 3,893,867
Quindío 514,415 Antioquia 4,872,343
Magdalena 543,083 Santafé de Bogotá, D.C. 7,148,304
La Guajira 547,622
Cauca 553,303
Norte de Santander 587,561
Meta 644,714
Córdoba 669,114
Caldas 716,333
Total GDP is Col$33,515,046 millions.
11 Includes Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainia, Guaviare, Putumayo, the archipelago of 
San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, Vaupés, and Vichada.
Source: DANE (1995b).
I
Lastly, regional agricultural GDP figures for 1992 were used to divide the 
country in five regions. The resulting classification is presented in Table A.2.3. This
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table reveals that region one accounts for approximately 4% of total agricultural 
GDP, region two for 7%, region three for 17%, region four for 21%, and region five 
for 51%.
Table A2.3: Regional classification according to Agricultural GDP
Provinces Agricultural Provinces 
GDP
Col$ millions__________
Agricultural
GDP
Col$ millions
Región 1 193,111
Nuevos Departamentos 17 193,111
Región 2 352,457
Santafé de Bogotá, D.C. 2,874
Chocó 37,457
La Guajira 39,683
Caquetá 68,443
Atlántico 90,411
Sucre 113,589
Región 3 874,927
Norte de Santander 118,052
Huila 139,493
Quindío 142,768
Meta 152,673
Risaralda 157,717
Cauca 164,224
Region 4 1,107,697
Nariño 166,432
Boyacá 168,425
Bolívar 183,950
Magdalena 188,838
Caldas 192,412
Cesar 207,640
Region 5 2,660,202
Córdoba 248,265
Tolima 303,623
Santander 330,717
Valle del Cauca 559,169
Antioquia 593,014
Cundinamarca 625,414
Total agricultural GDP is Col$5,188,394 millions.
17 Includes Amazonas, Arauca, Casanare, Guainia, Guaviare, Putumayo, the archipelago of 
San Andres. Providencia and Santa Catalina, Vaupes, and Vichada.
Source: This information was kindly provided by Hector Mejia from DANE.
I
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2. Production and factors of production
In the model, each region is assumed to produce three PRI goods and two PPQP
a
goods. The formers are allocated by the market according to supply and demand 
conditions, whereas the latter are provided by the government.
The Colombian national accounts classifies products, based on the 
international standard industrial classification (ISIC) of the United Nations, in nine 
broad categories: agriculture, fishing and hunting; mining; manufacturing; electricity, 
gas and water; construction; transportation and storage; communications; personal 
and business services; and government services. The first eight categories (which 
account for 89.8% of GDP) are considered as private goods. Then, these goods were 
classified into primary commodities (including fuels), manufactured goods, and 
services. PPQP goods are included in the ninth category (which represents 10.2% of 
GDP). Using the Colombian SAM for 1992 (Valderrama and Gutiérrez, 1996) it was 
possible to disaggregate government services into health, education, and other 
government services: health accounts for approximately 2.3% of GDP, and education 
for 0.4% of GDP. Other government services were added to services.
The value added generated by each administrative region is obtained from the 
Colombian regional accounts (DANE, 1995b). Value added comprises payments to 
labour, net indirect taxes, and operating surplus, the latter obtained as a residual. 
From DANE (1995b) it is not possible to break down regional value added into its 
components. However, national accounts (DANE, 1995a) allows us to determine the 
composition of value added at the national level. Therefore, using national accounts
data the value-added share of payments to labour, operating surplus, and net indirect
/
taxes for each of the nine categories considered by the national accounts were 
calculated. The resulting shares are used at the regional level to disaggregate value
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added into its components. Using these shares it is possible to know the endowment
of labour and capital in each region. Table A2.4 presents the resulting regional factor 
endowments.
Table A2.4: Regional value added at factor cost 
Col$ billions
Regions Labour Capital Total
Pacific region 2,077.3 2,464.2 4,541.5
Atlantic region 1,944.8 2,633.4 4,578.2
Andean region 8,771.5 10,293.5 19,065.0
A&O region 689.7 1,405.2 2,094.9
Total 13,483.3 16,796.3 30,279.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
When the country is divided into three regions using GDP, the corresponding
regional factor endowments are:
Regions Labour Capital Total
Region 1 518.3 1,100.5 1,618.8
Region 2 2,421.6 3,147.4 5,569.0
Region 3 10,543.4 12,548.4 23,091.8
Total 13,483.3 16,796.3 30,279.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
And, when the country is divided into five regions using agricultural GDP,
the regional factor endowments are:
Regions Labour Capital Total
Region 1 380.0 960.7 1,340.7
Region 2 4,180.0 4,542.9 8,722.9
Region 3 1,539.4 1,986.0 3,525.4
Region 4 1,804.4 2,223.5 4,027.9
Region 5 5,579.5 7,083.2 12,662.7
Total 13,483.3 16,796.3 30,279.6
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Since the tax structure of the country is not being considered, net indirect 
taxes are deducted from regional value added, so that value added at factor cost is 
obtained.
3. Demand
The model considers three groups of consumers per region: low, medium, and high- 
income groups. The first group comprises the bottom four .deciles of the population; 
the second group includes the following four deciles; and the third group comprises 
the top two deciles of the population. The Social Accounting Matrix for 1992 
assembled for Colombia by Valderrama and Gutiérrez (1996) was used to calculate 
each group’s consumption of the PRI and PPQP goods. For the Pacific, Atlantic and 
Andean regions the percentages of consumption of each good are calculated using 
national totals (includes both urban and rural consumption); the resulting percentages 
are;
Consumer 
group 1
Consumer 
group 2
Consumer 
group 3
Primary commodities 24.0% 43.0% 33.0%
Manufactured goods 23.6% 40.0% 36.4%
Services 13.3% 35.1% 51.6%
Health 13.6% 33.2% 53.2%
Education 13.6% 33.2% 53.2%
For the A&O region, information for rural consumers was used, and the 
percentages of consumption are:
Consumer 
group 1
Consumer 
group 2
Consumer 
group 3
Primary Commodities 24.0% 44.1% 31.9%
Manufactured goods 22.1% 42.6% 35.3%
Services 13.5% 33.5% 53.0%
Health 15.8% 33.4% 50.8%
Education 15.8% 33.4% 50.8%
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Given that there is no information about regional consumption, the 
proportions presented above were used to calculate the regional consumption of each 
good.
In the model the PPQP goods are regarded as non-tradable; hence, regional 
production equals regional consumption. As to the PRI goods, there is no initial 
interregional trade, and there are no transfers to consumers.
Consumers are the owners of the factors of production. However, given that 
there is no information about regional factor ownership, the national capital-labour 
ratio is assumed for all consumers in the region. The resulting four-region data set is 
presented in Tables 2.1 in the text. The data sets for three and five regions are 
reported in tables A2.5 and A2.6.
/
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T able A.2.5: Colombian regional data set 
Regional classification according to GDP 
(Col$ billion)
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Production side: Primary inputs
Labour
Region 1 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 2 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 3 
Capital
Value
Added
Total
Value
Added
Primary goods 227.8 820.4 1.048.3 794.8 1.505.0 2,299.7 1.415.6 2.552.0 3,967.6 7.315.6
Manufactures 6.2 7.0 13.2 223.0 252.5 475.5 2.096.9 2.374.8 4.471.7 4,960.3
Services 250.2 273.0 523.2 1,244.6 1.390.0 2,634.6 6.346.5 7,621.6 13.968.1 17.125.9
Education 
Region 1 4.9 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 0.0 23.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.8 0.0 98.8 98.8
Health 
Region 1 29.2 0.0 29.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.2
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 136.2 0.0 136.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 136.2
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 585.7 0.0 585.7 585.7
Total 518.3 1.100.5 1,618.8 2,421.6 3,1474 5,569.0 10.543.4 12.548.4 23,091.8 30,279.6
Demand side: Final demands
Cons. 1
Region 1 
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 2 
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 3
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Primary goods 251.2 450.7 346.3 551.1 988.8 759.8 950.8 1,706.0 1.310.8 7,315.6
Manufactures 3.1 5.3 4.8 112.4 190.0 173.1 1.057.0 1,786.8 1,627.8 4.960 3
Services 69.6 183.7 269.9 350.6 925.0 1.358.9 1.859.0 4,904.4 7.204.6 17.125 9
Education 
Region 1 0.7 1.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 7.6 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.4 32.9 52.5 98.8
Health 
Region 1 4.0 9.7 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.2
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 45.3 72.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 136.2
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 79.5 194.7 311.4 585.7
Total 328.6 651.1 639.1 1.035.8 2.156.8 2.376.4 3.9598 8.6248 10.507.2 30.279.6
Consumers income and expenditure accounts
Cons. 1
Region 1 
Cons 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 2 
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 3 
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Income:
Labour income 
Capital income
105.2
223.4
208.5
442.6
204.7
434.5
450.4
5854
937.9
1.219.0
1.033.4
1.343.1
1.808.0
2.151.8
3.938.0
4.686.8
4.797.4
5.709.8
13.483.3
16.796.3
Total income 328.6 651.1 639.1 1.035.8 2.156.8 2.376.4 3.959.8 8.624.8 10.507 2 30.2796
Expenditure: 
Final demand 
Taxes
328.6
0.0
651.1
0.0
639 1
0.0
1.035.8
0.0
2,156.8
0 0
2.376.4
0.0
3.959.8
0.0
8.624.8
0.0
10.507.2
0.0
30.2796
0.0
Total expenditure 328.6 651 1 639.1 1.035.8 2.156.8 2.376.4 3.9598 8.6248 10.507.2 30.279 6
Government income and expenditure accounts
Income:
Provision Education 126.7
Provision Health 751.1
Tax collections 0.0
Total income 877.8
Expenditure:
Cost provision Educ 126.7
Cost provision Heal) 751.1
Total expenditure 8778
Source: DANE (1995b) and author's calculations.
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T ab le  A.2.6: Colombian regional data set 
Regional classification according to agricultural GDP 
(ColS billion)
Production side: Primary inputs
4
Labour
Region 1 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 2 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 3 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 4 
Capital
Value
Added Labour
Region 5 
Capital
Value
Added
Total
Value
Added
Primary gixxls 180.1 733.2 913.3 188.2 471.0 659.2 404.4 781.0 1,185.5 488.6 843.7 1.332.3 1.176.9 2.048.5 3.225.4 7.315.6
Manufactures 1.7 1.9 3.6 751.7 851.3 1.603.0 220.4 249.6 470.1 249.5 282.6 532.1 1.102.7 1.248.9 2.351.6 4.960.3
Services 180.3 223.6 406.1 2.875.2 3.220.6 6.095.8 819.1 955.3 1.774.4 951.6 1.097.2 2.048.7 3.015.0 3.785.9 6.800.8 17.125.9
Region 1 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
Region 2 0.0 0.0 ().() 52.7 0.0 52.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.7
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8 0.0 13.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8
Region 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ().() 16.6 0.0 16.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.6
Regk>n3
Health
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.1 0.0 41.1 41.1
Region 1 13.2 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 312.3 0.0 312.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 312.3
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.6 0.0 81.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.6
Region 4 0.0 0.0 <).() ().() 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2 0.0 98.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2
Region 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ().() 0.0 0.0 0.0 243.7 0.0 243.7 243.7
Total 380.0 960.7 1.340.7 4.180.1 4.542.9 8.723.0 1.539.4 1.986.0 3.525.4 1.804.4 2.223.5 4.027.9 5.579.5 7.083.2 12.662.7 30.279.6
Dem and side: Final demands
Cons. 1
Region 1
Cons. 2 Cons. 3 Cons. 1
Region 2
Cons. 2 Cons. 3 Cons. 1
Region 3
Cons. 2 Cons. 3 Cons. 1
Region 4
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 5
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Primary goods 218.9 392.7 301.7 158.0 283.4 217.8 284.1 509.7 391.7 319.3 572.9 440.2 772.9 1.386.8 1.065.6 7.315.6
Manutac tures 0.8 1.4 1.3 378.9 640.5 583.5 111.1 187.8 171.1 125.8 212.6 193.7 555.9 939.7 856.1 4.960.3
Services 54.0 142.6 209.5 811.3 2.140.3 3.144.2 236.2 623.0 915.2 272.7 719.3 1.056.7 905.1 2.387.9 3507.8 17.125.9
Region 1 0.3 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 17.5 28.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.7
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 4.6 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.8
Region 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 5.5 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.6
R egions
HüàW)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 13.7 21.9 41.1
Region 1 2.1 5.1 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 O.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.2
Region 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.4 103.8 166.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 (>.() 0.0 0.0 0.0 312.3
Region 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I I . 1 27.1 43.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.6
Region 4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ().() 0 .0 ().() 0.0 0.0 13.3 32.7 52.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.2
Region 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ().() 33.1 81.0 129.6 243.7
Total 276.2 542.6 521.9 1.397.8 3.185.7 4.139.6 644.3 1.352.3 1-528.7 733.3 1543.0 1,731.6 2.272.6 4.809.1 5580 .9 30.279.6
Consumers incom e and expenditure accounts
Cons. 1
Region 1
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Coas. 1
Region 2 
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 3
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 4
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Cons. 1
Region 5
Cons. 2 Cons.3 Total
Labour income 
Capital income
78.3
197.9
153.8
388.8
147.9
374.0
669.8
727.9
1526.6
1.659.1
1.983.7
2,155.9
281.3
363.0
590.5
761.8
667.5
861.2
3285
404.8
691.2
851.8
784.7
966.9
1.001.4
1.271.3
2.119.0
2.690.1
2.459.1
3.121.9
13.483.3
16.796.3
Total income 276.2 542.6 521.9 1.397.8 3.185.7 4.139.6 644.3 1.352.3 1528.7 733.3 1543.0 1.751.6 2.272.6 4.809.1 5.580.9 30.2796
Expenditure: 
Final demand 276.2
0.0
542.6
0.0
521.9
0.0
1.397.8
0.0
3.185.7
0.0
4.139.6
0.0
644.3
0.0
1.352.3
0.0
1528.7
0.0
733.3
0.0
1543.0
0.0
1,751.6
0.0
2.272.6
0.0
4.809.1
0.0
5.580.9
0.0
30.279.6
0.0
Total expenditure 276.2 542.6 521.9 1.397.8 3.185.7 4,139.6 644.3 1.352.3 1.528.7 733.3 1.543.0 1.751.6 2.272.6 4.809.1 5.580.9 30.279.6
Government incom e and expenditure accounts
Income:
Provision Education 126.7
Provision H ealth 751.1
Tax collections 0.0
Total income 877.8
Expenditure:
Cost provision Educ 126.7
Cost provision Heait 751.1
Total expenditure 877.8
Source: DANE (1993b) and author's calculations.
Appendix 2 3
Quantities of education and health provided by 
the central and regional governments as determined by the median voter
Table A2.3.1: Regional classification according to geographic regions 
(billion units)
Percentage of Education Health
The cost of 
Provision paid *1
by consumers (PP):_______________________
1. N a tio n a l p ro v is io n  f in a n c e d  w ith  a  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 5.4 31.8
PP = 50% 5.9 35.2
PP = 30% 6.4 37.9
PP = 0% 7.2 42.8
2. N a tio n a l p ro v isio n  f in a n c e d  w ith reg io n a l ta xe s
PP = 80% 4.9 29.0
PP = 50% 4.7 27.7
PP = 30% 4.6 27.0
PP = 0% 4.4 25.9
3. N a tio n a l p ro v isio n  f in a n c e d  w ith  reg io n a l ta x e s  a n d  
a  0 .0 5 %  n a tio n a l tax
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Table A2.3.1 (Continued): Regional classification according to geographic regions
(billion units)
Percentage of Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
the cost of Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health
provision paid 
by consumers:
1. R e e io n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  a  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 6.9 40.6 6.0 35.6 31.4 186.0 2.2 12.9
PP = 50% 9.8 57.6 8.6 50.4 34.6 . 204.9 3.3 19.3
PP = 30% 13.7 80.1 11.9 69.8 37.2 219.8 5.0 29.1
PP = 0% 33.8 196.5 28.8 168.0 41.8 246.8 21.4 124.6
2. R e e io n a l o ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith re e io n a l ta xes
PP = 80% 5.6 33.2 4.9 29.0 28.9 171.1 1.7 10.2
PP = 50% 5.4 32.0 4.7 27.7 27.9 165.2 1.6 9.6
PP = 30% 5.3 31.2 4.6 27.0 27.3 161.5 1.6 9.3
PP = 0% 5.1 30.1 4.4 25.9 26.4 156.3 1.5 8.8
3. R e e io n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith re e io n a l ta xe s  and ' a  0 .0 5 %  n a tio n a l tax
PP = 80% 5.6 33.2 4.9 29.0 28.9 171.0 1.7 10.2
PP = 50% 5.4 31.9 4.7 27.7 27.9 165.1 1.6 9.6
PP = 30% 5.3 31.2 4.5 27.0 27.2 161.5 1.6 9.3
PP = 0% 5.1 30.1 4.4 25.9 26.4 156.2 1.5 8.8
Note: In some cases the provision levels seem identical, but this is due to rounding.
I
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Table A2.3.2: Regional classification according to regional GDP
(billion units)
0 Percentage of 
the cost of 
provision paid 
by consumers (PP):
Education Health
1. N a tio n a l  p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  a  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 8.2 48.8
PP = 50% 9.3 55.2
PP = 30% 10.2 60.5
PP = 0% 11.9 70.7
2. N a tio n a l  p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  re g io n a l ta xe s
PP = 80% 7.4 43.9
PP = 50% 7.1 41.9
PP = 30% 6.9 40.7
PP = 0% 6.6 39.0
3. N a tio n a l  p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  re g io n a l ta x e s  a n d
a  0 .0 5 %  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 7.4 43.9
PP = 50% 7.1 41.9
PP = 30% 6.9 40.7
PP = 0% 6.6 39.0
I
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Table A2.3.2 (Continued): Regional classification according to regional GDP
(billion units)
Percentage of Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
the cost of Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health
provision paid 
by consumers:
1. R e g io n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith a  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 2.0 11.9 9.1 53.5 33.8 200.4
PP = 50% 3.1 18.0 12.6 73.9 • 35.4 209.7
PP = 30% 4.7 27.6 17.0 99.4 36.6 216.4
PP = 0% 25.2 146.7 35.6 207.8 38.4 227.2
2. R e g io n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  re g io n a l ta xe s
PP = 80% 1.6 9.3 7.4 43.9 
PP = 50% 1.5 8.8 7.1 41.9 
PP = 30% 1.4 8.5 6.9 40.7 
PP = 0% 1.4 8.0 6.6 39.0
3. R e g io n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  re g io n a l ta xe s  a n d  a
32.1
31.0
30.3
29.3
0 .0 5 %
190.1
183.7 
179.6
173.8
n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 1.6 9.3 7.4 43.9 32.1 190.0
PP = 50% 1.5 8.8 7.1 41.9 31.0 183.6
PP = 30% 1.4 8.5 6.9 40.7 30.3 179.5
PP = 0% 1.4 8.0 6.6 39.0 29.3 173.7
Note: In some cases the provision levels seem identical, but this is due to 
rounding.
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Table A2.3.3: Regional classification according to agricultural GDP
(billion units)
Percentage of Education Health
the cost of
provision paid
by consumers (PP):
1. N a tio n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith  a  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 5.4 32.3
PP = 50% 5.3 31.1
PP = 30% 5.1 30.4
PP = 0% 5.0 29.4
2. N a tio n a l p ro v is io n  f in a n c e d  w ith  reg io n a l ta x e s
PP = 80% 6.2 36.5
PP = 50% 7.3 43.0
PP = 30% 8.2 48.9
PP = 0% 10.4 61.5
3. N a tio n a l p ro v is io n  fin a n c e d  w ith reg io n a l ta x e s  a n d
a  0 .0 5 %  n a tio n a l ta x
PP = 80% 6.1 36.4
PP = 50% 7.3 43.0
PP = 30% 8.2 48.9
PP = 0% 10.4 61.4
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Table A2.3.3 (Continued): Regional classification according to agricultural GDP
(billion units)
Percentage of Region 1______ Region 2______ Region 3______ Region 4______ Region 5
the cost of Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health Educ. Health 
provision paid 
by consumers
__ <m:______________________________________________
1. R egional provision financed with a national tax
PP = 80% 1.1 6.2 20.3 120.0 5.5 32.7 6.6 39.2 15.3 90.2
PP = 50% 1.6 9.5 26.6 156.7 8.1 47.5 9.5 56.2 18.5 108.9
PP = 30% 2.5 14.7 33.6 197.4 11.6 68.1 13.5 79.4 21.5 126.5
PP = 0% 15.8 91.7 55.4 324.3 34.1 199.3 35.9 210.3 28.6 167.5
2. Regional provision financed with regional taxes
PP = 80% 0.8 4.8 17.2 101.9 4.4 26.3 5.3 31.7 13.3 78.8
PP = 50% 0.8 4.6 16.7 99.1 4.3 25.2 5.1 30.4 12.8 75.8
PP = 30% 0.7 4.4 16.4 97.3 4.1 24.5 5.0 29.6 12.5 73.8
PP = 0% 0.7 4.2 16.0 94.8 4.0 23.6 4.8 28.4 12.0 71.1
3. Regional provision financed with regional taxes and a 0.05% national tax
PP = 80% 0.8 4.8 17.2 101.8 4.4 26.3 5.3 31.7 13.3 78.8
PP = 50% 0.8 4.6 16.7 99.1 4.3 25.2 5.1 30.4 12.8 75.7
PP = 30% 0.7 4.4 16.4 97.3 4.1 24.5 5.0 29.5 12.4 73.8
PP = 0% 0.7 4.2 16.0 94.7 4.0 23.6 4.8 28.4 12.0 71.1
Note: In some cases the provision levels seem identical, but this is due to rounding.
V I
65
Appendix 2.4: Empirical implementation using Colombian data
Tax rates when consumers pay 0% of the cost of provision
Provision financed by:
National tax Regional
taxes
Regional 
taxes and 
national tax 
of 0.05%
National provision .
Pacific 1.9% 2.0% 1.9%
Atlantic 1.9% 2.0% 1.9%
Andean 1.9% 0.5% 0.5%
A&O 1.9% 4.3% 4.2%
Regional provision
Pacific 10.2% 2.3% 2.2%
Atlantic 10.2% 2.0% 1.9%
Andean 10.2% 2.9% 2.9%
A&O 10.2% 1.5% 1.3%
I
Subsidies when consumers pay 0% of the cost of provision
(Col $ billion)
_________ Provision financed by:________
National tax Regional Regional 
taxes taxes and
national tax
__________________________________________ of 0.05%
National provision
Pacific
Consumer 1 34.6 14.3 14.6
Consumer 2 16.9 -3.9 -3.4
Consumer 3 10.7 -10.4. -9.7
Atlantic
Consumer 1 32.2 13.5 13.8
Consumer 2 14.6 -4.6 -4.1
Consumer 3 10.5 -8.9 -8.3
Andean
Consumer 1 -13.2 14.7 13.7
Consumer 2 -87.9 -3.7 -5.8
Consumer 3 -117.9 -11.0 -13.7
A&O
Consumer 1 38.4 12.1 12.6
Consumer 2 30.4 -6.1 -5.0
Consumer 3 30.5 -6.0 -4.9
Regional provision 
Pacific
Consumer 1 152.8 16.7 16.9
Consumer 2 64.0 -4.6 -4.0
Consumer 3 32.5 -12.1 -11.4
Atlantic
Consumer 1 172.1 13.5 13.8
Consumer 2 -69.1 -4.6 -4.1
Consumer 3 -44.9 -8.9 -8.3
Andean
Consumer 1 -29.3 88.8 87.7
Consumer 2 -404.4 -22.2 -24.3
Consumer 3 -554.7 -66.6 -69.2
A&O
Consumer 1 183.3 4.1 4.7
Consumer 2 134.6 -2.1 - 1.0
Consumer 3 135.1 -2.0 -0.9
Note: The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP
goods, minus the value paid by the consumer and the income tax.
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Tax rates when consumers pay 30% of the cost of provision
Provision financed by:
National tax Regional
taxes
Regional 
taxes and 
national tax 
of 0.05%
National provision
Pacific 1.2% 1.5% 1.4%
Atlantic 1.2% 1.4% 1.4%
Andean 1.2% 0.3% 0.3%
A&O 1.2% 3.2% 3.0%
Regional provision
Pacific 3.3% 1.7% 1.6%
Atlantic 3.3% 1.4% 1.4%
Andean 3.3% 2.1% 2.1%
A&O 3.3% 1.1% 0.9%
I
Subsidies when consumers pay 30% of the cost of provision
(Col $ billion)
6 8
Pravision financed by:
National tax Regional Regional
taxes taxes and
national tax
of 0.05%
National provision
Pacific
Consumer 1 21.5 10.5 10.7
Consumer 2 10.7 -2.9 -2.3
Consumer 3 6.8 -7.6 -6.9
Atlantic
Consumer 1 19.5 9.9 10.1
Consumer 2 8.9 -3.4 -2.8
Consumer 3 6.4 -6.5 -5.8
Andean
Consumer 1 -7.8 10.7 9.7
Consumer 2 -53.6 -2.7 -4.8
Consumer 3 -72.0 -8.0 -10.6
A&O
Consumer 1 23.1 8.8 9.3
Consumer 2 18.2 -4.5 -3.4
Consumer 3 
Regional provision
18.3 -4.3 -3.2
Pacific
Consumer 1 39.9 12.1 12.4
Consumer 2 10.3 -3.3 -2.7
Consumer 3 -0.2 -8.8 -8.1
Atlantic
Consumer 1 29.7 9.9 10.1
Consumer 2 0.2 -3.4 -2.8
Consumer 3 -6.8 -6.5 -5.8
Andean
Consumer 1 74.2 64.2 63.2
Consumer 2 -50.6 -16.0 -18.2
Consumer 3 -100.7 -48.2 -50.9
A&O
Consumer 1 10.3 3.0 3.6
Consumer 2 -3.2 -1.5 -0.4
Consumer 3 -3.1 -1.5 -0.4
Note: The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP
goods, minus the value paid by the consumer and the income tax.
Tax rates when consumers pay 80% of the cost of provision
Provision financed by:
« National tax Regional
taxes
Regional 
taxes and 
national tax 
of 0.05%
National provision
Pacific 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
Atlantic 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
Andean 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
A&O 0.3% 1.0%. 0.8%
Regional provision
Pacific 0.6% 0.5% 0.4%
Atlantic 0.6% 0.4% 0.4%
Andean 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
A&O 0.6% 0.3% 0.2%
Subsidies when consumers pay 80% of the cost of provision
(Col $ billion)
Provision financed by:
National tax Regional
taxes
Regional 
taxes and 
national tax
of 0.05%
National provision
Pacific
Consumer 1 5.2 3.2 3.5
Consumer 2 2.6 -0.9 -0.3
Consumer 3 1.7 -2.3. -1.7
Atlantic
Consumer 1 4.6 3.0 3.3
Consumer 2 2.1 - 1.0 -0.5
Consumer 3 1.5 -2.0 -1.3
Andean
Consumer 1 -1.8 3.3 2.3
Consumer 2 -12.6 -0.8 -3.0
Consumer 3 -17.0 -2.5 -5.0
A&O
Consumer 1 5.3 2.7 3.2
Consumer 2 4.2 -1.4 -0.3
Consumer 3 4.2 -1.3 -0.2
Note: The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP 
goods, minus the value paid by the consumer and the income tax.
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Subsidies when consumers pay 80% of the cost of provision
(Col $ billion)
_________ Provision financed by:________
National tax Regional Regional 
taxes taxes and
national tax
___________________________ ________________of 0.05%
Regional provision
Pacific
Consumer 1 4.4 3.7 3.9
Consumer 2 -1.4 -1.0. -0.4
Consumer 3 -3.5 -2.7 -2.0
Atlantic
Consumer 1 3.0 3.0 3.3
Consumer 2 -2.9 -1.0 -0.5
Consumer 3 -4.3 -2.0 -1.3
Andean
Consumer 1 22.7 19.4 18.4
Consumer 2 -1.9 -4.8 -7.0
Consumer 3 -11.8 -14.6 -17.1
A&O
Consumer 1 0.3 0.9 1.5
Consumer 2 -2.3 -0.5 0.6
Consumer 3 -2.3 -0.4 0.6
Note: The subsidy is calculated as the cost of provision of the PPQP 
goods, minus the value paid by the consumer and the income tax.
I
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CHAPTER 3
T a x  E x p o r t in g :
A n  A n a l y s is  U s in g  a  M u l t ir e g io n a l  C G E  M o d e l
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate whether developed countries export taxes 
to developing countries, contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and 
welfare. Developing countries have become increasingly integrated into world 
commerce. Since the beginning of the 1990’s most developing countries have 
undertaken radical changes in their trade regimes. Trade negotiations have mainly 
concentrated on multilateral tariff reductions and in giving preferential treatment to 
developing countries, and hence helping them to improve their welfare. However, so 
far the role of domestic taxation in affecting the distribution of gains from trade, has 
been overlooked. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the 
distribution of gains from trade is being affected not by existing tariffs in developed 
countries, which are already at low levels, but by their domestic taxation.
Toward this end, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the 
world economy is built. This modelling approach constitutes an appropriate tool for 
this analysis, since it allows us to model the interrelationships between different 
regions. The model consists of eight regions: the United States (USA), Japan (JAP), 
the European Union (EU), other developed countries (ODC), developing America 
(DAM), developing Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS), and developing Europe 
(DE). Each region has a production and demand structure, and are linked through
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trade. Further, the model explicitly includes domestic taxation and commercial
policy. Domestic taxation comprises taxes such as corporate tax, property tax, payroll 
»
tax, social security contributions, income tax, and a tax on final expenditure. 
Commercial policy is represented by import tariffs. The model uses data for 1990.
To the best of my knowledge, the issue of tax exporting among countries has 
not been analysed empirically, although Mutti and Morgan (1986), and Morgan et al 
(1996) have looked at tax exporting among regions within the same country (the 
United States). One of the few analyses in this area is that of Whalley (1980a), who 
investigates the strength of relative price effects in international trade caused by the 
different domestic factor taxes which operate in the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan. Whalley uses a four-region general equilibrium model (the fourth 
region being the rest of the world), which incorporates tariffs, non-tariff barriers and 
domestic taxation policies of major trading blocks, using data for 1973. This author 
finds that domestic factor taxes can induce very strong terms of trade effects and that, 
for some trading areas, domestic taxation can be more important in distorting 
international trade than traditional instruments of commercial policy, such as import 
tariffs.1
My study differs in one important respect from Whalley (1980a). There is a 
distinction between developed and developing regions, and more importantly both 
groups have been divided further into four sub-groups. The advantage of this 
additional disaggregation is that it helps to identify from which region(s) developing 
sub-groups are likely to import taxes. Developed regions have more commercial ties 
with some particular developing regions than with others, and so their domestic tax *
' See Whalley (1984) for an analysis of the role of trade protection policies on the North-South terms 
of trade.
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policies may affect one developing region more than another. It is worth mentioning 
that developed countries main trading partners are developed countries themselves, 
and this inter-developed regions trade may weaken tax exporting effects. In 1990, for 
example, 65% of the United States exports were destined to Japan, the European 
Union and other developed countries, whereas less than 16% were destined to 
developing America and developing Africa (these figures are taken from the 
benchmark data set).
According to the results, when factors of production are internationally 
immobile, developed regions do not export factor taxes to developing regions 
because the burden of the tax is borne by the immobile factors. By contrast, when 
capital is internationally mobile the replacement of capital taxes in developed regions 
generates welfare gains and terms of trade improvement in developing countries. In 
this case, the replacement of the tax reduces the return to capital, as this factor moves 
into developed regions, and this in turn reduces the cost of producing exports (i.e. 
developing countries imports are cheaper). This result suggests that developed 
countries were exporting capital taxes to developing regions. In addition, it is found 
that JAP exports income taxes to developing regions, although the effects on welfare 
and terms of trade are small. Regardless of the assumptions on international capital 
mobility, the effects of import tariffs on welfare and terms of trade are larger than 
those of domestic taxes.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study. Section 3 describes the structure of the 
multiregional computable general equilibrium model used in the analysis of tax 
exporting. Section 4 presents the empirical implementation, which involves the 
construction of an eight-region benchmark data set as well as the specification of
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elasticities. Section 5 summarises the results of the model, for the cases of factor 
immobility, international capital mobility, differential factor taxation, and also 
presents the sensitivity analysis. Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.
3.2 Theoretical underpinnings of the study
Tax exporting refers to the shifting of tax burdens from domestic residents to non­
residents of the taxing jurisdiction; it is also known in the theory of international 
trade as the terms of trade effect (see e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1980; Woodland, 1982; 
Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994; Bhagwati et al, 1998).
To illustrate this concept, let us consider the case of a country that imposes a 
tariff on imports of a good in whose market the country has some market power. In 
this case, the effect of the imposition of a tariff will be to raise the price in the home 
country while lowering the price in the exporting country. As a result, the volume of 
trade in the world market falls. The increase in the price in the home country is less 
than the amount of the tariff, because part of the tariff is reflected in a reduction in 
the other country’s export price, and hence is not passed on to domestic consumers. 
This decline in the foreign country’s export price will improve the home country’s 
terms of trade, leading to a welfare improvement in the home economy.
A country can improve its terms of trade by imposing a tariff but at the cost of 
increased inefficiencies. First, there is a production distortion loss, caused by the 
increase in domestic production of the good as a result of the higher domestic price. 
Second, there is a consumption distortion loss caused by the reduction in consumers’ 
demand for the good, once again as a result of the higher domestic price. The benefits 
of the tariffs are represented by the terms of trade gain resulting from the decline in 
the foreign export price. The final result in terms of welfare will depend on which
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effect dominates. In a country that can not affect its terms of trade, costs will exceed 
benefits.
The existing literature on tax exporting has concentrated in the exportation of 
state and local taxes to other regions within the same country. This literature has also 
focused on issues such as foreign tax credits (e.g. Damus et al, 1991) and 
deductibility of state and local taxes with multilevel governments (e.g. Wildasin, 
1987a).
McLure (1969) is one of the first authors that analysed tax exporting in the 
context of a general equilibrium framework.2 3McLure addressed the question of the 
extent to which the burden of taxes levied by state and local governments is borne by 
non-residents of the taxing jurisdiction. In order to do this, he presented a theoretical 
general equilibrium analysis of interstate incidence of several types of general taxes 
levied in one state in a larger nation.1 The key assumption in McLure’s analysis is 
that labour is completely immobile between states; also, capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile in response to interstate differentials in rates of return, and the 
geographic site of residence of both workers and capitalists is assumed to be fixed. 
McLure concludes that, under the restrictive assumptions of his model, “...the degree 
of net tax exporting on the side of sources of income depends upon the change in the 
return to capital resulting from the tax in question and the extent to which the non­
taxing state is a net debtor or creditor” (p. 481). On the uses side, “...interstate tax 
exporting depends upon how the tax alters the terms or trade of the non-taxing state 
and the amount of the product of the taxing state bought by non-residents” (p. 482).
2 In this case, the general equilibrium framework matters because the author is considering interstate 
mobility of factors, and this assumption is likely to be of considerable importance in determining 
interstate tax incidence.
3 These general taxes include: taxes on all labour employed in the taxing state, on all capital invested 
in the state, on all production of the state, on the consumption of all domestically produced goods, on 
all imports, and on all exports.
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This kind of tax exporting can be significant when the regions’ producers 
and/or consumers are non-negligible in size relative to the market for some particular 
commodity (a good or a factor). In this case, the government will have an incentive to 
tax exports or imports in order to restrict trade and to achieve improvements in the 
region’s terms of trade. Oates (1972) points out that a common form of tax exporting 
could be the imposition of a tax on restaurants and hotel bills in tourist centres.
One implication of tax exporting is that it is commonly believed that the 
presence of tax exporting reduces the effective cost of public services, by pushing 
some of the burden on to non-residents, and thus creating an incentive to increase 
public expenditure. This issue has been analysed by Wildasin (1987b), who shows 
that the additional revenues could be collected from exported or non-exported taxes 
without affecting the marginal cost of public funds. Furthermore, Wildasin (1987a) 
points out that if tax exporting affects spending, it will do so by creating an income 
effect and by affecting the marginal excess burden of non-exported taxes.
In a paper evaluating the literature on interregional exporting and importing 
of state and local taxes within the United States, Mutti and Morgan (1986) indicate 
that tax exporting may result in lower tax rates since public services could be partly 
financed by non-residents. In the long run tax exporting can also have effects on the 
levels of income and employment within the taxing region, in the patterns of resource 
use and on the location of economic activity across regions, since the lower tax rates 
may attract footloose industries and other mobile factors to the region. The inflow of 
factors can result in rapid growth of the tax-exporting region (see for example, Oates, 
1972; Mutti and Morgan, 1986; Oates, 1991).
Little empirical work has been done on tax exporting among countries. 
Damus et al (1991) evaluate tax exporting between Canada and the rest of the world.
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They develop a numerical general equilibrium model in order to highlight the 
importance of tax exporting in determining the welfare effects of tax changes in open 
economies. In their model the authors emphasise the importance of including foreign 
tax credits when modelling the supply of foreign capital.4 In this context, tax 
exporting occurs either through a change in the terms of trade or through a change in 
the net return paid to foreign-owned capital employed in Canada. Damus’ et al 
measure of the aggregate welfare change (AW) resulting from a given tax change 
includes a tax exporting (TEE) effect and an efficiency effect (DWL), that is,
AW = TEE + DWL , [1]
where AW is calculated as the sum of equivalent variations across income groups; 
TEE captures the possibility of exporting tax burdens to non-residents (foreigners); 
and DWL is the efficiency effect (dead-weight loss or gain) associated with a given 
tax change, which captures the impact on resource allocation resulting from any 
change in the overall pattern of taxation in the economy.
The results of Damus et al (1991) indicate that tax exporting effects may be as 
significant as efficiency effects in evaluating potential reforms. Furthermore, 
efficiency effects may be influenced by the way foreign capital flows are modelled.
More recently, Morgan et al (1996) analyse long-run exporting and importing 
of regional taxes using a six-region general equilibrium model of the United States. 
They conclude that the ability of states to export taxes does not necessarily promote 
economic growth or welfare. In addition, factor tax exporting depends on regional 
ownership patterns and the determinants of factor prices, such as factor mobility, 
factor intensities, and elasticities of substitution in production.
4 In this chapter foreign tax credits are not considered.
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As indicated above, the literature I have reviewed mainly focuses on the 
exportation of state and local taxes to other regions within the same country, with the 
exception of Damus et al (1991). In what follows, I investigate whether developed 
countries export factor taxes to developing countries, contributing to the deterioration 
of their terms of trade and welfare.
3.3 The model
The general equilibrium model used to analyse tax exporting is a standard 
multicountry model that incorporates domestic tax structures in each region. The 
model is static and consists of eight regions, each one with a demand and production 
structures.5 The regions are linked through trade. Each region has three industries, 
each of which produces a single output. There are two factors of production (namely 
labour and capital) which are used as primary inputs; for simplicity, intermediate 
production is not considered. There is a representative consumer by region.
Commodities are considered to be qualitatively different from similar 
commodities produced abroad. This is the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), 
widely used in international trade applied general equilibrium analysis, to account for 
the presence of cross hauling in international trade data. In addition, the use of the 
Armington assumption rules out complete specialisation, and allows us to establish 
the strength of the terms of trade effect by introducing estimates of trade elasticities 
(Whalley, 1985).
I 1
11n the empirical implementation (section 3.4) it is explained how these regions were chosen.
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3.3.1 P r o d u c t io n  s id e  o f  t h e  m o d e l
On the production side of the model, in each region there are three industries each 
using labour (L) and capital (K) as inputs. Production exhibits constant returns to 
scale and firms are perfectly competitive, so that prices equal marginal costs of 
output. The production structure in each industry is summarised in Figure 3.1, and 
the formal equations and notation used in the model are presented in Appendix 3.1.
A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function describes the 
substitutability between L and K into value added for each industry in each region. 
More formally, the value added function for industry i, in region r, is given by,
Q[ =Y,r[81rL ',o;-,)'oi + (1 - 0[ )K[<0‘~I>/0' ]°r/<0i-,) for i = r=l,...,R, [ 2 ]
where Q[ is the value added in industry i in region r; y[ is a constant defining units 
of measurement; 5,r is a share parameter; ct[ is the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital in the production of good i.
»
Figure 3.1: Production structure in each sector
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Each industry selects an optimal level of inputs that minimises the cost of 
producing Q units of output. Further, each industry in each region produces a 
commodity that can be transformed either into a commodity sold on the domestic 
market, or into an export according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. In a second stage, exports are allocated across regions according to a sub 
CET function.
Factors are non-produced commodities in fixed supply in each region. It is 
assumed that both factors are mobile across industries within the region. Regarding 
international factor mobility, labour is assumed to be internationally immobile 
because of restrictions to international labour mobility. As to capital, in global 
models international mobility is usually ignored (e.g. Whalley, 1985; Shoven and 
Whalley, 1992). However, in their analysis of domestic tax policies and the foreign 
sector, Goulder et al (1983) point out that the incorporation of international capital 
mobility can substantially affect the results of the model.6 In addition, capital markets 
are becoming more integrated internationally. Hence, it seems appropriate to consider 
two variants of the model: one in which both labour and capital are assumed to be 
internationally immobile, and another one in which capital is internationally mobile.7
3.3.2 Demand side of the model
On the demand side of the model, it is assumed that consumers within a region have 
identical homothetic preferences. This assumption allows us to consider a
6 See Gasiorek et al (1992) for a presentation of a multicountry computable general equilibrium model 
with perfect international capital mobility.
7 Whalley (1985) mentions that the absence of international factor mobility follows the tradition of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin literature. This assumption can be crucial for model results, since factor mobility can 
be a substitute for trade. Moreover, "... factor flows in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework can equalise 
relative factor endowments across countries, removing the source of trade. Global gains from
liberalised factor mobility........can thus be just as important as global trade liberalisation" (Whalley
1985, p.36).
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representative consumer, endowed with all the labour and capital in the region. The 
consumer maximises a nested CES utility function subject to the regional budget 
constraint.8 The nesting structure used for each region in the CES final demand 
function is summarised in Figure 3.2, and the complete set of equations and notation 
that defines the demand side of the model is presented in Appendix 3.1.
Figure 3.2: Nested utility structure
Utility
Sector 1 I Sector 2
---------1-----------------1 L--------------- i--------
Domestic j  ^  Imports | j Domestic Imports Domestic Imports
Imports from the I Imports from the Imports from the
other 7 regions j other 7 regions other 7 regions
Sector 3
......I
At the top level, consumers decide how much to spend on goods from each 
sector given the regional budget constraint. Consumers demand a composite of 
similar imported and domestically produced goods. At the second level, the 
consumer determines domestic and aggregate import expenditure in each sector 
according to a CES function.9 At the third level, purchases of imports from each 
region are selected in each sector, according to a CES function.10
The budget constraint in each region is given by income equal expenditure (Ir 
= Er), where income is derived from factor ownership, government transfers and the
* It seems appropriate to use a nested CES utility function because it allows us to use a different 
elasticity of substitution for each level. In contrast, in a single-stage CES function only one elasticity 
of substitution can be specified, and this applies for all goods appearing in demands. In this case, if all 
expenditure shares are small, the value for the compensated own-price elasticity for all goods would 
be approximately the same (Whalley, I98S).
’ The substitution between comparable domestic and composite imports determines the price elasticity 
of demand for imports.
>0 The substitution among imports from the other 7 regions determines export-price elasticities faced 
by the region.
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region’s current account deficit. On the other hand, the region’s expenditure includes 
the amount spent on the goods as well as taxes paid.
3.3.3 Treatment of policies
In addition to demand and production structures, the model also incorporates some 
policy elements that may have regional effects, such as factor, income and 
consumption taxes, as well as import tariffs. Domestic taxes, especially factor taxes, 
affect the cost structure of domestic output. Since part of this output is exported, the 
degree of tax exporting will depend on how much the price of the exported output is 
increased by the domestic tax, and the fraction of output purchased by non­
residents. 11
Factor taxes are modelled as ad valorem taxes on the use of factors of 
production, and so will affect the price paid by producers. These taxes are exported 
mainly due to intersectoral effects.
Income taxes are modelled as an ad valorem tax on taxable income. This tax 
is paid by residents and cannot be exported. However, it seems appropriate to 
consider this tax in the formulation of the model, since in some countries there exists 
double taxation of corporate income, that is at the firm and shareholders levels.
Consumption taxes are modelled as ad valorem taxes on final consumption, 
and therefore affect the price paid by consumers. Consumption taxes cannot be 
exported since the possibility of commuting is not considered; that is, in the model 
workers purchase goods in the region where they live. These taxes are included 
I *
" This is what McLure (1969) refers to as tax exporting from the uses side.
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because in the counterfactual experiments, domestic taxes are eliminated and 
replaced by an equal yield non-distorting tax on final expenditure.
Import tariffs are modelled as an ad valorem tax on imports, with rates 
varying across commodities. Import tariffs are not exported, but are used to alter the 
terms of trade of a country with respect to its trading partners. Finally, all tax 
revenues raised are assumed to be transferred back to consumers.
3.3.4 Equilibrium conditions in the model
Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. A 
general equilibrium in the model can be interpreted in the usual Walrasian sense as a 
set of prices for which all markets clear. That is demand-supply equalities hold in 
each goods and factors markets; zero profit conditions hold for each industry in each 
region; and each region is in external-sector balance. Appendix 3.1 formally presents 
the full set of equilibrium conditions of the model.
In the goods market, gross output equals final demand because intermediate 
production is netted out; specifically, the model has the following blocks of market 
clearing conditions:
• The supply of goods for domestic consumption must equal the demand for 
domestically produced goods.
• Exports from region r to region s must equal imports of region s from region r, 
because there are assumed to be no transfer (e.g. transport) costs in shipping 
goods from one region to another.
• Total supply of composite commodities, which consists of the composite of 
similar domestic products and aggregate imports, must equal consumer’s demand 
in each region.
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Regarding factor markets, it is initially assumed that both factors are 
intersectorally mobile within each region, but internationally immobile. The first 
assumption implies that there is only one price for each factor in each region. The 
second assumption implies that factor prices are different in each region, and this is a 
crucial assumption for the results of the model, since market clearing conditions in 
factor markets determine factor prices. Under these assumptions, there are separate 
labour and capital equilibrium conditions in each region. That is, factor use across all 
industries by region must equal the region’s endowment of labour and capital (i.e. 
there is full employment in all regions).
In the second variant of the model capital is assumed to be internationally 
mobile. This assumption implies that there is only one price for capital in the model, 
and this is determined by the market clearing condition that factor use across all 
industries and regions must equal the world endowment of capital (i.e. relative to the 
model with international capital immobility, the capital market clearing conditions 
within countries are dropped).
In addition, zero profit conditions must hold for each industry in each region; 
in particular;
• In each region the value of domestic output in sector i must be equal to the capital 
and labour costs of producing good i. At the same time, the value of domestic 
output in sector i equals the value of commodities sold in the domestic market 
plus the value of commodities sold as exports.
• Export aggregation, that is the value of commodities sold as exports, must equal
the value of the sum of exports to the other 7 regions.
I
•  Import aggregation, that is the value of total imports, must equal the value of the 
sum of imports from the other 7 regions.
8 6
• The value of the composite commodity i demanded by consumers must equal the 
value of aggregate imports plus the value of domestically produced goods.
»
• The value of goods sold for domestic consumption must be equal to the value of 
the demand for domestically produced goods.
• The value of exports from region r to region s must be equal to the value of 
imports of region s from region r.
Finally, an external sector balance condition for each region is included. This 
equilibrium condition indicates that each region is always on its budget constraint. In 
the model, this condition states that the value of exports minus the value of imports, 
that is the trade surplus (or deficit), remains fixed in real terms.12
Having presented the equilibrium conditions that characterise the model, I 
proceed to introduce the benchmark data set to be used in the simulations. In 
addition, I calculate the parameters of the model that are consistent with the data set 
and that together with the elasticities (that are exogenously specified), reproduce the 
data set as an equilibrium solution of the model.
3.4 Empirical implementation
The model consists of eight regions, each of which engages in both domestic and 
foreign trade activities. No internal trade among the countries of any region is 
included. These regions were chosen to reflect world trade. Instead of having two big 
regions called “developed countries” and “developing countries”, it was decided to 
split each group into four sub-groups. The advantage of this additional classification 
is that it allows us to consider from which region(s) developing sub-groups are likely
12 The trade balance is not equal to zero, since this involves adjusting the data.
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to “import” taxes. Developed regions were chosen to represent the main trading areas 
in the developed world, that is the United States (USA), Japan (JAP), the European
A
Union (12-member-EU), and the remaining developed countries were grouped in 
other development countries (ODC). Developing regions comprise a heterogeneous 
group of countries, and were chosen according to their geographical location, that is 
developing America (DAM), developing Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS), and 
developing Europe (DE).13 Table 3.1 presents the grouping of individual countries.
The regional classification described above is important since domestic tax 
policy in developed regions may affect one developing region more than another. 
Also, developing regions have more commercial ties with one developed region than 
with others. For example, the USA is the main market for developing America due to 
its proximity, as it is the case between Japan and developing Asia. The European 
Union is the main market for African products, not only because of their proximity 
but also because there are still colonial ties and institutional agreements (e.g. EU- 
ACP). Lastly, developing Europe is increasingly trading with the European Union 
mainly as a result of the opening up of the countries in Eastern Europe, and the 
possibility of enlargement of the European Union.
The model uses 1990 data. This was the latest consistent year available at the 
time of building the benchmark data set.
"  Initially, developing Oceania (which included Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu) was included as a ninth region. At the time of solving the model I encountered 
numerical problems because this region was very small compared to the others (in 1990 its GDP 
accounted for only 0.2% of world GDP). Hence, it was excluded from the analysis.
8 8
Table 3.1: Regional classification
Region 1: USA United States
Reeion 2: JAP Japan
Reeion 3: EU Belgium Denmark France • Germany
Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg
Netherlands Portugal Spain United Kingdom
Region 4: ODC Australia Austria Canada Finland
Iceland Israel New Zealand Norway
South Africa Sweden Switzerland
Reeion 5: DAM Antigua & Barbuda Argentina Barbados Belize
Bolivia Brazil Chile • Colombia
Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador
El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana
Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico
Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru
St. Lucia St.Kits & Nevis Suriname Uruguay
Trinidad & Tobago Venezuela St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Reeion 6: DAF Algeria Angola Benin Botswana
Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde
Central African Rep. Chad Comoros Congo
Cote d’Ivoire Djibouti Egypt Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana
Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho
Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania
Mauritius Morocco Mozambique Namibia
Niger Nigeria Reunion Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone
Sudan Swaziland Togo Tunisia
Uganda Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
Region 7: DAS Bahrain Bhutan Bangladesh China
Hong Kong India Indonesia Iran (Islamic Rep)
Jordan Kuwait Laos Lebanon
Malaysia Mongolia Myanmar Nepal
Oman Pakistan Philippines Qatar
Rep. of Korea Saudi Arabia Singapore Sri Lanka
Syrian Arab Rep. Taiwan Thailand Yemen
United Arab Emirates
Region 8: DE Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep.
Estonia Hungary Malta Poland
Romania Slovenia Turkey USSR (former)
Yugoslavia (former)
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3.4.1 Commodities considered
As mentioned previously, intersectoral effects play an important role in the 
exportation of domestic taxes. It would be desirable to include a wide range of 
commodities in the model. However, given that the analysis involves a large number 
of countries, it is difficult to find the same data for every country. For example, in 
some countries production data are disaggregated, but this is not the case for foreign 
trade data (or vice versa). Also, in some countries the cost components of value 
added are not available. Hence, it was necessary to find a commodity classification 
such that production and foreign trade data were available for as many countries as 
possible.
In the model, each region is assumed to produce three commodities: primary 
commodities (including fuels), manufactured goods, and services. It is also assumed 
that each region’s domestically produced and imported goods are qualitatively 
different (i.e. the Armington assumption). Appendix 3.2 presents the sources and 
how the data set was assembled.
3.4.2 Treatment of policies
In the model, both commercial and domestic tax policies are considered. Commercial 
policy is represented by import tariffs, applied in ad valorem form; tariff collections 
are part of the government’s revenues.14 As to domestic taxation, factor, income and 
consumption taxes are incorporated in the domestic transactions of each region. 
Factor taxes include corporate and property taxes, treated as taxes on the use of 
capital by industry, and payroll taxes and social security contributions, treated as
14 Import tariffs were included because of their effect on both regional terms of trade and welfare.
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taxes on the use of labour by industry.15 Income taxes are treated as taxes on 
consumer’s taxable income. Consumption taxes include value added tax, sales tax 
and some specific taxes on consumption. All taxes are in ad valorem form. Lastly, 
foreign tax credits are not included in the model.
Tax rates are calculated by dividing tax revenues (as taken from the 
benchmark data set) by the model tax base, obtaining an average effective tax rate. 
For simplicity, in applied general equilibrium models it is assumed that marginal tax 
rates equal the observed average tax rates. However, Fullerton and Gordon (1983) 
indicate that for some taxes16, there is no reason to assume that average and marginal 
tax rates are equal, and that marginal tax rates should be used instead. King and 
Fullerton (1984) point out that “...the difference between average tax rates and 
marginal tax rates primarily involve distinctions between ex post taxes paid and ex 
ante expectations of taxes using current legislation” (p. 266). The use of marginal tax 
rates, however, is also subject to criticisms as indicated by Shoven and Whalley 
(1984). They emphasise that various alternative tax rates can be calculated depending 
on “ ...more characteristics than can adequately be captured by the models...” and 
hence, this is “...inappropriate because distortions at the appropriate margins are not 
fully represented” (p. 1031).
Table 3.2 shows the tax rates used in the model. As can be seen, the resulting 
tax rates are quite low; in addition, income tax rates, factor taxes and taxes on 
domestic goods and services are higher in developed regions than in developing
15 From the available data it was only possible to calculate one lax rate by factor tax in each region. 
Since intersectoral effects play an important role in the model, the data set was also modified to 
include differential tax rates by industry in order to assess the sensibility of the results (Appendix 3.2 
presents the procedure followed to calculate the differential tax rates).
6 These authors re-examine the modelling of the property tax, unemployment insurance, workmen's 
compensation, and social security, and present the effects of corporate and personal taxes on firms' 
financial and investment decisions.
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regions. The collection of tax revenue in developing countries is often limited by 
their administrative capacity and political constraints. One consequence of this is that 
direct taxation plays a much more limited role in developing than in developed 
regions. Hence, developing regions exhibit a heavier reliance on indirect taxation, 
especially taxes on international trade.
Table 3.2: Model-equivalent ad valorem tax rates used in the model (%)
Regions
USA JAP HU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
1. Taxes on the use of capital
Corporate tax 5.3 11.3 6.3 6.3 5.0 6.0 7.6 3.3
Property tax 0.7 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.5 0.4 1.0 0.1
2. Taxes on the use of labour
Payroll tax 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.3 2.1
Social security contributions 11.3 16.7 24.9 10.5 8.5 8.0 1.5 3.6
3. Taxes on domestic goods and 
Primary commodities
services
3.0
1/
1.1 5.2 3.4 5.3 0.5 0.4 3.9
Manufactured goods 4.4 14.3 11.2 3.6 7.2 6.5 11.8 4.2
Services 8.1 5.0 10.4 11.8 4.1 0.1 7.5 0.7
4. Income tax 9.2 6.2 8.3 9.2 0.2 1.6 1.4 3.0
5. Import tariffs
Primary commodities 13.5 9.3 15.0 9.3 20.2 53.6 33.2 15.7
Manufactured goods 5.2 4.9 5.4 7.7 21.6 30.2 30.0 11.3
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
u Includes mainly commodity excise taxes, and retail sales taxes. 
Source: Author’s own calculations, as described in Appendix 3.2.
During the nineties there have been some changes in tax policy (International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, various years). The general trend has been towards 
reduced rates of personal income tax and corporate tax. There has also been a shift 
towards indirect taxation as a mean of collecting revenue. Some countries with fiscal 
difficulties (e.g., Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, the Middle East countries) have chosen 
to rely on indirect taxation either by increasing the tax rate or by broadening the tax 
base. Other countries (e.g., Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Ghana) have
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introduced VAT, and in some other cases (e.g., Japan, Pakistan, Thailand, Ivory 
Coast, Niger) VAT systems have been simplified by reducing the number or rates. 
The general trend among Latin American countries has been the increase of VAT. In 
Central Europe changes have also been made in with a view to harmonising 
corporate taxation and VAT with the European Union.
Reductions in corporate income taxes have been observed in countries such as 
Korea, the Solomon Islands, Bangladesh, Ireland, Kenya, Lesotho, Zimbabwe. Other 
countries (e.g., Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Singapore, Pakistan, the 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana) have been reducing 
the burden of individuals by rate reductions, a widening of tax bands or one-off 
rebates, or by a combination of these.
Regarding direct taxation, the general trend has been to protect the tax base, 
often accompanied by reduced or at least stable tax rates. Also, anti-avoidance / anti­
evasion measures have been strengthened in order to deal with international tax 
avoidance and new business practices. Perhaps as a result of the increased 
competition brought about by globalisation, one of the main features world-wide has 
been the enactment of measures design to attract investment (exemptions and other 
tax concessions), sometimes limited to specific sectors (e.g. the oil sector in Nigeria). 
The Netherlands have introduced tax incentives in order to make the investment 
climate more attractive: these include the extension of incentives to research and 
development activities, by allowing accelerated or free depreciation for certain new 
assets, and relaxing significantly its ruling policy.
Virtually all countries in the world continued to expand their tax treaty 
networks, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and several countries have been 
reducing their import tariffs in the continuing move towards freer markets.
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3.4»3 Benchmark data set, calibration and elasticities
The benchmark data set involves data on value added by component by industry, 
domestic taxes, foreign trade and import tariffs. Given that the model considers a 
representative consumer in each region, the final demand for domestic products is 
equal to gross output minus exports, whereas the final demand for imported products 
equals imports.
The size of the eight regions is given by their respective GDP, in 1990 US 
dollars, as reported in the World Tables (World Bank, 1995). The benchmark data set 
satisfies the equilibrium conditions of the model in the presence of the existing 
policies. I use data from National Accounts as compiled by the United Nations, 
World Tables produced by the World Bank, and the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund. Regarding foreign trade statistics, I 
use information from UNCTAD (1995) and the GATT-trade policy review. A 
detailed presentation of the sources and how the data set was assembled is presented 
in Appendix 3.2.
Once the data set has been assembled, some parameter values, such as share 
parameters and scale parameters, can be directly calculated from the equilibrium 
conditions of the model, following the procedure described in Mansur and Whalley 
(1984). Because of the CES/CET functional forms used in the model, some 
parameter values for the elasticities of substitution and the elasticities of 
transformation need to be specified. Then, on the demand side, share parameters can 
be obtained from demand functions. On the supply side, share and scale parameters
can be obtained from cost functions.
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The results of the model are dependent on the values selected for the
elasticities of substitution. Trade elasticities determine the strength of the terms of
»
trade effects associated with trade policies. These terms of trade effects, together with 
production and consumption effects, which also depend on the elasticities chosen, 
determine the welfare effects of any policy change. Sensitivity analysis is performed 
around the values chosen.
On the demand side, the model involves elasticities of substitution in 
consumption between composite goods; elasticities of substitution between 
comparable imported and domestically produced goods; and elasticities of 
substitution between imported products. In this case, the elasticities used are based 
on price elasticity estimates, since it was not possible to find econometric estimates 
of elasticities of substitution for CES demand functions. The elasticity of substitution 
between composite commodities was set equal to one in all regions; these elasticities 
imply Cobb-Douglas demand functions.
The elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods (o) was set equal to literature estimates of import price elasticities 
(see Table 3.3). Within each region the same value was assumed for all commodity- 
substitution possibilities (Appendix 3.3 presents a description of the sources). Lastly, 
since substitution between import types forming import composites determines the 
export price elasticity faced by the region, the elasticity of substitution between 
imports forming import composites (Ç) was set equal to estimates of export price 
elasticities obtained from the literature (see Table 3.3 and Appendix 3.3).
I
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Table 33: Elasticities in the model
Regions
Elasticity USA JAP EU- ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
a
Primary Commodities 0.70 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.70
Manufactured goods 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.90 0.81 0.81 0.81
Services 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
P
Primary Commodities -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77
Manufactured goods -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75
Services -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95
Primary Commodities -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
Manufactured goods -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
Services -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
Primary Commodities 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72
Manufactured goods 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72
Services
Primary Commodities
0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72
0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41
Manufactured goods 0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41
Services 0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41
Notes:
a  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour; based on estimates presented in 
Whalley (1985).
p is the elasticity of transformation for domestic output; taken from de Janvry et. al. (1991).
£ is the elasticity of transformation for exports. These elasticities appear to be identical 
when the figures are rounded to two decimal places.
t) is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. This elasticity was 
set equal to literature-survey import price elasticities. Within any region, the same value is 
used for all commodity-substitution possibilities.
£ is the elasticity of substitution between regional imports. This elasticity was set equal to 
literature-survey export price elasticities. Within any region, the same value is used for all 
commodity-substitution possibilities.
Source: See Appendix 3.3.
Shiells and Reinert (1993) point out that estimated Armington elasticities are 
low; thus, there are large terms of trade effects losses associated with trade 
liberalisation. They also state that the value chosen for the elasticity of substitution
among imports from different sources clearly affects trade, terms of trade and the
/
welfare effects of bilateral tariff reductions.
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The Armington assumption has been criticised by Brown (1987), in the sense 
that it may imply large terms of trade effects regardless of the size of the country. 
Brown also shows that the terms of trade effect would increase in magnitude, the 
larger the elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods, and the smaller the elasticity of substitution between import types.
Regarding the supply side, the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital (a) is the key parameter of the value added functions. I use elasticities of 
factor substitution by industry based on those used by Whalley (1985). With regard to 
the elasticities of transformation for domestic output (p), it was not possible to find 
econometric estimates, so that the elasticities of transformation estimated for Ecuador 
by de Janvry et al (1991) were used. The strong assumption adopted here is that the 
same elasticity values apply by industry for all the regions in the model. Finally, it 
was not possible to find econometric estimates of the elasticity of transformation for 
exports (e); hence, these parameters were calculated such that the elasticity of supply 
was equal to one. Once all parameters have been specified, the model can be solved 
for counterfactual experiments. The model was solved using a routine I wrote in 
GAMS.
3.5 Model results
In this section a set of simulations is performed to investigate whether developed 
countries export taxes to developing countries. Seven counterfactual experiments are 
carried out in which existing taxes and import tariffs are eliminated and replaced by 
an equal yield non-distorting tax. These experiments involve the elimination an 
replacement of: i) capital taxes; ii) labour taxes; iii) all factor taxes; iv) import tariffs; 
v) all factor taxes and import tariffs vi) income taxes; and vii) all factor taxes, import
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tariffs, and income taxes. The equal yield non-distorting tax is a destination-based tax 
on final expenditure within the region.17 Whalley (1980a) points out that the 
introduction of an equal yield non-distorting tax may not be very realistic. However, 
it allows us to appraise the effect domestic taxes may have on both welfare and terms 
of trade of the region’s trading partners.
The counterfactual experiments were performed individually for USA, JAP, 
and EU, and for all developed regions simultaneously;18 Further, the cases of 
international factor immobility and international capital mobility were considered.
After each change was introduced, a new equilibrium was calculated and the 
results were compared with the benchmark equilibrium. I am mainly interested in the 
impact of each policy change on the regional terms of trade and on welfare. The 
terms of trade were calculated for each region in its trade with ail other regions, and 
correspond to a quantity weighted price index giving the relative price of exports and 
imports. The quantity weights used correspond to those associated with the 
benchmark equilibrium. A reduction in the price of a region’s exports relative to that 
of its imports implies a deterioration in the terms of trade of the region, whereas an 
increase in this relative price implies a terms of trade improvement.
The welfare effects of the policy changes are measured by the Hicksian 
Equivalent Variation (EV) for each region, where a positive EV refers to a welfare 
improving change and vice versa. A positive EV could be the result of the removal of 
domestic distortions that affect producer and/or consumer decisions. Distortions to
17 The possibility of using an origin-based tax was not considered because the introduction of this kind 
of tax may increase the price of domestic output, and in consequence the price of exports.
"  Counterfactual experiments were also performed for the region comprising other developed 
countries (ODC). These results are not reported since I am interested in tax exporting from developed 
to developing regions, and the replacement of taxes in the ODC region mainly affects USA, JAP and 
EU.
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producer decisions are caused by the effects of taxes on producer prices, whereas 
distortions to consumer decisions are caused by the effect differential factor taxation 
can have on output prices.
In the scenario with international capital mobility, the welfare effects will be 
decomposed according to equation [1] into a tax exporting effect (TEE) and an 
efficiency effect (DWL) (Damus et al, 1991). TEE is measured as:
TEE = VEPE -  VMPM ,
where Vg and Vm correspond to the initial values of exports and imports, 
respectively; and PE and PM denote tax-induced percentage changes in the producer 
prices of exports and imports, respectively. Then, from [1] it follows that efficiency 
gains (losses) are given by the difference between the aggregate welfare change and 
the tax exporting effect, that is:
DWL = AW -  TEE.
DWL captures the impact a change on the overall pattern of taxation in the 
economy has on resource allocation.
If a region is exporting domestic taxes to another region, one would expect 
that an increase in such taxes will cause a deterioration in the terms of trade of the 
importing region as well as a welfare loss. For the exporting region an improvement 
in the terms of trade is expected, but the welfare effects could go either way. That is, 
the exporting region could experience a welfare gain or loss, because with the 
increase in the tax an additional distortion is introduced. The final result will depend 
on whether the terms of trade effect or the efficiency effect dominates.
A priori one might expect that the USA is mainly exporting taxes to DAM, 
since the former is the main trading partner of the latter; similarly, JAP is expected to
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export taxes to DAS, while EU is expected to export taxes to DAF and to a lesser 
extent to DE.
»
3.5.1 Model results: Factor immobility
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the results of the experiments when factors of production 
are assumed to be internationally immobile. Focussing first on the replacement of 
factor taxes (labour, capital, and both), a common feature of the results is that there 
are small welfare changes and small terms of trade effects since the burden of the 
taxes is borne by the factors themselves (see Table 3.4). Further, the replacement of 
taxes on labour produces stronger terms of trade effects, which can be explained by 
the fact that labour taxes are higher that those on the use of capital.
1 0 0
Table 3.4: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax 
replacement of existing factor taxes 
Factor immobility
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Taxes on labour Taxes on capital All factor taxes
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
1. USA
USA 812 0.12 228 0.03 1,040 0.16
JAP -102 -0.04 -29 -0.01 -131 -0.05
EU -186 -0.03 -52 -0.01 -238 -0.03
ODC -180 -0.03 -50 -0.01 -230 -0.04
DAM -882 -0.06 -25 -0.02 -113 -0.07
DAF -19 -0.02 -5 -0.01 -25 -0.02
DAS -115 -0.03 -32 -0.01 -148 -0.04
DE -10 -0.01 -3 -0.00 -13 -0.01
Total -683 32 143
2. JAP
USA 248 0.04 135 0.02 384 0.06
JAP -307 -0.17 -164 -0.09 -486 -0.26
EU 185 0.02 101 0.01 286 0.04
ODC 20 0.00 11 0.00 31 0.01
DAM 8 0.00 4 0.00 12 0.01
DAF 7 0.01 4 0.00 11 0.01
DAS 91 0.01 49 0.01 141 0.02
DE 5 0.00 3 0.00 8 0.01
Total 256 142 387
3. EU
USA -20 -0.00 -5 -0.00 -24 -0.00
JAP 14 0.00 3 0.00 170 0.01
EU 513 0.06 127 0.02 637 0.08
ODC -125 -0.02 -31 -0.01 -156 -0.03
DAM -43 -0.03 -11 -0.01 -54 -0.03
DAF -126 -0.12 -31 -0.03 -157 -0.15
DAS -83 -0.02 -21 -0.01 -104 -0.03
DE -40 -0.03 -10 -0.01 -50 -0.04
Total 90 23 263
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA 679 0.10 228 0.03 907 0.13
JAP -482 -0.24 -220 -0.11 -716 -0.35
EU 13 -0.01 -37 -0.00 0 -0.01
ODC 1,032 0.16 404 0.06 1,433 0.23
DAM -139 -0.09 -37 -0.02 -175 -0.11
DAF -164 -0.15 -42 -0.04 -205 -0.19
DAS -211 -0.06 -41 -0.01 -250 -0.08
DE -81 -0.07 -23 -0.02 -103 -0.09
Total 647 233 890
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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When USA and EU unilaterally replace factor taxes, factors of production
move out of manufactures into primary commodities and services. As a result, a
»
reduction in exports (especially of manufactures) is observed as well as an increase in 
output for domestic consumption. Since USA and EU reduce their exports, there is a 
small reduction in aggregate consumption in all other regions, and they suffer a 
welfare loss. USA and EU obtain welfare gains; this means that factor taxes in USA 
and EU were a source of loss for the regions, so that when they are replaced there is a 
gain in domestic efficiency. There are also small improvements in terms of trade of 
USA and EU, and a very small deterioration in the other regions.
In the case of JAP, the replacement of factor taxes generates a welfare loss for 
the region and a small deterioration of its terms of trade. In this case factors of 
production are reallocated towards manufactured goods, which increases exports and 
reduces output for domestic consumption. At the same time, there is an increase in 
imports that is not enough to compensate the reduction in output for domestic 
consumption. Hence, there is a small welfare loss of around 0.005% of GDP. This 
result suggests that factor taxes did not constitute a source of loss for JAP. The 
welfare loss occurs despite the productive efficiency gain, and is caused by the 
deterioration of the terms of trade (0.3%). Since JAP is increasing its exports, there is 
a small increase in all other regions aggregate consumption and small welfare gains. 
There are also small improvements in the terms of trade of these regions.
When all developed regions (i.e., USA, JAP, EU, and ODC) replace factor 
taxes, factors of production reallocate towards services in USA and ODC, services
and manufactured goods in EU, and manufactured goods in JAP. As a result a
I
reduction in total exports is observed in USA, EU and ODC, and an increase in 
output for domestic consumption. There is also an increase in JAP’s exports, and in
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consequence a reduction in output for domestic consumption. This increase in JAP’s 
exports is not enough to compensate the reduction in exports from USA, EU and 
ODC, leading to a reduction in aggregate consumption and a welfare loss for 
developing regions; also, terms of trade deteriorate in these regions. Factor taxes 
were a source of loss for USA, EU and ODC; these regions obtain welfare gains as a 
result of the terms of trade effect. For JAP, they did not constitute a source of loss 
although there is a welfare loss despite the efficiency gain, caused by the 
deterioration of its terms of trade (0.5%). Qualitatively similar results are obtained 
when all eight regions simultaneously replace factor taxes: that is, developing regions 
suffer welfare losses and terms of trade worsening, whereas developed regions 
(except JAP) are better off (the results are not reported here).
In summary, when production factors are assumed to be internationally 
immobile, there is no tax exporting of domestic factor taxes to developing countries 
since the burden of the taxes is borne by the factors. In the case of JAP, the expected 
results for the existence of tax exporting are obtained, although the effects on both 
welfare and terms of trade are rather small. At this point it is important to point out 
that with a fixed amount of labour and capital, and with the assumption of factor 
immobility, factor taxes are borne by the factors themselves, so that the replacement 
of factor taxes by a non-distorting consumption tax would have no effect of 
equilibrium prices or quantities. However, in these experiments welfare gains 
(losses) and terms of trade improvement (deterioration) are obtained, and these can 
be explained by the fact that in the model the trade balance (deficit or surplus) in
each region remains fixed in real terms. If instead one carries out the same
l
experiments for the case in which there is a zero trade balance in each region (which
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involves adjusting the data set), then, as expected, no effects on either welfare or 
terms of trade are observed.
Table 3.5 presents the effects of the replacement of import tariffs. When a 
region imposes an import tariff its welfare and terms of trade should improve, 
provided the region has market power. The results indicate that when import tariffs 
are unilaterally replaced in USA, JAP and EU, there are welfare losses of $ 16 billion 
(0.3% of GDP), $5 billion (0.2% of GDP), and $23. billion (0.4% of GDP), 
respectively. In these regions imports increase because they are now cheaper; at the 
same time there is an increase in exports of primary commodities and manufactured 
goods, since factors of production reallocate towards these sectors, hence reducing 
output for domestic consumption. The increase in imports is not enough to 
compensate for the reduction in domestic supply, so that there is a reduction in 
consumption. These welfare losses are accompanied by terms of trade deterioration 
of 2.5% for USA, 2.6% for JAP, and 3% for EU.
There are also welfare and terms of trade improvements in developing 
regions. The replacement of import tariffs by USA mainly affects the terms of trade 
of DAM (1.3%), the replacement of import tariffs in JAP improves the terms of trade 
of DAS by 0.8%, and the replacement of tariffs in EU improves the terms of trade of 
DAF and DE improve by 2.9% and 1.2%, respectively. The welfare gains in 
developing regions are obtained as a result of the terms of trade improvement.
When all developed regions simultaneously replace import tariffs, their terms 
of trade worsen and there are welfare losses. The welfare losses exhibited by 
developed regions are smaller than when the unilateral replacement of import tariffs 
took place. As expected, developing regions are better off and their terms of trade
improve.
Table 3.5: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax 
replacement of existing import tariffs and factor taxes 
Factor immobility
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Import tariffs Import tariffs and factor 
taxes
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
1. USA
USA -16,986 -2.54 -15,886 -2.39
JAP 1,764 0.67 1,634 0.62
EU 3,597 0.48 3,358 0.45
ODC 4,034 0.72 3,800 0.68
DAM 2,160 1.34 2,045 1.27
DAF 780 0.72 755 0.69
DAS 2,398 0.58 2,248 0.54
DE 234 0.19 220 0.18
Total -2,018 -1,827
2. JAP
USA 2,012 0.34 2,392 0.41
JAP -4,974 -2.61 -5,478 -2.86
EU 1,457 0.19 1,741 0.23
ODC 905 0.16 932 0.17
DAM 324 0.20 335 0.21
DAF 120 0.11 131 0.12
DAS 3,469 0.83 3,599 0.85
DE 95 0.08 102 0.08
Total 3,408 3,754
3. EU
USA 3,433 0.57 3,411 0.56
JAP 1,060 0.39 1,076 0.40
EU -22,580 -3.00 -21,853 -2.92
ODC 7,731 1.38 7,557 1.35
DAM 1,317 0.81 1,259 0.77
DAF 3,134 2.89 2,968 2.73
DAS 4,255 1.01 4,141 0.98
DE 1,429 1.16 1,375 1.12
Total -220 -66
4. USA, JAP, EU, QDC
USA -5,910 -0.82 -4,935 -0.69
JAP -634 -1.07 -1,384 -1.41
EU -9,546 -1.41 -9,499 -1.41
ODC -7,202 -0.84 -5,718 -0.63
DAM 4,145 2.58 3,958 2.47
DAF 4,445 4.12 4,230 3.92
DAS 11,732 2.83 11,454 2.75
DE 2,325 1.90 2,215 1.81
Total -646 321
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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The last two columns of Table 3.5 look at the combined replacement of factor 
taxes and import tariffs. The results are qualitatively the same as when only tariffs are 
replaced; that is, there are welfare losses and terms of trade deterioration for the 
regions replacing the taxes. The other regions obtain welfare gains and their terms of 
trade improve. The magnitude of the effects are dominated by the effects of the 
replacement of import tariffs alone. During recent years, several countries have 
continued reducing their tariffs in the continuing move towards freer markets. Hence, 
the effects of the elimination of import tariffs on both welfare and terms of trade 
should have also reduced.
Then, the replacement of income taxes was considered. This tax is paid by 
residents, and so it cannot be exported. However, it seems interesting to perform this 
experiment since, as indicated before, in some countries there is double taxation of 
corporate income (at the firm and shareholders levels). Results not reported here 
indicate that the unilateral replacement of income taxes in USA and EU generates 
welfare gains (of 0.02% and 0.01% of GDP, respectively), and small terms of trade 
improvements (0.15% and 0.04%, respectively). When income taxes are eliminated 
in USA and EU, consumers increase their demand for final consumption goods. This 
demand is met by shifting domestic output from exports to the domestic market, so 
that there is an increase in aggregate consumption. The other regions are worse off 
and there is a small deterioration in their terms of trade.
When income taxes are replaced in JAP the results are similar to when factor 
taxes were replaced. That is, JAP suffers a welfare loss of 0.01% of GDP ($189
million) and a deterioration of 0.1% in its terms of trade. In this case, domestic
l
factors are reallocated towards manufactured goods increasing total exports and 
reducing output destined for domestic consumption. At the same time, imports
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increase but this is not enough to compensate the reduction in domestic supply. 
Hence, there is a reduction in aggregate consumption and a welfare loss. Welfare 
gains in other regions are small, as is the improvement in terms of trade.
Finally, the simultaneous replacement of factor taxes, income taxes and 
import tariffs was considered. Results not reported here indicate that when developed 
regions unilaterally replace existing taxes, they obtain welfare losses and their terms 
of trade worsen. The opposite effect occurs in developing regions. These results are 
dominated by the effects of the replacement of import tariffs.
In short, when factors of production are internationally immobile, import 
tariffs are more important than domestic taxes in their effects on both welfare and 
terms of trade. The results suggest that there is no tax exporting of domestic taxes by 
USA and EU to developing regions. In the case of JAP, the results indicate that there 
is tax exporting, but the effects on welfare and terms of trade are rather small.
3.5.2 Model results: International capital mobility 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results for the experiments when capital is assumed to 
be internationally mobile. Focussing first on the replacement of labour taxes, the 
results are very similar to those obtained under the assumption of factor immobility; 
that is, the terms of trade effects are small, as well as the welfare gains or losses.
This case differs from the previous scenario in that the supply of capital in 
each region is no longer fixed; capital will move in response to changes in its rate of 
return. When labour taxes are replaced (see Table 3.6), the price of labour falls so 
that producers in USA, JAP, and EU demand more of it. However, labour is in fixed 
supply in each region, so that the price of labour goes up again in order to eliminate 
the excess demand. When labour taxes are unilaterally replaced in USA and EU the
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welfare gains in these regions account for $0.7 and $0.4 billions, respectively, that is 
approximately 0.01% of GDP; the terms of trade improve by 0.1% in USA and 
0.04% in EU. These gains are comprised of $2.5 and $0.3 billion tax exporting 
effects (gains for the regions) and $1.8 and $0.2 billion efficiency losses. These two 
regions attract capital from the other regions, leading to an increase in total output; 
exports in both regions reduce, being the increased output destined for domestic 
consumption. In the other regions there is less capital available, and this leads to a 
reduction in domestic production and exports. As a result, USA and EU imports 
reduce; the reduction in imports is more than compensated by the increase in output 
for domestic consumption, leading to an increase in aggregate consumption.
When labour taxes are unilaterally replaced in JAP, the region obtains losses 
of $0.3 billion (0.01% of GDP), whereas its terms of trade deteriorate 1.9%. This is 
comprised of a reduction in tax exporting of $0.5 billion, and an efficiency gain of 
$0.2 billion. In this case capital leaves the region, and hence there is a reduction in 
production. However, exports increase since factors of production reallocate towards 
manufactured goods. In the other regions, both production and exports increase 
because there is more capital available. Also these regions are better off as a result of 
the improvement in their terms of trade.
In the scenario in which capital taxes are replaced there are stronger terms of 
trade and welfare effects (see Table 3.6). In this case, capital moves out of the 
regions where capital taxes are in place, in order to avoid the tax and into the 
region(s) eliminating the tax(es). This is accompanied by a reduction in the marginal 
product of capital in the receiving region relative to that of labour, since labour is in 
fixed supply.
T a b le  3 .6 : W elfare  and  term s o f  trade  effects o f  an equal-yield tax rep lacem ent o f  ex isting  facto r taxes 
International C apital M obility 
($  m illions)
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R eplacem ent T axes o n  labour T axes on capital All facto r taxes
o f taxes in: EV TE E DW L T O T EV TE E DW L T O T EV TEE DW L TO T
1. USA
USA 721 2.547 -1.827 0 .1 0 % -5,071 -5,327 256 -0 .87% -4,375 -2,227 -2,147 -0.77%
JA P -121 -8,081 7,960 -0 .04% -788 3,160 -3,948 0.12% -906 -5,244 4,338 0.09%
EU -203 -3 ,184 2,981 -0 .03% -525 1,273 -1,798 0.01% -723 -2,043 1,320 -0.01%
O D C -131 4 ,624 -4,755 -0 .02% 1,785 412 1,373 0.37% 1,656 4,991 -3,335 0.35%
DA M -72 1,150 -1 ,222 -0 .04% 803 483 320 0.57% 733 1,583 -850 0.53%
D A F -19 -906 887 -0 .01% -92 349 -441 -0.01% -110 -593 483 -0.03%
DAS -101 9 ,999 -10,100 -0 .02% 1,059 -2,567 3,626 0.29% 96 0 7 ,690 -6,731 0.26%
D E -12 -6 ,149 6,137 -0 .01% -147 2,489 -2,635 -0.05% -159 -3,914 3,756 -0.06%
Total 62 0 61 -2,976 271 -3,247 -2,925 242 -3,167
2. JA P
USA 225 211 14 0 .0 4 % 2,519 2,978 -459 0.48% 2,733 3,177 -444 0.51%
JA P -314 -540 225 -0 .17% 339 -8,857 9 ,196 -1.90% -28 -9,346 9,318 -2.06%
EU 176 147 29 0.02% 1,006 1,343 -337 0.17% 1,172 1,481 -309 0.19%
O D C 41 49 -8 0.01% 712 829 -117 0.16% 752 877 -125 0.16%
DAM 12 14 -2 0.01% 221 231 -10 0.15% 232 244 -11 0.16%
D A F 6 5 1 0 .0 1 % 152 208 -56 0.16% 158 213 -54 0.16%
DAS 119 119 -0 0 .0 2 % 3,776 3,841 -65 0.75% 3,898 3,955 -58 0.77%
DE 2 -4 7 0.00% -175 158 -333 -0.07% -173 154 -327 -0.06%
Total 267 1 266 8.549 731 7 ,819 8.745 754 7,991
3. ELL
USA -30 -25 -4 0 .0 0 % -554 -77 -476 -0.05% -584 -103 -480 -0.06%
JA P 13 5 8 0.00% -1,238 -377 -861 -0.10% -1,227 -373 -854 -0.10%
EU 433 283 151 0.04% -6,577 -8,741 2,164 -1.17% -6,190 -8,461 2,271 -1.13%
O D C -51 -41 -9 -0 .01% 5,997 6,687 -690 1.17% 5,946 6,646 -700 1.16%
DAM -34 -27 -7 -0 .02% 177 300 -123 0.16% 144 273 -129 0.14%
DA F -80 -66 -15 -0 .06% 906 1,031 -125 1.09% 828 966 -138 1.03%
DAS -58 -67 9 -0 .02% 2,813 2,981 -169 0.65% 2.757 2,917 -160 0.63%
DE -64 -62 -2 -0 .04% -1,386 -1 .300 -86 -0 .55% -1,448 -1.360 -87 -0.59%
Total 130 1 130 138 504 -367 228 506 -278
4 USA. JA P . E U . O D C
USA 583 2,647 -2,064 0 .13% 1,112 966 146 0.13% 1,750 3,371 -1.621 0.22%
JA P -463 -8.395 7,931 -0 .21% -218 -5,178 4,960 -1.44% -733 -13,221 12,487 -1.65%
EU 1.011 -2,265 3,276 0 .1 1 % -1,121 -1 ,956 835 -0.33% -1,155 -4,861 3,705 -0.34%
O D C 987 5,309 -4,322 0 .15% -1,887 -1,445 -441 -0.37% -1,044 4,010 -5,054 -0.24%
DAM -71 1,134 -1,205 -0 .04% 1,201 989 212 0.90% 1,086 2,002 -916 0.83%
DA F 4.563 -2 .280 6,843 -1 .50% 6,015 5 ,578 437 0.10% 5,909 -585 6,494 0.01%
DAS 35 9,871 -9,836 0 .0 0 % 9.435 3.531 5,904 2.16% 9,334 15,271 ■5,937 2.13%
D E -24 -6 ,014 5,990 -0 .02% -1.843 -3.145 1.302 -0.60% -1,950 -5,066 3,116 -0.68%
Total 6.621 8 6,613 12,694 -661 13,354 13,196 922 12.274
EV: Equivalent V ariation; TEE : T ax  Exporting  E ffect; DW L: D eadw eight gain (or loss); TO T: T erm s o f  Trade. 
Note: Totals  m ay  not add up  due  to rounding.
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When capital taxes are unilaterally replaced by USA and EU, the welfare 
losses in these regions account for $5.1 and $6.6 billions, respectively, that is 
approximately 0.1 % of GDP; the terms of trade worsen by 0.9% in USA and 1.2% in 
EU. These losses are comprised of $5.3 and $8.7 billion tax exporting effects (losses 
for the regions) and $0.3 and $2.2 billion efficiency gains. When capital taxes are 
replaced, the price of capital falls so that producers in USA and EU demand more of 
it. Hence, production increases as well as exports. In the other regions there is less 
capital available, and this leads to a reduction in domestic production and exports. As 
a result of this, USA and EU imports reduce, so that there is a reduction in aggregate 
consumption. As to the other regions, DAM benefits more when USA replaces its 
capital taxes than when EU does it; on the contrary, DAF benefits more when EU 
replaces its capital taxes (in fact, when USA replaces its taxes DAF loses $92 
millions).
The terms of trade of USA and EU deteriorate since the price of their exports 
is lower after the replacement of capital taxes, and the price of their imports has gone 
up (due to the reduction in production for exports in the other regions). Also, the 
improvement of DAM’s terms of trade is greater when USA replaces its taxes rather 
than EU (0.6% compared to 0.2%). The improvement of DAF’s terms of trade is 
more significant when EU replaces its taxes (i.e. 1.1% compared to -0.01 %).
When JAP replaces capital taxes it obtains a welfare gain of 0.01% of GDP, 
despite the fact that the terms of trade of this region deteriorate by 1.9% (because its 
imports are now more expensive). These gains are comprised of a reduction in tax
exporting of $8.9 billion (loss for the region) and $9.2 billion efficiency gain. JAP
I
also attracts capital, hence there is an increase in production and an increase in 
exports. In the other regions, both production and exports reduce because there is less
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capital available. Also these regions (except DE) are better off as a result of the
improvement in their terms of trade (especially DAS whose terms of trade improve 
«
0.8% ).
When USA, JAP, EU and ODC simultaneously replace capital taxes, capital 
moves into JAP, EU and ODC; this result can be explained by the fact that these 
regions had higher taxes on the use of capital than USA. DAM, DAF and DAS 
benefit from the replacement of capital taxes in the developed regions, and there is an 
improvement in their terms of trade.
Let us now consider the replacement of all factor taxes (last two columns of 
Table 3.6). In this case, the results are dominated by what happens when capital taxes 
are replaced. When USA, JAP and EU unilaterally replace factor taxes, there is a 
welfare loss for these regions, accompanied by terms of trade deterioration (0.8%, 
2.1% and 1.1%, respectively). These gains are comprised of a reduction in tax 
exporting of $2.2, $9.3, and $6.2 billion respectively, and $2.1 billion efficiency 
losses for USA whereas JAP and EU obtain $9.3 and $2.3 billion efficiency gains. 
These regions attract capital from all other regions. As to developing regions, DAM 
and DAS benefit from the replacement of the factor taxes in USA (their terms of 
trade improve 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively). When JAP replaces factor taxes DAM, 
DAF and DAS obtain welfare gains of $232 million (0.02% of GDP), $158 million 
(0.05% of GDP), and $3.898 million (0.26% of GDP) respectively; the terms of trade 
of these developing regions also improve, specially for DAS (0.8%). When EU 
replaces factor taxes, DAF benefits the most (welfare gains of $828 million, and
terms of trade improvement of 1%), followed by DAS and DAM.
I
When all developed regions simultaneously replace factor taxes, the 
developing regions that benefit the most are DAF and DAS. DAF obtains a welfare
I l l
gain of 1.8% of GDP ($5,909 million) with a very small improvement in terms of 
trade (0.01%). DAS obtains a welfare gain of $9,334 million (0.6% of GDP) and an 
improvement of 2.1 % in terms of trade. DAM is also better off, but DE is worse off 
as a result of the deterioration in its terms of trade (0.7%).
In conclusion, when capital is internationally mobile, the results indicate that 
developed regions export factor taxes (especially on the use of capital) to developing 
regions, and that the magnitude of the effects depends upon commercial ties; that is 
USA mainly affects DAM, JAP mainly affects DAS, and EU mainly affect DAF.
Table 3.7 reports the case when import tariffs are replaced by a non distorting 
tax on final consumption. The regions replacing the tariffs suffer welfare losses and 
terms of trade worsening. A tariff lowers foreign export prices; the gain depends on 
the ability of the tariff-imposing country to drive down foreign export prices. Also 
notice that the effects of the replacement of import tariffs on welfare and terms of 
trade are larger than when factor taxes are replaced.
When USA, JAP, and EU unilaterally eliminate and replace import tariffs, 
they suffer welfare losses and terms of trade deterioration. The welfare losses in these 
regions are due to efficiency losses that more than compensate for the positive tax 
exporting effect. In this scenario, capital moves out of these regions since this factor 
is cheaper elsewhere. There is an increase in exports, an increase in imports, a 
reduction in output for domestic consumption, and a reduction in aggregate 
consumption. All other regions benefit from the replacement of tariffs, both in terms 
of welfare and terms of trade improvement. In particular, when USA replaces tariffs
DAM’s terms of trade improve by 0.8%; when tariffs are replaced in JAP, DAS’s
l
terms of trade improve by 0.6%; and, DE and DAF’s terms of trade improve by 1.6% 
and 1.4%, respectively, when EU replaces its tariffs.
1 1 2
Table 3.7: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax 
replacement of existing import tariffs and factor taxes 
International Capital Mobility 
($ millions)
Replacement Import tariffs Import tariffs and factor taxes
of taxes in: EV TEE DWL TOT EV TEE DWL TOT
1. USA
USA -13,111 20,284 -33,395 -1.81% -71,718 16,279 -87,997 -2.58%
JAP 2,351 2,885 -534 0.61% 1,374 -2,638 4,012 0.69%
EU 4,402 4,141 261 0.53% 3,538 1,711 1,827 0.51%
ODC 2,216 1,018 1,198 0.32% 3,797 5,959 -2,162 0.67%
DAM 1,483 1,043 440 0.82% 2,165 . 2,549 -383 1.35%
DAF 658 639 19 0.46% 524 -14 537 0.43%
DAS 1,832 156 1,676 0.41% 2,730 7,875 -5,144 0.67%
DE 337 1,118 -781 0.23% 167 -2,916 3,083 0.17%
Total 167 31,284 -31,117 -57,423 28,803 -86,226
2. JAP
USA 1,588 1,410 177 0.25% 4,249 4,507 -258 0.76%
JAP -5,884 7,659 -13,543 -2.03% -5,547 -2,054 -3,493 -4.08%
EU 1,279 1,052 227 0.15% 2,361 2,453 -92 0.34%
ODC 512 386 126 0.07% 1,219 1,247 -28 0.23%
DAM 240 204 37 0.13% 450 434 16 0.29%
DAF 92 69 22 0.07% 273 274 -1 0.23%
DAS 2,227 1,944 283 0.55% 5,957 5,824 133 1.31%
DE 149 95 54 0.10% -36 220 -256 0.03%
Total 202 12,820 -12,617 8,925 12,904 -3,978
3. EU.
USA 4,049 3,611 438 0.64% 3,396 3,408 -11 0.57%
JAP 1,855 1,304 550 0.52% 564 831 -267 0.41%
EU -18,077 30,134 -48,211 -2.06% -23,661 20,805 -44,466 -3.19%
ODC 3,225 2,426 800 0.46% 9,041 9,032 8 1.64%
DAM 1,157 934 223 0.63% 1,238 1,180 58 0.77%
DAF 2,001 1,515 486 1.39% 2,761 2,468 293 2.48%
DAS 2,571 2,415 156 0.61% 5,210 5,311 -101 1.24%
DE 2,486 2,282 204 1.55% 911 794 117 0.95%
Total -732 44,621 -45,353 -540 43,830 -44,369
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA -4,050 28,093 -32,143 -0.41% -1.864 28,375 -30,240 -0.25%
JAP -587 12,676 -13,263 -0.66% -1,387 -2,434 1.047 -2.36%
EU -5,359 40,951 -46,311 -0.62% -6,977 30,754 -37,732 -1.13%
ODC -8,202 25,005 -33,208 -1.02% -9,656 26,271 -35,927 -1.28%
DAM 3,313 2,499 814 1.83% 4,227 4,362 -135 2.69%
DAF 7,628 903 6,725 0.66% 8,789 1,682 7,107 2.20%
DAS 7,619 5,290 2,329 1.79% 16,520 20,447 -3,927 3.93%
DE 3,693 4,233 -540 2.37% 1,425 -1,480 2,905 1.63%
Total 4,055 119,651 115,596 11,076 107,977 -96,901
EV: Equivalent Variation; TEE: Tax Exporting Effect; DWL: Deadweight gain (or loss); 
TOT: Terms of Trade.
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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When all developed regions replace tariffs simultaneously, all developing 
regions benefit both in terms of welfare and terms of trade improvement.
The last two columns of Table 3.7 show the joint effects of the replacement of 
import tariffs and factor taxes. As can be seen, the results are qualitatively the same 
as when only import tariffs are replaced. Larger welfare losses are observed for 
developed regions when they unilaterally replace both import tariffs and factor taxes; 
there are also stronger terms of trade effects. The results are bigger than those 
obtained when factors are immobile, but are still tariff dominated.
As in the scenario without capital mobility, the effects of the replacement of 
income taxes were also calculated. Results not reported here indicate that in this case 
there are small welfare gains (losses) and small terms of trade effects. When USA 
and EU eliminate income taxes, their welfare improves because of the elimination of 
a distortion in the economy, and there is also terms of trade improvement. These 
regions attract capital from the other regions. All other regions are worse off and their 
terms of trade deteriorate. In the case of JAP, it obtains losses of $194 million 
(0.006% of GDP) as a result of the terms of trade deterioration (0.1 %); capital leaves 
this region. All other regions benefit, although there are small effects on both welfare 
and terms of trade. When all developed regions simultaneously replace income taxes, 
capital moves out of USA, JAP, DAM and DAS. All developing regions and JAP 
suffer terms of trade deterioration. DAM, DAS and DE also suffer a welfare loss.
The joint effects of the replacement of factor taxes, import tariffs and income 
taxes were also computed. Results not reported here indicate that the results are 
dominated by the effects of import tariffs. When USA, JAP and EU replace 
unilaterally all taxes, the region eliminating the taxes suffers terms of trade 
deterioration and welfare loss. When all developed regions eliminate all taxes.
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developing regions benefit. Lastly, when all regions simultaneously replace all taxes,
developed regions benefit since imports tariffs are higher in developing regions; DAF
*
and DE obtain welfare gains.
In summary, when capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, the results 
suggest that USA, JAP and EU export capital taxes to some particular developing 
regions. In the case of taxes on the use of labour and income taxes, the results appear 
to suggest that there is tax exporting from JAP to developing regions, although the 
effects on both welfare and terms of trade are small. Import tariffs are more important 
than domestic taxes in their effects on both welfare and terms of trade.
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
As indicated earlier on, the elasticities used in the model play a key role in the 
results. Therefore, it is important to examine how the results of the model change 
when some of its parameters are changed. I look at the effects of a change in trade 
elasticities, since they determine the strength of the terms of trade effects associated 
with policy changes. In particular, the elasticity of substitution between import types 
(0 , and the elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods (t>) are considered. It has been argued that the terms of trade effects 
increase when the elasticities are smaller and the u elasticities are larger. In 
addition, I report on the sensitivity of the results to changes in the elasticity of export 
transformation (e).
In the model, the elasticities of substitution used are based on price elasticity
estimates, since it was not possible to find econometric estimates of elasticities of
I
substitution for CES demand functions. In the case of the elasticities of export 
transformation it was not possible to find econometric estimates; hence these
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parameters were calculated such that the elasticity of supply was equal to one. The 
elasticity of transformation indicates the difference among the goods exported to the 
other seven regions; the larger the elasticity, the more similar are the exported goods 
and vice-versa. Uniform values for these elasticities of 0.5, 1.5 and 3.0 are used in 
the sensitivity analysis; the first value is smaller than the one used in the model, 
whereas the last two values are larger. These elasticity values were chosen in order to 
consider extreme possibilities, that is very little substitution (or transformation) and 
almost infinite substitution (or transformation). I focus on the replacement of factor 
taxes and import tariffs, since these experiments have larger effects on both terms of 
trade and welfare. The results of the sensitivity analyses are summarised in Tables 
3.8 to 3.10.
Sensitivity analysis was not carried out for the case of the elimination of 
factor taxes when factors are internationally immobile, since in this case the burden 
of the taxes is borne by the owner of the factor and there is no tax exporting.
Table 3.8 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for the replacement of 
import tariffs when factors of production are internationally immobile. First, in the 
case of trade elasticities, the larger the elasticity C, (or t>) the smaller the terms of 
trade deterioration and the welfare loss for the region replacing import tariffs. As to 
developing regions, as either £ (or o) increases there are smaller welfare gains and 
terms of trade improvement. Once again, the replacement of tariffs in USA affects 
mainly DAM; in EU affects mainly DAF; and in JAP affects specially DAS. Second, 
in the case of the export transformation elasticity, as e increases both welfare losses
and terms of trade deterioration reduce for the region replacing import tariffs. As to
l
developing regions, they continue obtaining welfare gains and terms of trade 
improvement as e increases. However, some regions benefit more than others; for
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example, when JAP eliminates tariffs, DAS’s terms of trade improve from 0.81% to 
0.85% as e increases from 0.5 to 3.0; in the case of EU, DAF’s terms of trade 
improve from 2.52% to 3.24%. Overall the findings of the sensitivity analysis are 
consistent with the results of the central case, i.e. the region replacing the tariffs 
obtains welfare losses and terms of trade deterioration, whereas other region’s 
welfare and terms of trade improve.
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______________________________________ a__________________________
Replacement Elasticity of substitution between import types Ç 
of taxes in:
Equivalent Variation Terms of Trade
$ Millions % Change
Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects of an
equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
Factor Immobility
Ç = 0.5 Ç = 1-5 Ç = 3.0 Ç = 0.5 C= 1.5 Ç = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -21,869 -14,809 -12,475 -3.30 -2.20 -1.84
JAP 1,924 1,667 1,516 0.73 0.64 0.58
EU 5,632 2,947 2,261 0.75 0.39 0.30
ODC 4,583 3,639 3,220 0.81 0.65 0.57
DAM 2,393 2,010 1,778 1.49 1.25 1.10
DAF 1,135 642 505 1.05 0.59 0.46
DAS 2,608 2,141 1,891 0.63 0.51 0.45
DE 532 122 43 0.43 0.10 0.03
Total -3,062 -1,640 -1,260
2. JAP
USA 2,374 1,848 1,585 0.40 0.31 0.27
JAP -7,395 -4,182 -3,256 -3.47 -2.32 -1.99
EU 3,042 1,099 706 0.40 0.15 0.09
ODC 1,530 703 525 0.28 0.13 0.09
DAM 470 270 202 0.29 0.17 0.12
DAF 222 90 56 0.20 0.08 0.05
DAS 3,640 3,197 2,828 0.85 0.77 0.69
DE 251 55 20 0.21 0.04 0.02
Total 4,134 3,080 2,666
3 .EU
USA 5,985 2,655 1,845 0.99 0.44 0.30
JAP 2,138 894 714 0.80 0.33 0.26
EU -29,644 -20,009 -16,845 -3.86 -2.68 -2.29
ODC 8,617 7,228 6,471 1.54 1.29 1.15
DAM 1,810 1,172 970 1.12 0.71 0.59
DAF 3,563 2,867 2,495 3.29 2.64 2.29
DAS 5,385 3,759 3,216 1.27 0.90 0.77
DE 1,498 1.325 1,176 1.21 1.08 0.95
Total -647 -109 43
4. USA, JAE, ELL Q D Ç
USA -6,327 -5,363 -4,728 -0.90 -0.73 -0.63
JAP -401 -487 -229 -0.99 -1.01 -0.91
EU -13,072 -8,212 -6,642 -1.86 -1.24 -1.04
ODC -11,003 -5,740 -4,552 -1.48 -0.60 -0.41
DAM 5,401 3,652 3,027 3.40 2.27 1.87
DAF 5,884 3,787 3,066 5.47 3.50 2.83
DAS 14,877 10,106 8,456 3.57 2.44 2.05
DE 2,999 1,969 1,608 2.45 1.60 1.31
Total -1,641 -289 7
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Table 3.8 (Continued): Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
Factor Immobility
Replacement Elasticity of substitution between domestic
of taxes in: ____________ and imported products u________
Equivalent Variation Terms of Trade
$ Millions % Change
u = 0.5 •oIIp o = 3.0 0 = 0.5 V) = 1.5 v = 3.0
l.USA
USA -19,656 -15,938 -14,691 -2.95 -2.38 -2.19
JAP 2,010 1,546 1,368 0.81 0.56 0.46
EU 3,549 3,244 3,241 0.48 0.43 0.42
ODC 4,497 3,683 3,349 0.79 0.66 0.60
DAM 3,344 2,018 1,615 2.06 1.25 1.00
DAF 757 791 806 0.71 0.72 0.72
DAS 3,209 2,552 2,333 0.73 0.61 0.57
DE 149 296 338 0.16 0.27 0.27
Total -2,140 -1,808 -1,640
2 JAP
USA 1,918 1,945 1,944 0.33 0.33 0.33
JAP -5,198 -4,940 -4,938 -2.68 -2.61 -2.64
EU 1,458 1,324 1,333 0.19 0.17 0.17
ODC 814 931 958 0.14 0.17 0.17
DAM 475 316 275 0.29 0.20 0.17
DAF 116 111 106 0.10 0.10 0.09
DAS 3,935 3,660 3,708 0.90 0.87 0.90
DE 80 120 137 0.09 0.11 0.11
Total 3,597 3,468 3,524
3. EU
USA 3,789 2,854 2,598 0.62 0.47 0.43
JAP 880 1,003 1,048 0.34 0.35 0.34
EU -27,436 -20,799 -18,605 -3.60 -2.78 -2.52
ODC 9,356 6,462 5,455 1.66 1.16 0.98
DAM 1,822 1,280 1,087 1.10 0.78 0.67
DAF 3,612 2,941 2,741 3.40 2.67 2.44
DAS 5,235 4,381 4,167 1.18 1.04 1.02
DE 1,882 1,576 1,512 2.14 1.43 1.20
Total -860 -302 3
4. USA JAE, EH ODC
USA -6,860 -6,269 -5,822 -0.98 -0.88 -0.81
JAP -897 -899 -1,066 1.07 -1.25 -1.43
EU -13,182 -9,416 -7,871 -1.86 -1.41 -1.24
ODC -7,988 -7,407 -7,273 -0.99 -0.88 -0.85
DAM 5,787 4,035 3,403 3.59 2.51 2.13
DAF 4,811 4,274 4,094 4.56 3.91 3.67
DAS 14,004 12,511 12,099 3.22 3.01 2.97
DE 2,751 2,644 2,639 3.14 2.41 2.11
Total -1,576 -527 203
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Table 3.8 (Continued): Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
Factor Immobility
Replacement Elasticity of export transformation e
of taxes in: _____________________ _________________
Equivalent Variation Terms of Trade
$ Millions % Change
e  = 0.5 e= 1.5 e = 3.0 e = 0.5 £= 1.5 E = 3.0
1 USA
USA -17,387 -16,872 -16,606 -2.60 -2.53 -2.49
JAP 2,049 1,680 1,481 0.78 0.64 0.56
EU 3,926 3,503 3,284 0.53 0.47 0.43
ODC 3,879 4,078 4,181 0.69 0.72 0.74
DAM 1,999 2,204 2,303 1.24 1.37 1.44
DAF 616 824 943 0.56 0.76 0.87
DAS 2,568 2,354 2,258 0.62 0.56 0.54
DE 244 231 223 0.19 0.19 0.18
Total -2,106 -1,997 -1,933
2. JAP
USA 2,351 1,904 1,632 0.40 0.32 0.28
JAP -5,468 -4,823 -4,450 -2.78 -2.55 2.42
EU 1,637 1,406 1,289 0.22 0.19 0.17
ODC 862 917 945 0.16 0.16 0.17
DAM 346 318 302 0.21 0.20 0.19
DAF 150 112 95 0.14 0.10 0.08
DAS 3,375 3,496 3,561 0.81 0.83 0.85
DE 109 91 80 0.09 0.07 0.07
Total 3,363 3,420 3,453
3. EU
USA 3,563 3,378 3,212 0.59 0.56 0.53
JAP 1,514 929 622 0.57 0.34 0.21
EU -22,865 -22,476 -22,189 -3.03 -2.99 -2.96
ODC 7,773 7,715 7,673 1.39 1.38 1.37
DAM 1,147 1,364 1,467 0.70 0.84 0.91
DAF 2,739 3,246 3,505 2.52 2.99 3.24
DAS 4,426 4,211 4,118 1.06 1.00 0.97
DE 1,300 1,470 1,573 1.05 1.20 1.28
Total -404 -163 -19
4. U M , JAR, EU QDC
USA -6,058 -5,891 -5,897 -0.85 -0.82 -0.82
JAP -406 -696 -833 -0.98 -1.09 1.14
EU -9,157 -9,644 -9,833 -1.36 -1.42 -1.45
ODC -6,970 -7,276 -7,466 -0.81 -0.86 -0.88
DAM 3,785 4,245 4,471 2.35 2.65 2.80
DAF 3,908 4,601 4,968 3.60 4.27 4.62
DAS 12,022 11,660 11,514 2.91 2.81 2.76
DE 2,191 2,368 2,478 1.78 1.93 2.03
Total -684 -633 -597
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
1 2 0
Let us now consider the scenario when capital is assumed to be 
internationally mobile. The sensitivity analysis also confirms the results of the model 
in the sense that there is evidence that USA, JAP and EU export factor taxes to the 
developing regions with which they have closer commercial ties. Table 3.9 shows 
that as the elasticity of substitution between import types (Q increases, there are less 
welfare losses and less terms of trade deterioration in USA and EU; the other regions 
reduce (increase) their welfare gains (losses) and terms of trade improvement 
(deterioration). In the case of JAP, as C, increases the welfare losses obtained as a 
result of the elimination of factor taxes become welfare gains, and the terms of trade 
deterioration also reduces. In DAF and DAS welfare gains reduce and terms of trade 
improve less; in DAM the welfare gains become losses and terms of trade 
deteriorate; and in DE welfare losses increase and terms of trade deteriorate.
The results are qualitatively the same when the elasticity of substitution 
between comparable imported and domestically produced goods (o) increases (see 
Table 3.9).
Let us consider the elasticity of export transformation (e). In this case, as e 
increases, both welfare losses and terms of trade deterioration increase for the regions 
eliminating the taxes. As to developing regions, as e increases their welfare losses 
become welfare gains and their terms of trade improve. The sensitivity analysis 
confirms the results of the model in the sense that there is evidence of tax exporting 
of factor taxes from USA, JAP, and EU to the developing regions with which they 
have close commercial ties (see Table 3.9).
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Table 3.9: Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects of an
equal-yield tax replacement of existing factor taxes
International Capital Mobility
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Elasticity of substitution between import types Ç
Equivalent Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of Trade 
% Change
¡¡ = 0.5 C= 15 Ç = 3.0 Ç = 0.5 C - 1.5 C = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -7,403 -2,422 395 -1.26 -0.45 0.00
JAP -441 -1,144 -1,531 0.20 0.03 -0.06
EU 820 -1,590 -2,900 0.16 -0.11 -0.27
ODC 2,008 1,360 977 0.40 0.30 0.25
DAM 889 664 525 0.62 0.49 0.41
DAF -5 -189 -308 0.05 -0.09 -0.17
DAS 1,342 580 44 0.35 0.18 0.07
DE 132 -368 -612 0.12 -0.19 -0.34
Total -2,657 -3,108 -3,410
2. JAP
USA 3,899 2,058 915 0.70 0.41 0.23
JAP -5,378 2,915 7,881 -3.43 -1.33 -0.11
EU 3,790 -39 -2,228 0.49 0.05 -0.19
ODC 1,521 239 -537 0.28 0.08 -0.03
DAM 496 103 -118 0.32 0.08 -0.05
DAF 237 117 36 0.22 0.13 0.07
DAS 4,043 3,648 3,232 0.79 0.73 0.68
DE 177 -350 -622 0.15 -0.18 -0.35
Total 8,785 8,690 8,560
3. EU
USA 1,498 -1,711 -3,452 0.27 -0.23 -0.51
JAP 184 -1,842 -2,950 0.23 -0.25 -0.52
EU -11,542 -3,343 1,260 -1.76 -0.79 -0.25
ODC 6,596 5,564 4,974 1.27 1.10 1.01
DAM 539 -30 -358 0.38 0.04 -0.15
DAF 1,008 744 575 1.17 0.96 0.83
DAS 3,388 2,265 1,500 0.77 0.53 0.38
DE -1,302 -1,516 -1,608 -0.49 -0.64 -0.70
Total 370 132 -60
4. USA, JAP, EU, QDC
USA 2,184 1,676 1,424 0.30 0.21 0.17
JAP -3,632 966 3,840 2.42 -1.21 -0.46
EU -2,591 -96 1,519 -0.52 -0.21 -0.00
ODC -1,791 -451 417 -0.38 -0.13 0.03
DAM 2,223 451 -677 1.53 0.43 -0.27
DAF 6,441 5,524 4,813 0.43 -0.30 -0.87
DAS 11,219 7,686 5,107 2.55 1.75 1.17
DE -905 -2,617 -3,495 0.01 -1.12 -1.71
Total 13,148 13,139 12,948
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Table 3.9 (Continued): Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing factor taxes
International Capital Mobility
Replacement Elasticity of substitution between domestic
of taxes in: ____________ and imported products u_______
Equivalent Variation 
$ Millions
v  = 0.5 "U = 1.5 -0 = 3.0
Terms of Trade 
% Change
u = 0.5 \> = 1.5 u = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -7,565 -1,999 1,232 -1.26 -0.40 0.12
JAP -198 -1,625 -2,511 0.30 -0.11 -0.36
EU 90 -1,974 -3,192 0.08 • -0.16 -0.31
ODC 2,264 1,205 708 0.44 0.28 0.21
DAM 1,494 455 -235 0.94 0.37 0.00
DAF -54 -160 -238 0.02 -0.07 -0.13
DAS 1,685 866 397 0.37 0.24 0.18
DE -191 -76 -6 -0.03 0.01 0.03
Total -2,474 -3,308 -3,845
2. JAP
USA 4,087 1,505 -52 0.73 0.32 0.08
JAP -3,220 2,600 6,407 -3.18 -1.08 0.39
EU 1,831 126 -845 0.28 0.07 -0.06
ODC 740 730 635 0.16 0.16 0.14
DAM 498 172 -52 0.30 0.13 0.00
DAF 193 139 94 0.19 0.15 0.11
DAS 4,854 3,518 2,486 0.92 0.66 0.44
DE -146 -101 -78 0.02 -0.00 -0.02
Total 8,837 8,689 8,594
3. EU
USA 479 -2,272 -3,921 0.11 -0.32 -0.58
JAP -827 -1,964 -2,619 0.04 -0.31 -0.51
EU -11,823 -1,637 4,205 -1.82 -0.54 0.23
ODC 7,296 4,631 3,425 1.36 0.96 0.79
DAM 599 -82 552 0.38 0.01 -0.24
DAF 1,229 441 -97 1.36 0.73 0.31
DAS 3,702 2,505 1,728 0.77 0.57 0.44
DE -411 -1,664 -2,432 0.47 -0.61 -1.26
Total 243 -42 841
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA 1,431 881 566 0.18 0.07 -0.01
JAP -2,962 618 3,062 -2.42 -1.08 -0.12
EU -4,215 -265 2,131 -0.72 -0.21 0.09
ODC -1,186 -1,339 -1,369 -0.25 -0.30 -0.33
DAM 2,582 568 -786 1.64 0.54 -0.18
DAF 6,320 5,534 4,994 0.35 -0.28 -0.69
DAS 12,063 8,838 6,654 2.50 1.99 1.63
DE -723 -1,784 -2,421 0.83 -0.36 -1.04
Total 13,311 13,051 12,832
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Table 3.9 (Continued): Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing factor taxes
International Capital Mobility
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Elasticity of export transformation e
Equivalent Variation 
$ Millions
£ = 0.5 E = 1.5 £ = 3.0
Terms of Trade 
% Change 
e = 0.5 £=1.5 £ = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -400 -5,551 -8,375 -0.10 -0.97 -1.44
JAP -1,316 -787 -502 -0.65 0.13 0.24
EU -2,278 -268 812 -0.22 . 0.05 0.19
ODC 1,199 1,787 2,093 0.26 0.37 0.43
DAM 464 815 1,017 0.35 0.58 0.71
DAF -359 -38 133 -0.26 0.04 0.20
DAS 92 1,218 1,840 0.06 0.32 0.47
DE -328 -98 74 -0.22 -0.00 0.16
Total -2,925 -2,922 -2,908
2. JAP
USA 2,091 2,926 3,391 0.41 0.55 0.63
JAP 4,417 -1,348 -4,524 -0.37 -2.56 -3.74
EU -232 1,581 2,548 -0.00 0.25 0.38
ODC -84 997 1,577 0.01 0.21 0.31
DAM -120 341 612 -0.07 0.23 0.41
DAF -100 233 409 -0.08 0.23 0.40
DAS 3,496 4,018 4,310 0.67 0.80 0.88
DE -336 -115 49 -0.22 -0.01 0.14
Total 9,132 8,633 8,372
3 -ELL
USA -2,573 0 1,388 -0.39 0.04 0.28
JAP -2,123 -966 -351 -0.45 -0.00 0.23
EU -242 -7,947 -12,155 -0.33 -1.36 -1.92
ODC 5,610 6,037 6,239 1.10 1.18 1.22
DAM -402 312 721 -0.21 0.25 0.52
DAF 632 883 1,007 0.84 1.09 1.21
DAS 1,498 3,131 4,027 0.33 0.73 0.95
DE -1,727 -1,349 -1,071 -0.84 -0.50 -0.24
Total 672 101 -195
4. U SA, JAPj EU, ODC
USA 2,432 1,542 1,021 0.34 0.19 0.11
JAP 1,891 -1,526 -3,463 -0.65 -1.96 -2.69
EU 1,124 -1,845 -3,527 -0.03 -0.43 -0.65
ODC 1,514 -1,823 -3,741 0.22 -0.38 -0.72
DAM -501 1,574 2,780 -0.19 1.14 1.93
DAF 4,334 6,368 7,454 -1.42 0.43 1.43
DAS 5,697 10,419 13,038 1.26 2.39 3.02
DE -2,780 -1,654 -816 -1.43 -0.41 0.35
Total 13,710 13,056 12,747
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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Tables 3.10 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for the replacement
of import tariffs, when capital is assumed to be internationally mobile. First, let us
»
consider the elasticity of substitution between import types (£). In this case, the 
losses of the region replacing the tariffs reduce as the elasticity increases; the 
worsening of the terms of trade also reduces. As to developing regions, when USA is 
the region replacing tariffs, DAM’s welfare gains increase as the elasticity increases 
(terms of trade remain unaltered); DAF’s welfare gains also increase; DAS and DE’s 
welfare gains reduce, with a very small change in terms of trade. When JAP replaces 
tariffs, there is a small reduction in welfare gains of developing regions as the 
elasticity increases (terms of trade remain almost unaltered). When EU replaces 
tariffs, DAF’s welfare gains increase as the elasticity increases and terms of trade 
improve from 1.3% to 1.5%; for all other developing regions, there is a reduction in 
welfare gains.
Then, let us consider changes in the elasticity of substitution between 
comparable imported and domestically produced goods (i>) (see Table 3.10). As this 
elasticity increases, the welfare losses of the region replacing tariffs increase and the 
terms of trade deteriorate more. Developing regions exhibit increasing welfare gains 
and improving terms of trade.
Lastly, let us consider changes in the elasticity of export transformation (e) 
(see Table 3.10). As e increases the regions replacing import tariffs exhibit a 
reduction in welfare losses and in the worsening of their terms of trade. Regarding 
developing regions, as the exported goods become less differentiated (that is, as e
increases) welfare gains reduce and the improvement in terms of trade also reduce.
/
Overall the results are consistent with the findings of the central case specification.
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects of an
equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
International Capital Mobility
« Replacement Elasticity of substitution between import types Ç
of taxes in: _____________________ __________________
Equivalent Variation Terms of T rade
$ Millions % Change
C = 0.5
«OII rt II U
) b C = 0.5 C= 1.5 Ç = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -13,476 -12,883 -12,559 -1.87 -1.78 -1.73
JAP 2,422 2,313 2,256 0.62 0.60 0.60
EU 4,602 4,305 4,145 0.55 0.52 0.51
ODC 2,195 2,234 2,285 0.32 0.32 0.32
DAM 1,467 1,488 1,496 0.82 0.83 0.83
DAF 645 661 653 0.45 0.46 0.46
DAS 1,860 1,806 1,782 0.42 0.40 0.38
DE 433 264 163 0.29 0.19 0.13
Total 149 187 221
2. JAP
USA 1,592 1,590 1,595 0.25 0.25 0.25
JAP -6,045 -5,789 -5.631 -2.07 -2.01 -1.97
EU 1,357 1,243 1,177 0.16 0.15 0.14
ODC 513 516 528 0.07 0.07 0.07
DAM 249 233 216 0.14 0.13 0.12
DAF 103 79 52 0.08 0.06 0.04
DAS 2,231 2,221 2,215 0.55 0.54 0.54
DE 184 124 88 0.12 0.08 0.06
Total 183 216 240
3. EU
USA 4,168 3,993 3,894 0.66 0.63 0.62
JAP 1,964 1,818 1,748 0.54 0.52 0.51
EU -18,614 -17,749 -17,240 -2.12 -2.02 -1.96
ODC 3,178 3,280 3,376 0.46 0.47 0.47
DAM 1,183 1,128 1,059 0.64 0.61 0.58
DAF 1,897 2,082 2,204 1.32 1.45 1.53
DAS 2,696 2,464 2,303 0.65 0.58 0.54
DE 2,714 2,316 2,083 1.69 1.45 1.32
Total -815 -669 -573
4. USA, JAP, ELL ODC
USA -4,320 -3,885 -3,642 -0.45 -0.38 -0.34
JAP -305 -744 -997 -0.60 -0 .6 8 -0.72
EU -5,541 -5,158 -4,885 -0.65 -0.60 -0.56
ODC -8,867 -7,711 -6,946 -1 .11 -0.96 -0.87
DAM 3,369 3,255 3,141 1.87 1.80 1.74
DAF 7,469 7,739 7,887 0.55 0.73 0.84
DAS 7,886 7,380 7,029 1.86 1.73 1.63
DE 4,171 3,335 2,856 2.65 2.16 1.88
Total 3,862 4,211 4,443
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Table 3.10 (Continued): Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
International Capital Mobility
Replacement Elasticity of substitution between domestic
of taxes in: ____________ and imported products t>______ i
Equivalent Variation 
$ Millions
= 0.5 v> = 1.5 v> = 3.0
Terms of Trade 
% Change
V) = 0.5 i> = 1.5 u = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -11,964 -14,175 -15,522 -1.67 -1.94 -2.09
JAP 2,085 2,590 2,905 0.57 0.64 0.69
EU 3,738 4,917 5,670 0.45 . 0.59 0.67
ODC 2,046 2,317 2,407 0.31 0.32 0.31
DAM 1,364 1,613 1,814 0.77 0.88 0.95
DAE 555 750 898 0.40 0.51 0.60
DAS 1,728 1,993 2,171 0.40 0.44 0.45
DE 330 399 427 0.26 0.28 0.29
Total -118 405 771
2. JAP
USA 1,317 1,844 2,242 0.21 0.29 0.35
JAP -4,973 -6,765 -8,204 -1.74 -2.30 -2.74
EU 1,028 1,488 1,787 0.12 0.18 0.21
ODC 451 569 656 0.06 0.08 0.08
DAM 213 268 318 0.12 0.15 0.18
DAF 82 102 123 0.06 0.08 0.09
DAS 1,957 2,490 3,006 0.49 0.61 0.72
DE 143 180 208 0.10 0.12 0.14
Total 219 178 136
3. ELL
USA 3,452 4,664 5,468 0.54 0.73 0.86
JAP 1,568 2,152 2,452 0.46 0.59 0.66
EU -16,547 -20,086 -22,321 -1.89 -2.26 -2.47
ODC 3,076 3,285 3,221 0.46 0.44 0.38
DAM 1,028 1,311 1,525 0.57 0.70 0.79
DAF 1,823 2,226 2,563 1.30 1.50 1.65
DAS 2,401 2,878 3,266 0.58 0.68 0.75
DE 2,315 2,933 3,394 1.55 1.84 2.05
Total -884 -637 -432
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA -3,839 -4,204 -4,275 -0.40 -0.41 -0.39
JAP -290 -891 -1,677 -0.47 -0.83 -1.16
EU -4,642 -6,889 -8,233 -0.54 -0.79 -0.92
ODC -8,675 -7,901 -7,636 -1.09 -1.00 -1.01
DAM 3,025 3,644 4,111 1.70 1.99 2.18
DAF 7,311 7,964 8,472 0.48 0.83 1.09
DAS 7,085 8,375 9,435 1.68 1.94 2.13
DE 3,538 4,314 4,840 2.48 2.79 3.01
Total 3,513 4,413 5,037
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Table 3.10 (Continued):Sensitivity Analysis - Welfare and terms of trade effects
of an equal-yield tax replacement of existing import tariffs
International Capital Mobility
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Elasticity of export transformation e
Equivalent Variation 
$ Millions
e = 0.5 £= 1.5 e = 3.0 e = 0.5 £ = 1.5 £ = 3.0
1 .USA
USA -16,652 -12,060 -9,534 -2.37 -1.65 -1.25
JAP 2,816 2,213 1,885 0.79 0.56 0.43
EU 5,939 3,951 2,880 0.74 . 0.47 0.32
ODC 2,577 2,111 1,861 0.39 0.30 0.26
DAM 1,613 1,442 1,340 0.91 0.80 0.74
DAF 854 601 468 0.64 0.41 0.29
DAS 2,454 1,648 1,205 0.56 0.37 0.26
DE 469 291 161 0.35 0.19 0.07
Total 70 196 266
2. JAP
USA 1,960 1,473 1,189 0.31 0.23 0.19
JAP -7,777 -5,318 -3,948 -2.70 -1.83 -1.34
EU 1,912 1,095 659 0.24 0.13 0.07
ODC 782 434 247 0.12 0.06 0.02
DAM 363 202 109 0.21 0.11 0.05
DAF 204 60 -16 0.18 0.04 -0.03
DAS 2,386 2,179 2,061 0.59 0.53 0.50
DE 212 127 66 0.16 0.08 0.02
Total 41 251 367
3. EU
USA 5,576 3,589 2,473 0.89 0.56 0.38
JAP 2,721 1,602 1,002 0.87 0.42 0.19
EU -22,663 -16,704 -13,377 -2.62 -1.89 -1.48
ODC 3,582 3,120 2,870 0.53 0.44 0.40
DAM 1,459 1,065 836 0.82 0.57 0.43
DAF 2,167 1,954 1,841 1.55 1.35 1.25
DAS 3,368 2,333 1,757 0.81 0.55 0.41
DE 2,573 2,456 2,372 1.63 1.53 1.46
Total -1,219 -585 -226
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA -4,934 -3,797 -3,206 -0.56 -0.37 -0.26
JAP -798 -515 -322 -0.73 -0.64 -0.56
EU -7,260 -4,779 -3,349 -0.86 -0.55 -0.37
ODC -8,880 -7,995 -7,482 -1.14 -0.99 -0.90
DAM 4,068 3,081 2,508 2.32 1.68 1.32
DAF 7,783 7,586 7,496 0.79 0.62 0.55
DAS 9,784 6,979 5,445 2.32 1.63 1.25
DE 4,034 3,574 3,245 2.68 2.27 1.97
Total 3,798 4,135 4,335
Terms of Trade 
% Change
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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3.5.4 Differential factor tax rates
From ¿he available data it was not possible to calculate differential tax rates by 
industry. In reality, in each country there are differential tax rates for each sector in 
the economy. Hence, given that intersectoral effects may play an important role in tax 
exporting, it seems interesting to investigate whether the results of the model are 
altered when there are differential factor tax rates by industry. Appendix 3.2 (Section 
5) describes how these differential tax rates were calculated. As an illustration, three 
counterfactual experiments were carried out: i) elimination and replacement of labour 
taxes; ii) elimination and replacement of capital taxes; and iii) elimination and 
replacement of all factor taxes. Each experiment is performed for USA, JAP, and EU 
individually, and for all developed regions simultaneously (i.e. USA, JAP, EU, and 
ODC). Similar to the previous experiments, existing factor taxes were replaced by an 
equal yield non-distorting tax on final expenditure within each region. Tables 3.11 
and 3.12 present the results for factor immobility and international capital mobility, 
respectively.
First, let us consider the scenario where factors of production are 
internationally immobile (see Table 3.11). As expected, the unilateral replacement of 
taxes on the use of labour yields a positive equivalent variation for USA, JAP, and 
EU; this can be due to either the gain in productive efficiency or the removal of 
consumer distortions brought about by the effects differential taxation has on the 
price of output. When USA replaces labour taxes, there is a welfare gain of 
approximately $11 billion (0.2% of GDP) and an improvement of 1.5% in the
region’s terms of trade; all other regions suffer welfare losses and terms of trade
l
deterioration (among the developing regions, DAM’s terms of trade deteriorates the
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most, i.e. 0.7%). The terms of trade effects and welfare gains (losses) with 
differential tax rates are larger than those obtained previously.
m
When JAP replaces labour taxes, it obtains gains of around $8 billion and its 
terms of trade improve 2.5%. This result contrasts with the findings of the initial 
experiment in which JAP lost $307 million and its terms of trade deteriorated (0.2%). 
In this case, there is an improvement in the terms of trade brought about by the 
increase in the price of exports as a result of the increase ip the price of labour. As a 
result of the replacement of labour taxes, the price of this factor reduces, specially in 
the sectors of primary commodities and services that had higher tax rates. Then, 
demand for the factor increases, driving its price up relative to capital; in 
consequence the cost of output for both domestic consumption and exports increases, 
resulting in higher prices. In the benchmark case, the price of labour also increased, 
but less because of the uniform tax rate. As to developing regions, all lose as a result 
of the policy change and suffer terms of trade deterioration, specially DAS.
When EU replaces labour taxes, there are very small effects on both welfare 
and terms of trade. When all developed regions replace labour taxes, all developing 
regions are worse off as a result of the terms of trade deterioration.
In short, when labour taxes are replaced there are larger welfare gains (losses) 
and stronger terms of trade effects than in the central case with uniform tax rates. The 
improvement in terms of trade is brought about by the effect differential taxation has 
on output prices; in this case, the increase in the price of exports resulted from the 
increase in the price of labour. These results contrast with earlier findings in which 
both welfare and terms of trade effects were rather small.
I
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Table 3.11: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax 
replacement of factor taxes in the presence of differential tax rates 
Factor immobility
Replacement Taxes on labour Taxes on capital All factor taxes
of taxes in:
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
1. USA
USA 10,539 1.54 715 0.11 11,290 1.64
JAP -847 -0.30 -312 -0.13 -1,159 -0.43
EU -2,501 -0.33 -40 -0.01 -2,542 -0.34
ODC -2,649 -0.50 76 0.01 -2,576 -0.48
DAM -1,129 -0.72 -51 -0.04 -1,180 -0.75
DAF -123 -0.11 -53 -0.05 -175 -0.16
DAS -1,545 -0.35 -59 -0.03 -1,608 -0.38
DE -19 -0.02 -66 -0.05 -86 -0.07
Total 1,727 210 1,964
2. JAP
USA -2,849 -0.48 3,139 0.52 282 0.05
JAP 7,958 2.52 -6,215 -2.62 1,889 -0.17
EU -1,530 -0.21 1,775 0.23 244 0.03
ODC -675 -0.13 697 0.13 16 0.00
DAM -234 -0.15 237 0.15 6 0.00
DAF -140 -0.13 144 0.13 6 0.00
DAS -2,744 -0.64 2,828 0.62 46 -0.01
DE -67 -0.06 73 0.06 44 0.00
Total -281 2,678 2,533
3. EU
USA -11 0.00 2,187 0.36 2,197 0.36
JAP 5 0.00 642 0.22 647 0.23
EU 139 0.03 -7,714 -1.33 -7,525 -1.31
ODC -8 -0.00 3,628 0.66 3,615 0.66
DAM -29 -0.02 406 0.25 378 0.23
DAF -33 -0.03 743 0.62 709 0.60
DAS -140 -0.03 2,121 0.46 1,977 0.43
DE -10 -0.01 514 0.41 501 0.40
Total -87 2,527 2,499
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA 7,522 1.02 7,835 1.29 15,352 2.33
JAP 7,173 2.25 -6,117 -2.64 1,199 -0.46
EU -4,184 -0.55 -3,334 -0.78 -7,466 -1.32
ODC -2,690 -0.53 -30 -0.07 -2,695 -0.61
DAM -1,394 -0.89 708 0.43 -705 -0.47
DAF -305 -0.27 924 0.77 613 0.51
DAS -4,480 -1.02 5,348 1.14 798 0.12
DE -123 -0.11 732 0.59 601 0.48
Total 1,518 6,065 7,698
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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Turning to the replacement of capital taxes, in the case of USA there is a 
welfare gain and terms of trade improvement, whereas all other regions are worse off. 
When JAP and EU replace capital taxes, they obtain welfare losses resulting from 
terms of trade deterioration (2.6% and 1.3% respectively). All other regions are better 
off. In this case the results suggest that JAP and EU could be exporting capital taxes 
specially to DAS in the case of JAP, and to DAF in the case of the EU. The 
simultaneous replacement of capital taxes in developed regions also benefits 
developing regions; their terms of trade improve between 0.4% in the case of DAM 
and 1.1% in the case of DAS. The replacement of capital taxes in the presence of 
differential taxation generates larger welfare gains and stronger terms of trade effects 
than in the presence of uniform tax rates.
When all factors taxes are replaced in USA, this region obtains welfare gains 
and its terms of trade improve; developing regions obtain welfare losses as a result of 
terms of trade deterioration (especially DAM whose terms of trade deteriorate 0.8%). 
When all factors taxes are replaced in JAP, there are small welfare and terms of trade 
effects in all other regions; this result is due to the fact that the replacement of labour 
taxes generates terms of trade deterioration, and the replacement of capital taxes 
generates terms of trade improvement of almost the same magnitude. When the EU 
replaces all factor taxes, the results are dominated by the effects of capital taxes as in 
the initial findings.
Table 3.12 considers the scenario where capital is assumed to be 
internationally mobile. The unilateral replacement of labour taxes generates welfare 
gains for the region replacing the taxes. As to developing regions, there are small 
losses as a result of the small terms of trade deterioration. However, when all 
developed regions simultaneously replace labour taxes, EU and ODC obtain welfare
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losses; developing countries also obtain welfare losses ranging from 0.1 % of GDP in
the case of DAM, to 1.3% of GDP in the case of DAF; terms of trade deteriorate 
a
0.9% and 1.6% respectively. In this case there is no tax exporting of labour taxes.
If these results are compared with those obtained in the central case, 
differential taxation generates larger welfare gains (losses) and stronger terms of 
trade effects. For example, when USA replaces labour taxes, the region obtains 
welfare gains of 0.2% of GDP compared with 0.01% of GDP without differential 
taxation, and the region’s terms of trade improve 1.6% compared to 0.1%. As to 
developing countries, the deterioration in DAM’s terms of trade increases from 
0.04%, without differential taxation, to 0.8%.
When taxes on the use of capital are replaced, the region replacing the tax 
obtains welfare losses as a result of terms of trade deterioration. The region also 
attracts capital because this factor is now cheaper relative to labour. USA appears to 
be exporting capital taxes to DAM and DAS; JAP and EU export capital taxes to all 
developing regions but DE. When all developed regions simultaneously replace 
capital taxes, DAM, DAF and DAS obtain welfare gains of 0.2%, 2.1% and 1% of 
GDP, respectively, as a result of the terms of trade improvement. Comparing these 
results with those obtained without differential taxation, little change is observed in 
the case of USA but for the other regions there are larger welfare gains (losses) and 
stronger terms of trade effects. For example, in the case of JAP the replacement of 
capital taxes generates welfare losses of 0.2% of GDP whereas in the central case 
JAP obtained welfare gains of 0.01% of GDP. JAP has the highest tax rates on the 
use of capital, and as a result of the elimination of these taxes this country attracts 
capital from all other regions, increasing the production of manufactured goods and 
in turn exports. At the same time, imports from all other regions are reduced; hence
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the supply of goods for domestic consumption is reduced. There is also a 
deterioration of JAP’s terms of trade (4.4% compared with 1.9% without differential
A
taxation) brought about by the reduction in the price of exports as a result of the 
reduction in the price of capital.
Lastly, in the presence of differential tax rates, the welfare and terms of trade 
effects of the elimination of all factor taxes in USA are dominated by labour taxes 
(which are higher than capital taxes) whereas with uniform tax rates the results are 
dominated by capital taxes. By contrast, in the case of JAP and EU the results are 
dominated by capital taxes, as it was the case with uniform tax rates.
I
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Table 3.12: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield 
tax replacement of factor taxes in the presence of differential tax rates 
International Capital Mobility
0
Replacement 
of taxes in:
Taxes on labour Taxes on capital All factor taxes
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
Equivalent 
Variation 
$ Millions
Terms of 
Trade 
% Change
1. USA
USA 10,550 1.55 -5,006 -0.81 5,947 0.72
JAP -857 -0.29 -996 0.02 -1,843 -0.27
EU -2,504 -0.33 -582 0.01 -3,066 -0.31
ODC -2,627 -0.49 1,897 0.10 -733 -0.08
DAM -1,176 -0.76 790 0.56 -378 -0.19
DAF -120 -0.11 -122 -0.05 -238 -0.16
DAS -1,611 -0.37 862 0.25 -756 -0.11
DE -15 -0.14 -205 -0.10 -219 -0.11
Total 1,640 -3,361 -1,286
2. JAP
USA -2,672 -0.44 5,362 0.91 2,695 0.50
JAP 7,943 2.55 -6,909 -4.39 2,113 -1.98
EU -1,546 -0.21 2,613 0.37 1,080 0.18
ODC -691 -0.13 1,449 0.28 749 0.16
DAM -266 -0.17 481 0.30 228 0.15
DAF -128 -0.12 2,764 0.26 155 0.16
DAS -2,957 -0.69 6,750 1.40 3,713 0.74
DE -45 -0.05 -123 -0.02 -171 -0.06
Total -362 12,386 10,562
3. EU
USA -15 -0.00 1,619 0.26 1,605 0.26
JAP -5 -0.00 -509 0.12 -514 0.12
EU 56 0.00 -14,279 -2.47 -14,259 -2.47
ODC 85 0.02 9,416 1.80 9,498 1.82
DAM -19 -0.01 645 0.44 628 0.43
DAF 13 0.03 1,705 1.75 1,718 1.78
DAS -88 -0.02 4,861 1.11 4,771 1.10
DE -42 -0.02 -903 -0.14 -945 -0.16
Total -16 2,555 2,503
4. USA. JAP. EU. ODC
USA 7,707 1.11 7,990 1.27 16,004 2.38
JAP 7,179 2.30 -6,896 -3.93 1,056 -1.75
EU -3,165 -0.43 -4,411 -1.11 -8,588 -1.64
ODC -2,840 -0.57 -2,138 -0.48 -5,105 -1.07
DAM -1,424 -0.92 2,082 1.41 581 0.46
DAF 4,454 -1.61 7,047 0.89 6,807 0.71
DAS -4,510 -1.03 14,712 3.35 9,915 2.28
DE -44 -0.05 -1,162 -0.03 -1,301 -0.13
Total 7,356 17,226 19,368
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
0
In this chapter I present numerical results on the possibility that developed regions 
export domestic taxes to developing regions, particularly to those regions with which 
they have close commercial ties. I have used a general equilibrium model that 
incorporates domestic taxation and import tariffs of eight regions, chosen to represent 
world trade. Two variants of the model were considered: in the first one both labour 
and capital are assumed to be internationally immobile, in the second one capital is 
internationally mobile.
The results of the model suggest that when factors of production are 
internationally immobile, the replacement of domestic taxes have almost no effect of 
welfare and terms of trade; hence there is no tax exporting of domestic taxes to 
developing regions, which is not surprising, since the burden of the taxes is borne by 
the same factors. In the case of JAP, the expected results are obtained, in the sense 
that the elimination of factor taxes generates both welfare gains and terms of trade 
improvement in developing regions, but the effects on both welfare and terms of 
trade appear small. Income taxes have a rather small impact on welfare and terms of 
trade. It was also observed that in some cases the replacement of domestic taxes 
and/or import tariff had a negative effect on welfare. This may occur because the 
adverse terms of trade effects are strong enough that the removal of distorting 
domestic taxes could lead to reductions in national welfare.
When capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, the results support the 
existence of tax exporting of capital taxes by USA, JAP and EU to some particular 
developing regions. In the case of taxes on the use of labour and income taxes, the 
results indicate that there is tax exporting from JAP to developing regions, although
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the effects on both welfare and terms of trade are small. In this case, once again, 
import tariffs are more important than domestic taxes in their effects on both welfare 
and terms of trade.
The effects that differential factor tax rates might have on the results of the 
model were also considered. Stronger terms of trade effects and larger welfare gains 
(losses) were found, and this confirms that intersectoral effects are very important for 
tax exporting. In particular, more taxes could be exported if a region taxes more 
heavily those industries that constitute their main exports, as appear to be the case of 
capital taxes in JAP and EU.
It is not possible to say that policies in developed regions affect all 
developing regions in the same way. Policies will have stronger effects on those 
regions with which there are close commercial ties; for example, USA will mainly 
affect DAM, JAP will mainly affect DAS, and EU will mainly affect DAF and to a 
lesser extent DE.
In the light of these results, it could be suggested that the possibility of tax 
exporting of domestic taxes will become a more important part in trade negotiations 
as international markets become more integrated. Capital markets are becoming more 
international in scope; international migration is highly constraint and very selective; 
hence it will still take considerable time to reduce restrictions to labour mobility. At 
the moment, tariffs are low in developed countries and the benefits of any further 
reductions could be dampened by higher domestic factor taxes, which can be 
exported to developing countries.
I
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Appendix 3.1: Model equations and notation
Production side o f  the model
•  Value-added function
Q,r = y [[8 1rL '<oI~l)'°! + ( l - 8 1r)K1r<<,[",),°: ]<,:/(o!-|>
• Domestic and foreign sales
Qi =<plr[P1rDC'<p;' l>/p: + ( l - P 1r)EXP1r<pi~l)'Pi]pi/(P|,-|)
• Export allocation
EXP,' = v,r I e ; Rx ; ,< 1 | , s * r
Demand side o f the model 
•  Utility function
U' =
V ¡-I
■v-,)
Domestic and import consumption
I  ( vf—I )/ vf <uf-l)/uf
CMP,r = iî,r to'IMP,' +(l-to')DOM [
, \u j /(« ;-d
Import allocation
IMP,' = V|/[ Z x:d im p ,r yi-4»'*
c[ /< c* - I  »
, s * r
Constraints
•  Consumer budget constraint (T = Er) 
Pl.,L, +PKrÎC, +TRr +TB' = X Pi'x i + T '
[A3.1]
[A3.2]
[A3.3]
[A3.4]
[A3.5]
[A3.6]
[A3.7]
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• Government budget constraint
[A3.8]
• Trade balance equation
[A3.9]
Zero profit conditions
In each region the value of domestic output in sector i must be equal to the 
capital and labour costs of producing good i. At the same time, the value of domestic 
output in sector i equals the value of commodities sold in the domestic market plus 
the value of commodities sold as exports. Combining these two zero profit 
conditions, the following expression is obtained:
The value of commodities sold as exports must equal the value of the sum of 
exports to the other 7 regions:
The value of total imports must equal the value of the sum of imports from the other 
7 regions:
The value of the composite commodity i demanded by consumers must equal 
the value of aggregate imports plus the value of domestically produced goods:
[A3.10]
[A3.11]
p ' i m p ' = V  p 1
DIMP.i
If.» DIMP;r\ s * r [A3.12]
p. ,c m p ;  = P«., im p ; + pìom.d o m ; [A3.13]
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The value of goods sold for domestic consumption must be equal to the value
of the demand for domestically produced goods; i.e.,
P'  DCr = P r D O M r 
Hence:
PdCJ =  f*DOM,i [A3.14]
The value of exports from region r to region s must be equal to the value of 
imports of region s from region r; i.e.,
P",RX:‘ = P ^ PJDIMP*
Hence:
[A3.15]
Market clearing conditions
•  Goods markets
The supply o f goods for domestic consumption must equal the demand for 
domestically produced goods:
DC[ = DOM[ [A3.16]
Exports from region r to region s must equal imports of region s from region r 
because there are assumed to be no transfer (e.g. transport) costs in shipping goods 
from one region to another:
RX;'=DIMI>,r [A3.17]
Total supply o f composite commodities, which consists of the composite of 
similar domestic products and aggregate imports, must equal consumer’s demand in 
each region:
CMP; = X[ [A3.18]
• Factor markets
For labour:
i - l
[A3.19]
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For capital, assuming that it is internationally immobile, the market clearing 
condition is:
S k; [A3.20]
When capital is internationally mobile, the market clearing condition 
becomes:
¿ S K.r = X ^ r . [A3.20a]
1=1 r= l  r=l
Equations fo r  price relationships
• Import prices
Pm, = P m,( i + < ) [A3.21]
• Factor prices
p ; .i= P K ,( i+ t ;J [A3.22]
Pl, = P L,(l + t u ) [A3.23]
• Consumer prices
P,r =P„( l  + t ' . ,) [A3.24]
List o f  variables
Qi Value added good i region r.
L' Labour input good i region r.
K[ Capital input good i region r.
DC- Output for domestic consumption good i region r.
EXP/ Output for exports good i region r.
RX[ * Exports of good i from region r to region s.
Ur Consumer utility region r.
»
X,r Consumer demand good i region r.
CMP/ Total supply of good i region r.
IMP/ Total imports good i region r.
DOM' Domestic output for domestic for consumption good i region 
DIMP/’' Imports good i region r from to region s. 
r  Income region r.
Er Expenditure region r
TRr Government transfers region r.
TBr Trade surplus or deficit region r.
Tr Income tax paid by consumers region r.
PLr Selling prices of labour region r.
P/ Producer price labour input good i region r.
PK r Selling prices of capital region r.
P/ Producer price capital input good i region r.
Pi r Gross price of consumer good i region r.
P/ Price paid by consumers for good i region r.
P/,a Domestic price of imports good i region r.
P/, j Gross price of imports good i region r.
Px j Price of exports good i region r.
P/cj Price goods sold for domestic consumption good i region r. 
P/xj Price of good i exported from region r to region s.
142
P d o m j  Price good i for domestic consumption region r. 
Pdimp.i Price of good i imported by region r from region s.
List o f  parameters
y \
8'
Scale parameter value added function, good i region r. 
Share parameter value added function, good i region r.
<p;
p ;
p,r
Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, good i region r. 
Scale parameter exports and domestic sales function, good i region r. 
Share parameter exports and domestic sales function, good i region r. 
Elasticity of transformation between domestic output, good i region r.
vi Scale parameter export allocation function, good i region r.
e,r Share parameter export allocation function, good i region r.
Elasticity of transformation between regional exports, good i region r.
a,r Share parameter utility function, good i region r.
nr Elasticity of substitution in consumption region r.
« Î Scale parameter domestic and import consumption function, good i region r.
Share parameter domestic and import consumption function, good i region r.
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported consumption, good
region r.
Vi Scale parameter import allocation function, good i region r.
x;
Ci
Share parameter import allocation function, good i region r. 
Elasticity of substitution between regional imports, good i region r.
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Lr Endowment of labour region r.
Kr Endowment of capital region r.
»
tr Tax rate on income region r.
t' Tax rate on imports good i region r.
tj-j Tax rate on consumption good i region r.
tJtj Tax rate on capital (i.e. corporate and property taxes) region r.
t[j Tax rate on labour (i.e. payroll tax and social security contributions) region r.
TBg Benchmark region’s trade surplus or deficit region r.
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Appendix. 3.2: Benchmark data set
The benchmark data set involves both domestic data and external sector data for the 
following regions: the United States (USA), Japan (JAP), the European Union (EU), 
Other Developed Countries (ODC), Developing America (DAM), Developing Africa 
(DAF), Developing Asia (DAS), and Developing Europe (DE). Domestic activity 
data consists of data on value added by component by industry and domestic taxes. 
External sector data includes foreign trade and import tariffs. The data set is 
consistent with 1990 US dollar GDP for the eight regions, as reported by the World 
Tables (World Bank, 1995).
1. Value added by industry (including net indirect taxes)
First, GDP for each region was taken from the World tables published by the World 
Bank(1995); then, National Accounts Statistics (United Nations, 1996) were used to 
obtain the cost components of value added, that is compensation of employees, gross 
operating surplus and net indirect taxes. In addition, this source was used to split 
domestic production among primary commodities, manufactured goods and services.
National accounts classify products, based on the international standard 
industrial classification (ISIC) of the United Nations, in nine broad categories. 
Primary commodities correspond to the first two categories, that is agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing, and mining and quarrying. Manufactured goods include 
all the manufacturing sector. And services comprise the remaining six categories, that 
is electricity, gas and water; construction; wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels; transport, storage and communications; finance, insurance, real state and 
business services; community, social and personal services; and government services.
145
Given that these data are published in domestic currency, average exchange rates (as
taken from the International Financial Statistics from the International Monetary 
»
Fund) are used to convert the data into US dollars.
Since there is no data on the distribution of value added by industry, nor on 
the cost components of value added by industry for every country, data on the 
countries for which this information was available were used. The EU is represented 
by all member states but Belgium, Greece and Ireland (for Portugal the latest 
available data was used, that is 1989). Regarding ODC, the distribution of value 
added by industry was obtained using information for Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Then, to calculate the cost components of value added by industry 
information for Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway was 
used.
In the case of DAM, ECLAC (1997) provided information on the distribution 
of value added by industry. As to the cost components of value added, data for 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela were used. Regarding DAF, the distribution of 
value added by industry was obtained using information for Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya 
and Nigeria. Then, to calculate the cost components of value added by industry data 
for Nigeria were used. With regard to DAS, the distribution of value added by 
industry was calculated using data for India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. To calculate the cost components of value added by industry data for 
Korea, Thailand and India were used. Finally, as to DE, the region’s distribution of 
value added by industry was calculated using data for Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, and Turkey; the cost components of value added by industry were obtained
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using information for Hungary. It is worth mentioning that in all cases the data were 
scaled for consistency with the 1990 GDP at factor cost by region.
2. Foreign Trade
The basic sources used are the UNCTAD’s 1995 Handbook of International Trade 
and Development Statistics (Annex A -  Network of world exports by selected 
commodity classes and regions of origin and destination),, the United Nation’s 1996 
National Accounts Statistics, the Balance of Payments Yearbook (International 
Monetary Fund, 1996), and ECLAC (1997).
To begin with, a commodity classification compatible with the one used for 
value added was found. In this case, UNCTAD’s classification of primary 
commodities (including fuels) and manufactured products was chosen. The former 
includes the SITC divisions 0, 1,2, 3, 4, and 68, whereas the latter includes the SITC 
divisions 5, 6 (excluding 68), 7, and 8. To represent trade flows export figures were 
used, since the same value of exports and imports must appear for each region on any 
bilateral trade route. Exports figures are f.o.b.
For USA and JAP total exports of goods and services were obtained from 
national accounts. UNCTAD’s data were used to split exports of goods between 
primary commodities and manufactured goods. As to the destination of the regions’ 
exports UNCTAD’s data were also used. For services, the same percentage 
distribution of exports of goods was assumed.
Regarding the EU, from the national accounts for each member state total 
exports of goods and services were obtained; however, it was not possible to 
disaggregate exports of goods between primary commodities and manufactured 
goods. Information from UNCTAD was used. Then, intra-EU trade was subtracted in
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order to avoid double counting. This information was obtained from UNCTAD for
primary commodities and manufactured goods; EUROSTAT (1994) provided the
*
relevant information on intra-EU trade in services (approximately 48.7% of total 
exports of services). Then exports of services were adjusted to eliminate this type of 
trade. Now, regarding the destination of EU exports, UNCTAD’s data (Annex A) for 
primary commodities and manufactured goods were used. As to exports of services, 
they were calculated using the same percentage distribution of total exports of goods.
With regard to the ODC, from national accounts total exports of goods and 
services were obtained. Using UNCTAD’s data, exports of goods were split between 
primary commodities and manufactured goods, and intra-regional trade was 
eliminated. Regarding services, it was assumed that 12.2% of exports were intra- 
regional trade (this figure corresponds to the weighted average of intra-regional trade 
of primary commodities and manufactured goods). As to the destination of ODC’s 
exports UNCTAD’s data were used. For services, it was assumed the same 
percentage distribution of exports of goods.
In the case of DAM, data on total exports of goods and services were 
obtained from ECLAC (1997). Information from national accounts for Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela, was 
used to split total exports between goods and services. UNCTAD data were used to 
split exports of goods between primary commodities and manufactured goods, and to 
eliminate intra-regional trade. Regarding services, it was assumed that 13.7% 
corresponded to intra-regional trade (this figure is the weighted average of intra- 
regional trade of primary commodities and manufactured goods). As to the 
destination of the region’s exports, UNCTAD’s data were used. For services, the 
same percentage distribution of exports of goods was assumed.
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The Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (International Monetary Fund, 
1996) was used to obtain data on total exports of goods and services for DAF, DAS, 
and DE. UNCTAD’s data were used to split exports of goods between primary 
commodities and manufactured goods and to eliminate intra-regional trade.19 
Regarding services, it was assumed that 5.9%, 34.8% and 35.2% of total exports 
corresponded to intra-regional trade for DAF, DAS, and DE respectively (these 
figures correspond to the weighted average of intra-regional trade of primary 
commodities and manufactured goods). As to the destination of the regions’ exports, 
UNCTAD’s data were used. For services, once again the same percentages 
distribution of exports of goods were assumed.
3. Domestic Taxes and Import Tariffs
Regarding domestic taxes, six taxes were included: income tax, corporate tax, 
property tax, payroll tax, social security contributions, and taxes on goods and 
services. The average tax rates used in the model were reported in Table 3.2. These 
rates were calculated as tax revenues divided by the base of the tax. Tax revenues 
were taken from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (International 
Monetary Fund, 1996).20 The base of the income tax was total income from factor 
ownership; in the case of the corporate and the property taxes, the tax base was total 
use of capital; and in the case of the payroll tax and the social security contributions 
the tax base was total payments to labour. For taxes on the use of capital as well as
19 In the case of DAS, UNCTAD’s data were adjusted since Turkey and Cyprus are included in Asia. 
In the case of DE, UNCTAD’s data were adjusted to include Eastern Europe, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta 
and the former Yugoslavia.
20 These data are collected on a fiscal year basis, and may not coincide with the calendar year used to 
collect data on production and trade.
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on the use of labour, it is assumed that the same tax rate applies across industries, 
since it was not possible to find the required data.
For the EU and ODC information for all the countries in the region was used 
to calculate the tax rates. For DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE, the following countries 
were used to calculate the tax rates in the following way: in each region, the 
aggregate tax base for the countries available was calculated; then, using the 
corresponding aggregate tax revenues (for each tax ). average tax rates were 
calculated. The countries used in each region were:
DAM
Income Tax 
Corporate Tax
Property Tax
Payroll Tax
Social Security Contributions
Costa Rica, Perù, Uruguay, and Venezuela
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Perù, Uruguay, and
Venezuela
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Perù, and Uruguay
Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Perù, Uruguay, and
Venezuela
DAF
Income Tax 
Corporate Tax 
Property Tax 
Payroll Tax
Social Security Contributions
Cameroon, Egypt, Namibia, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, and Zimbabwe
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m
DAS
Income Tax
Corporate Tax 
Property Tax 
Payroll Tax
Social Security Contributions
Korea, Thailand, Iran, India, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Jordan, and Malaysia
Korea, Thailand, Iran, India, Philippines, and Jordan 
Korea, Thailand, Iran, India, Philippines, and Jordan 
Korea, Thailand, Iran, India, Philippines, and Jordan 
Korea, Thailand, Iran, India, Philippines, and Jordan
DE
Income Tax
Corporate Tax 
Property Tax 
Payroll Tax
Social Security Contributions
Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and 
Turkey
Estonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Turkey 
Estonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Turkey 
Estonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Turkey 
Estonia, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Turkey
Regarding taxes on domestic goods and services, these are included in 
indirect taxes which were calculated as a component of value added. Using 
information from national accounts different average tax rates were calculated for 
primary commodities, manufactured products and services (see Table 3.2 in the text).
Finally, import tariffs were taken from GATT-Trade Policy Review (various 
countries) and correspond to average tariffs for the agricultural and industrial sectors.
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For EU information for all member states was used; for ODC, DAM, DAF, DAS, 
and DE average tariffs were calculated using information for the following countries:
ODC Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
South Africa, and New Zealand 
DAM Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay 
DAF Egypt21, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia 
DAS Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines 
DE Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic 
It was assumed that import tariffs on services were equal to zero.
4. Final Demand
The model assumes that there is a representative consumer by region, which 
simplifies the calculation of final demand. In the case of domestically produced 
goods, final demand is equal to gross output minus exports; for imported goods, final 
demand equals imports.
Once all the data were collected, the benchmark data set was assembled in the 
form of social accounting matrices (SAMs), one matrix for each region. A SAM is a 
square matrix that contains data for a particular period (usually a year) to offer an 
empirical description of the economy (see e.g. King, 1985; Pyatt, 1988). In the matrix 
each element has the following economic interpretation: on the one hand, it is a 
receipt for the account represented by the row; on the other hand, it is also an 
expenditure for the account specified by the column. Furthermore, a SAM has the
21 Egyptian tariffs were very high for Beverages and Spirits (1,247.1%).
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property that row and column totals must be equal. This characteristic, according to 
Pyatt (1988), is associated to the so-called “fundamental law of Economics”, which 
states that each income has its corresponding expenditure.
SAMs comprise accounts for institutions, factors of production, production 
activities, commodities and the rest of the world. In particular, the SAMs presented 
in Tables A3.1 to A3.8 comprise two factor accounts (i.e. labour and capital); three 
production activities (i.e., primary commodities, manufactured goods, and services); 
three value added accounts, where each one is associated with its correspondent 
production activity; fifteen commodity accounts that comprise three accounts for 
exports, three for domestically produced goods, three for imports, and three for 
composite commodities; one account for domestic institutions, namely the 
representative consumer; seven accounts for taxes; and seven accounts for the rest of 
the world (ROW) (one for each of the regions with which there is trade).
The account for factors of production indicates that factor income (measured 
along the rows) is generated by production activities that hire production factors in 
order to produce commodities. On the other hand, this income is allocated (across the 
columns) to domestic institutions (in this case the representative consumer), which 
are the owners of the factors of production.
The production side of the economy consists of production activities and 
commodity accounts. Production activities derive their income from output sales to 
commodity markets (along the rows); at the same time, along the columns it is 
observed that production activities hire factor services to generate value added, part 
of which represents factor payments. The remainder accrues to domestic institutions 
as taxes.
I
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In the commodity accounts, the sources of demand are final consumption and 
exports (along the rows). These demands can be satisfied by domestic production of 
goods and services as well as imports. However, it is worth noting that since demand 
is valued at market prices, taxes on commodities need to be added to express the 
aggregate supply in the same terms. The importance of the distinction between 
production activities and commodity accounts, is the fact that it permits us to 
consider the domestic demand for commodities as a composite of imported and 
domestically produced goods.
The account for domestic institutions (i.e. the representative consumer) shows 
that income (along the row) originates from factor services and tax revenues. The 
column presents the way in which consumer’s income is spent on consumption and 
taxes on consumption.
The accounts for indirect taxes indicate that production activities are the 
source of indirect taxes (along the rows). The columns indicate that these tax 
revenues accrue to domestic institutions.
The last accounts of the matrices present the transactions between the 
domestic economy and the rest of the world. In particular, each domestic economy 
receives income from the ROW in the form of payments for exports. On the other 
hand, each domestic economy pays to the ROW for imports. The model assumes that 
the trade balance in each region remains constant in real terms, so that it was not 
necessary to adjust the data to obtain a zero external sector balance. The consumer 
account is not balanced, but the imbalance in each region is equal to the trade balance 
with the opposite sign. This implies that if a region is in trade surplus, then 
consumer’s expenditure in that region will be greater than consumer’s income.
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5. Modification of factor tax rates
The model assumes that the same tax rate applies across industries, as it was not
possible to find the required data. Since intersectoral effects may be important for tax 
exporting, the data set was modified in order to illustrate the relevance of differential 
factor tax rates by industry. Whalley (1980a, Table 1, p. 1182) presents model- 
equivalent ad valorem tax rates on the uses of capital and labour for the United 
States, the European Union, and Japan, by industry (i.e. agriculture and food; raw 
materials and extractive; non-durable manufacturing; durable manufacturing; and 
services). The first two industries were associated to what I referred to as primary 
commodities, the following two industries to manufactured products, and the last 
industry to services (these tax rates are for 1973).
Tax rates on the uses of capital and labour by industry were calculated, such 
that they generate the same tax revenues as in the benchmark data set, and that the 
ratios between the tax rates for manufactures and services, and for manufactures and 
primary commodities, are the same as those obtained from Whalley (1980a). The 
resulting tax rates are presented in Table A3.9.
»
Table A3.9: New ad valorem factor tax rates by industry (%)
Regions
USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
1. Taxes on the use of capital
Primary commodities 2.8 9.5 4.4 4.3 3.5 4.3 5.4 1.9
Manufactured goods 7.8 21.7 19.2 18.8 9.8 12.1 14.9 5.3
Services 6.0 10.0 6.2 6.0 6.1 7.5 9.3 3.3
2. Taxes on the use of labour
Primary commodities 14.0 21.2 32.7 14.8 10.2 9.7 2.0 6.3
Manufactured goods 6.7 10.2 24.6 11.1 8.9 8.4 1.7 5.5
Services 12.5 19.0 25.1 11.4 8.9 8.4 1.7 5.5
Source: Author’s own calculations.
1 6 3
For USA, JAP and EU, the ratios obtained from Whalley (1980a) for each 
region were used. For taxes on the use of labour in JAP the same proportion as in 
USA were used, since in Whalley’s paper the same tax rate applies for all sectors. 
For ODC the ratios calculated for the EU were used, and for the developing regions, 
the ratios were calculated using the average of tax rates for USA, JAP and EU.
I
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Appendix 3.3: Armington elasticities in the model 
«
These elasticities are the elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and 
domestically produced goods (v), and the elasticity of substitution between imports 
forming import composites (Q. The former was set equal to literature estimates of 
import price elasticities. The latter was set equal to literature estimates of export 
price elasticities. Within each region the same values are assumed for all commodity- 
substitution possibilities.
• For USA and JAP these elasticities were obtained from Marquez (1990).
• For EU these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the 
following countries (sources in parentheses): Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands (Stem et al, 1976); Germany and the 
United Kingdom (Marquez, 1990); and Portugal (Houthakker and Magee, 1969).
• For ODC these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the 
following countries (sources in parentheses): Canada (Marquez, 1990); Austria, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand (Stem et. al., 
1976).
• For DAM these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Pern and Uruguay, as 
taken from Khan (1974).22
• For DAF these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of Ghana 
and Morocco, as taken from Khan (1974).
I
22 The export price elasticity of Uruguay is not included in the computation of the average elasticity for 
DAM since it was not available.
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• For DAS these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the 
following countries (sources in parentheses): India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka 
(Khan, 1974); and Pakistan and Bangladesh (Nguyen and Bhuyan, 1977).23
• Lastly, for DE I use the elasticities for Turkey estimated by Khan (1974).
The elasticities used in the model are presented in Table 3.3 in the text. I
I
21 The export price elasticity of the Philippines is not included in the computation of the average 
elasticity for DAS since it was not available.
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C H A P T E R  4
E f f ic ie n c y  G a in s  f r o m  t h e  E l im in a t io n  o f  G l o b a l  
R e s t r ic t io n s  o n  L a b o u r  M o b il it y : A n  A n a l y s is
U s in g  a  M u l t ir e g io n a l  C G E  M o d e l
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compute the world-wide efficiency gains from the 
elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility. To this end, a multiregional 
general equilibrium model is used, since this approach constitutes an ideal 
framework to analyse the effects of policy changes on resource allocation, the 
structure of distribution, and economic welfare. In addition, a segmented labour 
market is considered, since the benefits (losses) of migration are not equally 
distributed within each country.
The classic economic argument in favour of labour migration is that people 
move in search of higher wages, hence increasing their own productivity.1 However, 
as indicated by Layard et al (1992), the decision to migrate also depends upon other 
economic, social and political considerations. Among the economic aspects, migrants 
may take into account comparative wage levels, actual and expected; comparative 
unemployment rates and unemployment benefits; the availability of housing; and the 
cost of migration which includes travel expenses, information costs, and the
' Layard et al (1992) indicate that free trade and international capital mobility can also raise 
productivity, without labour migration.
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psychological cost of leaving friends and family. Weyerbrock (1995) also indicates 
that political instability and civil war may cause larger emigration flows than 
economic or demographic pressures.
Recent empirical studies on international migration have mainly focused on 
U.S.-Mexico migration patterns (Hill and Méndez 1984, Robinson et al. 1993, and 
Levy and van Wijnbergen 1994), and migration flows from Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union into Western Europe (Layard et al 1992, and Weyerbrock 1995).
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) has been the only attempt to quantify the 
efficiency gains from the removal of global restrictions on labour mobility. They use 
a partial equilibrium framework, in which the parameters of a CES production 
function are estimated for a seven-region country classification.2 Then, the estimated 
parameters are used to calculate the changes in labour allocation across regions after 
the removal of immigration controls. They assume that the world-wide labour supply 
is fixed, that full employment occurs in all regions, and that differences in labour’s 
marginal product across regions arise from barriers to inward mobility of labour in 
high wage countries. Hamilton and Whalley find large efficiency gains from the 
removal of immigration controls; in most cases, these gains exceed world-wide GNP 
generated in the presence of the controls. In addition, in labour exporting regions 
wage rates rise and capital owners are made worse off; on the other hand, in labour 
receiving regions wage rates fall and capital owners are made better off.
In contrast to Hamilton and Whalley (1984), I use a multiregional general 
equilibrium model instead of a partial equilibrium approach, since the former 
provides an ideal framework to analyse the links among the different regions, and the
2 The regions considered are: the United States, Japan, the European Union (9-member EU), other 
developed countries, OPEC, newly industrialised countries and less developed countries.
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distributional and welfare effects of migration. The distinctive feature of my analysis 
is that it considers a segmented labour market, which can be justified on the grounds 
that this factor of production is not homogeneous. In particular, two types of labour 
are considered, namely skilled and unskilled. The segmentation of the labour market 
jointly with the general equilibrium framework allow us to examine the distributional 
effects of migration between skilled and unskilled labour in each region, and between 
these two and capital. In addition to that, there are further elaborations on the 
structure of the model, as I also consider the role of transaction costs, international 
capital mobility, and selective labour mobility (the latter corresponding to the case 
where the individuals of a particular developing region are allowed to migrate to 
developed regions).
According to the results, the elimination of global restrictions on labour 
mobility generates world-wide efficiency gains that could be of considerable 
magnitude, ranging from 14% to 62% of world GDP. With the introduction of a 
segmented labour market, welfare gains reduce since the benefits and losses of 
migrations are not evenly distributed within each country, ranging from 12% to 55% 
of world GDP. And when only skilled labour migrates, world-wide efficiency gains 
are much smaller, since skilled labour represents a small fraction of the labour force 
in developing regions, ranging from 3% to 11% of world GDP. Lastly, the removal of 
global restrictions on labour mobility leads to an improvement in global income 
distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient. In the benchmark case, the 
calculated coefficient was 0.41; once the restrictions on labour mobility were
eliminated this coefficient reduced, suggesting an improvement in the global
l
distribution of income (the coefficient varied within the range 0.30 to 0.37, 
depending on the measure of wages used).
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the
multiregional general equilibrium model. Section 3 contains the empirical 
m
implementation, which includes the description of the benchmark data set, the 
calibration of the model, and the specification of elasticities. Section 4 presents the 
results of the model as well as the sensitivity analysis. Section 5 presents model 
elaborations, including transaction costs, international capital mobility, and selective 
mobility. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Introduction
In a world economy characterised by countries with different levels of income, 
individuals have incentives to migrate to countries with higher wage rates. If labour 
were allowed to move from one country to another without restrictions, it will do so 
until the marginal product of labour is the same in both low income and high income 
countries. In order to assess the benefits and losses from migration, let us consider, 
drawing on earlier work by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) and Layard et al (1992) 
on international migration, a world economy consisting of a rich country and a poor 
country. The wage rate in the rich country is higher than the wage rate in the poor 
country, and for simplicity it is also assumed that there is no unemployment.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the world labour force, L, between the 
rich country and the poor country. Before migration is allowed, the labour force is
larger in the poor country, as measured by the horizontal distance between Op and
/
L i ,  while the labour force in the rich country is given by the distance between O r  and 
L |. The wage differential between the rich and the poor countries corresponds to the
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vertical distance WR-Wp. Once barriers to labour movements are removed, labour 
will move out of the poor country and into the rich country, so that the new 
equilibrium is reached at point E, where wage rates are equalised. Migration will 
reduce the labour force in the poor country, leading to an increase in wages from WP 
to WE,3 and a reduction in the demand for labour from Op-Li to Op-L2. In addition, 
migration leads to a process of factor reallocation within the poor country: the 
remaining workers gain through higher wages, but capital owners lose since labour is 
now scarce relative to capital.
Figure 4.1: The effects of migration
• ------------------------------------------------------------------------•
Total Labour Endowment, L
i
'The magnitude of the increase will depend on the elasticity of labour demand. The more elastic the 
demand for labour, the smaller the increase in wages.
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Conversely, in the rich country the labour force increases from Or-L i to Or- 
L2, which leads to a reduction in the wage rate (assuming no rigidities) from WR to 
WE. This lower wage will increase the demand for labour and aggregate employment. 
During the transition, workers will lose through lower wages and capital owners will 
gain since labour is now less scarce relative to capital. In sum, the loses in the poor 
country are given by the triangle CDE, whereas the rich country gains are given by 
the triangle ABE. Migrants gain the rectangle BECD, and since they may send 
remittances back home, the poor country’s losses might be partially or totally 
compensated. The world economy gains the Harberger triangle ACE. It is worth 
bearing in mind that the preceding analysis was based on the assumption that labour 
is a homogeneous factor of production, which implies that the benefits and loses of 
migration are evenly distributed within each country. However, as the analysis will 
show later on, this is not necessarily the case since there are many types of labour.
At this point it is worth mentioning that for some trade theorists, the issue of 
the removal of restrictions on labour mobility may not be of great relevance because 
of the factor price equalisation theorem, according to which factor prices will be 
equalised by free trade without internationally mobile factors.4 This theorem, 
however, is based on very restrictive assumptions: identical technologies in different 
countries, constant returns to scale, perfect competition, no factor intensity reversals, 
no specialisation, and that good prices are equalised as a result of trade. Moreover, 
factor price equalisation depends on the complete convergence of the price of the 
goods. In reality, the prices of the goods are not fully equalised because of both
natural (e.g., transportation costs) and artificial barriers to trade (e.g., import tariffs,
(
4 See Samuelson (1948, 1949) for a presentation of the first complete statement of the factor price 
equalisation theorem. This theorem has been extended and refined by other authors.
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import quotas, voluntary export restraints): An additional reason why factor price 
equalisation may not be achieved is that countries exhibit different technologies and 
resources, so that they are unlikely to remain unspecialised (Layard and Walters 
1978, Krugman and Obstfeld 1994). For example, Burfisher et al (1994) indicate that 
in the case of the United States and Mexico, the assumption of identical technologies 
in all sectors, differing only in aggregate factor proportions, is not a realistic one 
since observed differences in production technology are enormous.
4.2 .2  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  m o d e l
The structure of the model follows the standard specification of a multiregional 
general equilibrium model. I use the model constructed in Chapter 3, which is a static 
model consisting of eight regions, each one with demand and production structures. 
All regions are linked through trade. Each region contains three industries, each of 
which produces a single output, which are treated as heterogeneous across regions 
(Armington, 1969). There is a representative consumer in each region, and for 
simplicity, intermediate production is not considered.
On the production side of the model, two variants are considered. In the first 
variant, in each sector production involves a CES value added function with capital 
(K) and labour (L) as primary inputs; factor demands are obtained from cost 
minimisation. This is the same production structure previously used in Chapter 3 (see 
Figure 3.1).
The second variant of the model considers capital (K) and two types of 
labour: namely skilled labour and unskilled labour, denoted Ls and Lu respectively. 
In other words, the labour market is assumed to be segmented and this, as indicated
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above, is a distinctive feature of this modelling exercise in comparison to previous
work by Hamilton and Whalley (1984). This characteristic allows us to take into
M
account distributional effects of migration among skilled labour, unskilled labour and 
capital owners. Figure 4.2 presents the production structure of the model when there 
is segmentation in the labour market.
The model uses two-stage CES production functions, which are more flexible 
than non-nested functions, since they allow for different elasticity parameters in each 
stage of the production process. In the first stage, Ls and Lu are combined to produce 
the aggregate labour input (L); the labour aggregation function for industry i in region 
r, is given by,
where L' is the aggregate labour input; Ls[ and Lu[ are skilled and unskilled labour
Figure 4.2: Production structure in each'sector
Exports to the 
other 7 regions
Exports Domestic
Consumption
Output
Labour Capital
Skilled Unskilled
Labour Labour
, i  = 1,2,3; r=  1...... 8, [ 1]
inputs; <|>[ is a constant defining units of measurement; n\ is a share parameter;
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and <;' is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour in the 
production of the aggregate labour input.
Labour demand functions are obtained from cost minimisation; that is, each 
industry in each region selects an optimal level of Ls and Lu that minimises the cost 
of producing L units of the aggregate input. Aggregate supplies of skilled and 
unskilled labour are fixed.
In the second stage the aggregate labour input and capital are combined to 
produce value added. In each region each industry selects an optimal level of inputs 
that minimises the cost of producing value added. At this point, the structure of the 
model becomes the same as that of the model used in Chapter 3. The notation and 
equations are presented in Appendix 3.1.
Factors are non-produced commodities in fixed supply. It is assumed that 
factors of production are mobile across industries within each region, but are 
internationally immobile, although this assumption is relaxed later on for Ls.
The demand structure of the model is the same as that used in Chapter 3 (see 
Figure 3.2). The region’s representative consumer demands composites of 
domestically produced and imported goods subject to the region’s budget constraint 
(see Appendix 3.1).
As in Chapter 3, the model also incorporates income, factor and consumption 
taxes, as well as import tariffs, all of which are modelled in ad valorem form. All tax 
revenues raised are assumed to be transferred back to consumers. These policy 
instruments are not relevant to the issue being analysed; however, as they were 
included in the previous chapter, for convenience, it was decided to include them in 
order to avoid the adjustment of the benchmark data set.
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Lastly, it is worth pointing out that some of the assumptions of the model may
affect the outcome of the simulations. In global models it is usually assumed that
*
capital is internationally immobile. This assumption may not be very realistic since 
international capital markets are becoming more integrated. However, this 
assumption is fundamental to the structure of the model; if all factors of production 
are allowed to move freely, the concept of region is no longer clear. Hence the need 
for a fixed factor in the specification of the model (in one of the extensions of the 
model, when capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, unskilled labour is the 
fixed factor in the model).5
Regarding labour, in the model it is assumed that differences in the marginal 
product of labour arise from barriers to inward mobility of labour in high-wage 
countries. Thus, once barriers to labour mobility are eliminated wage rates equalise 
across regions. The model also assumes that labour in one region is the same as 
labour in another region, so that differences in labour quality or human capital per 
worker across countries are ignored. In the real world these differences are not only 
present but may also be significant. For example, Lucas (1995) indicates that 
production per worker in the US is about fifteen times what it is in India; after 
correcting for differences in human capital, each American worker was estimated to 
be the equivalent of about five Indian workers. Another important factor that may 
affect labour productivity is the technology available in each region. Thus, the 
elimination of restrictions on labour mobility may not after all eliminate differences 
in productivity across regions. As can be seen, some of the assumptions used in the
specification of the labour market may be highly simplified; however, incorporating
/
5 Instead of having a fixed factor, a nontradable good could be introduced, so that all production 
factors could be inter-regionally mobile.
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differences in the quality of labour across regions is severely constrained by data 
availability.
4.2.3 E q u il ib r iu m  c o n d it io n s  in  t h e  m o d e l
Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. 
Equilibrium in the model is given by a set of goods and factor prices for which all 
markets clear. It is assumed that all factors are intersectorally mobile within each 
region; this means that there is only one price for each factor in each region. As to 
international factor mobility, it is initially assumed that all factors are internationally 
immobile, so that there are separate labour and capital equilibrium conditions in each 
region. That is, the region’s endowment of capital and labour must equal factor use 
across all sectors (i.e. full employment occurs in all regions).
In the first variant of the model, in which the labour market is not segmented, 
the equilibrium conditions (i.e. demand-supply equalities, zero profit conditions and 
external-sector balance) are the same as in Chapter 3 (see Appendix 3.1). Assuming 
that the labour market is segmented requires the inclusion of an additional market 
clearing condition, which states that the supply of the aggregate labour input 
generated by the combination of Lu and Ls in each industry, must equal the demand 
for the aggregate labour input used in the production of value added in each industry. 
Further, it is necessary to introduce an additional zero profit condition, which states 
that the value of the aggregate labour input in each industry must be equal to the 
skilled and unskilled labour costs of producing the aggregate input in each industry.
Once the equilibrium conditions that characterise the model have been
I
specified, counterfactual equilibria can be compared with the benchmark equilibrium
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generated by the data. However, before doing this, the parameters of the model that 
are consistent with the benchmark data set are calculated. These parameters allow us 
to reproduce the data set as an equilibrium solution of the model.
4.3 Empirical implementation
The model used to analyse the efficiency gains from the elimination of restrictions on 
labour mobility consists of eight regions: four developed regions (USA, JAP, EU, 
and ODC) and four developing regions (DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE). These regions 
were chosen to reflect world trade, and the 1990 data set assembled in the previous 
chapter was used. The disaggregation between developed and developing regions is 
important since individuals have incentives to migrate from regions with low wage 
rates (developing regions) to regions with higher wage rates (developed regions). The 
additional disaggregation into developed and developing regions is again of 
particular interest, since it provides an indication of the main source and destination 
regions (Table 3.1 in the previous chapter presents the grouping of individual 
countries).
As indicated above, each region produces three commodities, and each 
region’s domestically produced and imported goods are qualitatively different 
(Armington, 1969). The price of the composite primary commodities demanded by 
the consumer in USA is chosen as the numeraire.
4.3.1 B e n c h m a r k  d a t a  s e t
i
The benchmark data set involves domestic and external sector data for each region. 
Domestic activity data involve data on value added by component by industry, the
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segmentation of the labour market as well as domestic taxes. External sector data 
includes data on foreign trade and import tariffs. The size of the eight regions 
remains unaltered, and is given by their respective GDP in 1990 US dollars, 
consistent with the World Tables (World Bank, 1995) (see Appendix 3.2 for a 
detailed presentation of the sources and how the data set was assembled).
One of the modifications introduced to the data set was the segmentation of 
the labour market. National Accounts Statistics (Unite«) Nations, 1996) provide 
information on the cost components of value added, that is compensation of 
employees, gross operating surplus and net indirect taxes. However, this source 
reports the remuneration of employees without distinguishing between different types 
of labour. Information from (various issues of) the Yearbook of Labour Statistics of 
the International Labour Office (ILO) was then used to calculate the percentage of 
skilled and unskilled workers within the economically active population for each 
sector in each region. Using the methodology described in Appendix 4.1, the 
following percentages (of the number of employees) were obtained:
Table 4.1: Percentage of skilled and unskilled workers by sector
Primary Commodities Manufactured Goods Services
Regions Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
labour labour labour labour labour labour
USA 10.8% 89.2% 24.1% 75.9% 32.2% 67.8%
JAP 0.8% 99.2% 10.5% 89.5% 20.2% 79.8%
EU 1.7% 98.3% 13.1% 86.9% 24.3% 75.7%
ODC 10.0% 90.0% 14.9% 85.1% 28.7% 71.3%
DAM 1.9% 98.1% 8.2% 91.8% 19.5% 80.5%
DAF 0.5% 99.5% 7.7% 92.3% 18.4% 81.6%
DAS 0.1% 99.9% 4.6% 95.4% 11.8% 88.2%
DE 0.9% 99.1% 7.8% 92.2% 19.9% 80.1%
Source: Author’s calculations. See Appendix 4.1
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As can be seen, these percentages indicate that skilled labour is more 
abundant in developed regions. The percentages reported above are important since 
they are used to split the wage bill in each industry, as taken from the National 
Accounts, into remuneration to skilled and unskilled labour in each region. Table 4.2 
presents the resulting costs components of value added for each sector when the 
labour market is segmented.
Table 4.2: Value added at factor costs
(1990 US$ Billions)
USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Primary Commodities 
Skilled labour 6.6 0.1 1.0 4.1 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.3
Unskilled labour 54.2 18.9 59.3 37.3 34.2 8.5 64.8 141.7
Capital 136.0 53.3 147.9 111.8 100.7 120.1 354.1 102.0
Manufactured Goods 
Skilled labour 164.8 44.9 116.9 32.8 6.3 1.0 4.3 16.3
Unskilled labour 518.2 381.8 777.5 188.2 71.3 11.6 91.1 191.5
Capital 272.3 292.8 417.4 103.3 161.5 23.0 143.6 83.9
Services
Skilled labour 828.3 235.9 525.6 260.7 54.4 9.2 44.2 93.0
Unskilled labour 1,741.4 930.0 1,635.9 646.2 224.8 40.7 330.0 373.5
Capital 1,344.4 777.0 1,708.2 395.4 410.6 96.6 381.5 315.6
Source: Author's calculations. See Appendix 4.1
Once the segmentation of the labour market has been included, the data set 
was completed by incorporating foreign trade and final demand data. The resulting 
data sets are consistent with those presented in Appendix 3.2. Then, some parameters 
such as share parameters and scale parameters, can be directly calculated from the 
equilibrium conditions of the model, following the procedure described in Mansur
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and Whalley (1984). Before that, it is necessary to specify parameter valued for the 
elasticities of substitution and transformation that are not contained in the data set.
4.3.2 Elasticities
The elasticities used in the model play a key role in the results. In this case, the key 
elasticities in the model are the skilled-unskilled labour substitution elasticity, as well 
as the elasticity of substitution between capital and the aggregate labour input. The 
degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour determines the change 
in relative wages once a policy change is introduced. The model also includes other 
elasticities such as the elasticities controlling substitution between import types in 
forming import composites, and those controlling substitution between comparable 
domestic goods and aggregate imports. These trade elasticities determine the strength 
of the terms of trade effects associated with trade policies.
The majority of studies on labour-labour substitution use a disaggregation by 
occupation to separate the labour force; in particular, due to data constraints the 
disaggregation most widely used is between production and non-production workers. 
There does not seem to be consensus as to an approximate value for the labour- 
labour substitution elasticity, and this is reflected by the fact that there is a rather 
large range of variation in the elasticity estimates, from 0.14 to 7.5 (Hamermesh and 
Grant 1979).6 The big differences in the elasticity estimates can be the result of major 
methodological differences, such as the choice of estimating a cost or a production 
function, the choice of functional forms, the choice of data (time-series versus cross­
6Hamermesh (1993), however, points out that the substitution relationship between production and 
non-production workers tells us little about the substitution between high- and low-skilled workers 
because “...there is a remarkably large overlap in the earnings of these two groups" (p. 65).
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section), and the disaggregation of the labour force according to various criteria, 
among others. The estimate of the elasticity of substitution between non-production- 
production workers was chosen as a proxy for the elasticity of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labour. A value of 0.9 was used in the central case, and this 
value is used across sectors for all regions, since estimates for each industry in region 
were not available. Sensitivity analysis is performed around the value chosen in the 
range 0.5 to 2.5.7
In the value added functions the key parameters are the CES elasticities of 
substitution between the aggregate labour input and capital.8 In this case, I used the 
same elasticities of substitution used in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.3).
On the demand side of the model, three different types of elasticities are 
involved with the CES forms used: elasticities of substitution in consumption 
between composite goods, those controlling substitution between import types in 
forming import composites, and those controlling substitution between comparable 
domestic goods and aggregate imports. The elasticities used in the model (central 
case) are the same as in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.3).
4.3.3 C a l ib r a t io n
Once the data set has been assembled, and elasticity parameters have been specified, 
share and scale parameters can be calculated from the equilibrium conditions of the 
model, following the procedure described in Mansur and Whalley (1984).
7 I also tried using elasticity values greater than 2.5, but I encountered numerical problems when 
solving the model.
8 Whalley (1985) points out that there is no consensus as to the quantitative orders of magnitude 
involved, since most time-series estimates of the aggregate substitution elasticity are in the 
neighbourhood of unity, and cross-section estimates are often around 0.5.
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The benchmark data set provides information on equilibrium transactions in
value terms. The first step of the calibration procedure involves the separation of
»
these transactions into price and quantity observations. In order to do this, a units 
convention is widely used, in which it is assumed that a physical unit of each good 
and factor is the amount that sells for one dollar. That is, both goods and factors have 
a price of unity in the benchmark equilibrium.
However, this approach is not applicable in the case of the labour market, 
because there are different marginal products of labour that are assumed to arise from 
barriers to inward mobility of labour in high-wage countries (that is, wages are 
different from one). In addition, there are two types of labour in the model, skilled 
and unskilled, each one with a different productivity and, as a result, a different price 
within each region. Hence, wage rates for each type of labour in each region must be 
calculated.
Six possible measures of average wage rates were calculated in order to 
assess the robustness of the results to the selection of the wage measure. The first 
measure, denoted WB/TOTP, takes the wage bill for each region (WB), as taken 
from National Accounts, and divides it by total population (TOTP), as taken from the 
UN Demographic Yearbook. Total population, however, exceeds the workforce in 
each region. Therefore, a second measure of the average wage rate, denoted 
WB/EAP, divides the wage bill by the economically active population (EAP).9 The 
third and fourth measures, denoted GDPpc(TOTP) and GDPpc(EAP), use GDP per 
capita using TOTP and EAP, respectively. The fifth and sixth measures, denoted
9 ILO (1996; p.5) defines the economically active population as "...all persons of either sex who 
furnish the supply of labour for the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference 
period”.
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AGDPpc(TOTP) and AGDPpc(EAP), use GDP per capita using TOTP and EAP,
where the GDP has been adjusted by the exchange rate deviation index, that corrects 
0
for the difference between the official and the purchasing power parity exchange 
rates (Kravis et al., 1982).
Of these six measures, I consider that WB / EAP is best since the 
denominator involves all the labour force involved in the production process. With 
the use of TOTP the average wage rate is being underestimated since it includes 
population that do not participate in the production process such as children and 
elderly people. The wage measures based on GDP per capita were included for 
comparison purposes, since Hamilton and Whalley (1984) used this measure in their 
calculations. However, GDP per capita in only an approximate measure of average 
wages as it is a measure of economic activity, and not a measure of income. 
Furthermore, in the production of domestic output labour is not the only factor of 
production involved; physical capital and human capital are also involved. From 
GDPpc it is not possible to isolate the labour component.
Table 4.3 reports the relative wage rates calculated using the six measures 
mentioned above; wage rates are calculated relative to DAF wages, the region with 
the lowest wage rates in four out of the six measures used. Regardless of how the 
wage rates are calculated, USA, JAP, EU and ODC have higher wage rates than the 
developing world (i.e. DAM, DAF, DAS and DE).
/
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Table 4.3: Relative wage rates -  Homogeneous labour 
(1990 US$)
Wage Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/TOTP 100.0 98.4 68.3 72.8 7.0 1.0 1.5 13.2
WB/EAP 75.1 78.2 60.0 61.4 7.4 1.0 1.5 10.8
GDPpc(TOTP) 34.9 52.1 27.0 25.3 4.3 ‘ 1.0 0.9 4.9
GDPpc(EAP) 26.2 38.6 23.7 21.4 4.6 1.0 0.9 4.0
AGDPpc(TOTP) 17.5 28.7 13.4 12.5 4.1 1.0 1.2 3.7
AGDPpc(EAP) 13.1 21.2 11.8 10.6 4.4 1.0 1.2 3.0
Source: See Appendix 4.2
In the case where the labour market is segmented, it is necessary to calculate 
the average wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour in each region. Given that in 
practice such data are not available, average earnings per worker in finance, 
insurance, real state and business services were used as a proxy for skilled labour 
wages, while average earnings per worker in wholesale and retail trade, restaurants 
and hotels were used as a proxy for unskilled labour wages. The ratio between high 
and low wages is then used to infer the average wage rates for skilled and unskilled 
labour in each region (Appendix 4.2 presents how the average wage rates were 
calculated). The resulting relative wage rates for the two types of labour are reported 
in Table 4.4. Wage rates are calculated relative to unskilled DAF wages. Once again, 
regardless of the measure of wages used developed regions have higher wage rates 
than developing regions, for both types of labour.
I
Table 4.4: Relative wage rates -  Heterogeneous labour 
(1990 US$)
185
Wage Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/TOTP
Unskilled labour 91.3 96.3 60.2 72.9 6.7 1.0 1.5 13.8
Skilled labour 150.0 158.1 122.2 97.6 13.1 1.8 2.2 17.3
WB/EAP 
Unskilled labour 68.5 71.3 52.9 61.6 7.1 1.0 1.6 11.3
Skilled labour 112.6 117.0 107.5 82.4 13.8 1.8 2.3 14.1
GDPpc(TOTP)
Unskilled labour 31.9 51.0 23.8 25.4 4.2 1.0 0.9 5.1
Skilled labour 52.4 83.7 48.3 33.9 8.1 1.8 1.3 6.4
GDPpc(EAP)
Unskilled labour 23.9 37.7 20.9 21.4 4.4 1.0 1.0 4.2
Skilled labour 39.3 62.0 42.5 28.6 8.6 1.8 1.4 5.2
AGDPpciTOTP)
Unskilled labour 16.0 28.1 11.8 12.6 4.0 1.0 1.2 3.8
Skilled labour 26.2 46.1 23.9 16.8 7.7 1.8 1.8 4.8
AGDPpc(EAP)
Unskilled labour 12.0 20.8 10.4 10.6 4.2 1.0 1.3 3.1
Skilled labour 19.7 34.1 21.1 14.2 8.2 1.8 1.8 3.9
Source: See Appendix 4.2
Since the late 1970s there has been a widespread trend towards increasing
skill premiums in developed countries. The increase in wage premiums was larger in
I
the United States than in other developed countries; there were also large increases in 
the United Kingdom. In the United States, wage differential between college
186
graduates and high school graduates rose from 38% in 1980 to 53% in 1990, whereas 
the wage differential between college graduates and high school dropouts rose from 
66% to 86% (Buckberg and Thomas, 1996; similar findings are reported by Murphy 
and Welch, 1992).
Several studies have tried to establish the cause of increasing wage 
differentials in developed countries. Some authors attribute this to increased 
immigration and the expansion of trade with developing countries (van de Klundert 
and Nahuis, 1998; Wood, 1995), whereas others argue that the effect of trade on 
wage inequality has been small (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993). Borjas et al (1997) 
point out that there are other factors contributing to the increase in the skill premium, 
such as the acceleration of skill-biased technological change, the slowdown in the 
growth of the relative supply of college graduates, as well as institutional changes in 
the labour market. In addition, Kosters (1994) and Davis (1992) mention that 
government policies and practices such as deregulation (specially in the U.S), 
privatisation (specially in the U.K), wage-setting institutions (for example in France, 
the Netherlands and Sweden) could have powerful influences on relative wages. 
Buckberg and Thomas (1996) state that rising wage dispersion in the U.S., measured 
in terms of the education premium, can be explained by declines in manufacturing 
employment, loss of union power, and the impact of technology.
In the case of developing countries, Pissarides (1997) and Wood (1997) point 
out that both the return to labour and the skill premium have increased after trade 
liberalisation despite the low skill content of their exports. Pissarides (1997) also
points out that in the cases of Colombia and Mexico, for example, wage inequality
l
increased after trade liberalisation, and the most likely cause was the importation of 
skilled-biased technology from abroad.
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The final step in the calibration procedure involves the use of price-quantity 
data to calculate parameters for demand and production functions from the 
benchmark equilibrium observations, given the required values of pre-specified 
parameters such as elasticities and tax rates. In order to do this, the equilibrium 
conditions together with first-order conditions (from utility maximisation and cost 
minimisation) are used to solve for function parameter values using equilibrium 
prices and quantities. Calibration allows us to test the solution procedure, and ensures 
the consistency of agents’ behaviour with the benchmark data set. The model was 
solved using a routine I wrote in the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) 
software.
4.4 Model results
The model presented above was used to calculate the world-wide efficiency gains 
from free mobility of labour (the results are presented for the six measures of wages 
mentioned before). Two scenarios are considered: in the first one labour is a 
homogeneous factor of production, while in the second one labour is classified as 
skilled and unskilled. In the latter scenario, two cases are considered: a) both skilled 
and unskilled labour migrate; and b) skilled labour is the only factor that migrates. 
The case where unskilled labour is the only factor that migrates was not considered 
since this is not a realistic case, given the actual international restrictions on labour 
mobility. The model does not consider illegal migration.
The removal of restrictions on labour mobility modifies the market clearing 
condition that determines the equilibrium wage rate. In particular, when labour is 
homogeneous the equilibrium condition is given by
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[2]
where Lr corresponds to the region’s endowment oflabour. In the heterogeneous 
case the equilibrium condition is given by
where Lsr corresponds to the region’s endowment of skilled labour.
In the model international capital transfers are not considered, since it is 
assumed that migrant workers do not bring capital with them nor send capital back 
home. Capital flows and transfers may alleviate the negative effects of migration on 
wages. In addition, the model assumes that all migrant labour enter the labour market 
(some migrants such as children and elderly people will not actually work).
Once immigration controls are removed, labour migrates from low-wage to 
high-wage regions. The source regions are DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE, while the 
destination regions are USA, JAP, EU, and ODC. However, when the average wage 
rate is measured as WB/TOTP, DE becomes a destination region for the 
homogeneous labour case. When labour is heterogeneous, and both skilled and 
unskilled labour migrate, DE becomes a destination region for unskilled labour, and a 
source region for skilled labour when the average wage rate is measured as WB/EAP, 
WB/TOTP, and GDPpc(TOTP). Regardless of whether labour is homogeneous or 
heterogeneous, the amount of the factor entering DE is not considerable.
Table 4.5 quantifies the effects of the removal of immigration controls on 
welfare, as measured by the aggregate equivalent variation.10 In the homogeneous
8
£ £ L s[ = £ L s r , [3]
10 The equivalent variation (EV) is a measure of welfare change. It is defined as the amount of money 
a particular change, that has taken place between equilibria, is equivalent to. In this case, an arithmetic 
sum of EVs, summed across regions is used.
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labour case, there is a reduction in production in all sectors in the source regions.
This is accompanied by a reduction in exports and an increase in imports which
*
compensate for the reduction in domestic output. Conversely, in the destination 
regions, there is an increase in production in all sectors accompanied by an increase 
in exports and a reduction in imports from developing regions. In this case, there are 
large gains from the removal of global immigration controls, ranging from 14% to 
62% of world GDP, which means that the results are quite sensitive to the measure 
chosen, but in any case the efficiency gains are considerable. These gains are not as 
large as those obtained by Hamilton and Whalley (1984), where in some cases the 
gains exceeded the world-wide economy GNP. The differences may be the result of 
the modelling frameworks (i.e. partial equilibrium versus general equilibrium), the 
flows of labour leaving low-wage regions, or units of measurement as Hamilton and 
Whalley (1984) use population, whereas in this case units of labour are used.
Table 4.5: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Heterogeneous Labour
Wage measures: Homogeneous Both skilled and Only skilled
Labour unskilled labour labour migrates 
migrate
WB/TOTP 62 55 11
WB/EAP 49 44 9
GDPpc (TOTP) 41 37 8
GDPpc(EAP) 32 29 6
AGDPpc(TOTP) 17 16 4
AGDPpc (EAP) 14 12 3
I
Table 4.5 also presents the welfare effects of the removal of immigration 
controls when labour is a heterogeneous factor. In this case, as in the previous
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scenario with homogeneous labour, there is an increase in domestic output in 
developed regions, whereas output in all sectors reduces in developing countries; the 
reduction in domestic output is compensated by a reduction in all exports and an 
increase in imports from developed regions. When both skilled and unskilled labour 
migrate, efficiency gains range from 12% to 55% of world GDP. The gains are 
smaller than in the homogeneous case as a result of the technological constraint 
imposed by the substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour. Thus, with a 
segmented labour market skilled and unskilled labour have less opportunity to 
reallocate. When only skilled labour migrates, world-wide welfare gains are much 
smaller than in the previous two cases (from 3% to 11% of world GDP) because 
skilled labour represents a small fraction of the labour force in the source regions (i.e. 
14% in DAM, 10% in DAF, 5% in DAS, and 14% in DE).
If regions are considered individually, estimates of the efficiency gains from 
the elimination of global restrictions on labour mobility show that all regions benefit 
in the three scenarios (see Table 4.6). The regions experimenting more emigration, 
that is DAF and DAS, obtain the largest welfare gains among the source regions. For 
instance, in the homogeneous labour case, when wages are measured as WB/EAP, 
these amount to 61% and 94% of GDP, respectively. Regarding the destination 
regions, those receiving more immigrants obtain the largest welfare gains. For 
example, in the homogeneous labour case, when wages are measured as WB/EAP, 
USA and JAP obtain welfare gains of 48% and 58% of GDP, respectively. In the 
heterogeneous labour case the results follow the same pattern with smaller, although
still considerable, welfare gains.
I
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Table 4.6: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls by region 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of regional GDP)
Wage Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Homogeneous Labour
WB/TOTP 66 79 60 60 15 64 105 9
WB/EAP 48 58 52 49 IZ 61 94 7
GDPpc(TOTP) 36 70 37 33 10 40 87 4
GDPpc(EAP) 25 51 32 26 8 37 77 4
AGDPpc(TOTP) 12 32 14 11 6 28 52 2
AGDPpc(EAP) 8 22 12 9 4 25 44 1
Heterogeneous labour - Both skilled and unskilled labour migrate
WB/TOTP 55 74 53 52 14 63 100 10
WB/EAP 40 54 45 43 12 59 88 8
GDPpcfTOTP) 30 66 32 29 10 38 82 6
GDPpc(EAP) 21 48 28 24 8 35 72 5
AGDPpc(TOTP) 10 30 12 10 5 26 49 2
AGDPpc(EAP) 7 21 10 8 4 23 41 1
Heterogeneous labour -  Only skilled labour migrates
WB/TOTP 11 10 10 8 4 26 31 1
WB/EAP 8 8 9 6 4 25 28 1
GDPpc(TOTP) 6 10 7 4 3 14 27 1
GDPpc(EAP) 4 8 6 3 2 12 24 1
AGDPpc(TOTP) 2 6 3 2 2 10 15 1
AGDPpc(EAP) 1 4 3 1 1 8 13 1
The segmentation of the labour market also allows us to examine the
distributional effects of immigration between skilled and unskilled labour in each
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region. Tables 4.7 to 4.9 present the distributional impacts of the removal of
immigration controls for the six measures of wages considered. A priori one would
»
expect that labour migration from the source regions increases the labour supply in 
the destination regions, reducing the average wage rate (assuming no rigidities), and 
benefiting capital owners. In the source regions, the removal of immigration controls 
is expected to reduce the labour supply, increasing the average wage rate. As a result, 
capital is less scarce relative to labour, so that a reduction’ in the return to capital is 
expected.
In the case of homogeneous labour, capital owners in the destination regions 
benefit from migration through higher rental rates, whereas in the source regions 
workers benefit as a result of migration and capital owners lose (see Table 4.7). In the 
source regions, both wage rates and the return to capital increase, but the former 
increases even more.
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Table 4.7: Distributional effects of the removal of immigration controls
in the model with homogeneous labour
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB / TOTP
Wage rate -61 -61 -43 -47 454 3,768 2,565 194
Return to capital 88 94 77 105 316 962 871 210
WB/EAP
Wage rate -53 -52 -41 -43 376 3,419 2,237 226
Return to capital 74 80 66 91 268 871 777 224
GDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate -46 -64 -30 -25 336 1,796 2,052 289
Return to capital 63 65 59 85 242 495 709 258
GDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate -37 -57 -30 -23 259 1,552 1,716 262
Return to capital 50 48 45 69 192 424 604 230
AGDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate -28 -56 -5 1 206 1,167 985 246
Return to capital 23 11 38 49 150 319 372 209
AGDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate -21 -51 -12 -2 136 935 758 247
Return to capital 17 0 24 36 104 253 291 200
Let us now consider the case of heterogeneous labour (see Tables 4.8 and
4.9). When both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, average wages increase in the
/
source regions because labour is less abundant relative to capital, and the return to 
capital decreases relative to wages. The removal of immigration controls benefits
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skilled labour more than unskilled labour, because the former is a small proportion of
the total labour force, and after migration this factor is more scarce in developing 
«
regions. In the destination regions average wages reduce for both skilled and 
unskilled labour, since labour is now less scarce relative to capital, and the return to 
capital increases.
When only skilled labour migrates, there is a substantial increase in the 
remuneration of this type of labour in the source regions, since this factor of 
production is not abundant in these regions. Unskilled workers and capital owners are 
worse off relative to skilled labour as a result of migration, despite the fact that there 
is an increase in their remuneration. As to the destination regions, the inflow of 
skilled labour increase the supply of this type of labour, hence reducing its average 
wage rate. As expected, the average wage of unskilled labour and the return to capital 
increase. Skilled labour is worse off. The flexibility of wages allows the labour 
market to absorb labour immigration. Lower wages induce an increase in labour 
demand and in aggregate employment.
I
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Table 4.8: Distributional effects of the removal of immigration controls
in the model with heterogeneous labour - Both skilled and unskilled labour migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/ TOTP
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
WB/EAP
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
GDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
GDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
AGDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
AGDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour
I
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
-43 -46 -30 -12
-61 -63 -41 -51
81 84 72 98
-34 -37 -31 -10
-53 -55 -40 -48
67 69 59 83
-27 -55 -21 12
-46 -66 -28 -32
56 53 53 78
-20 -49 -26 10
-38 -61 -29 -31
44 37 40 62
-15 -52 -7 32
-28 -59 -3 -9
20 2 34 43
-11 -49 -17 24
-22 -55 -9 -I t
14 -7 20 30
555 4,629 3,774 395
430 3,435 2,200 157
311 919 810 207
436 3,985 3,141 425
353 3,097 1,911 184
259 820 713 216
369 1,997 2,744 496
314 1,620 1,748 238
230 460 644 246
266 1,632 2,173 504
238 1,387 1,445 258
179 389 540 248
187 1,122 1,150 362
190 1,048 830 200
137 289 327 191
114 866 856 348
125 840 636 201
93 227 254 181
Table 4.9: Distributional effects of the removal of immigration controls
in the model with heterogeneous labour -  Only skilled labour migrates
(% change in factor prices)
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Regions
Wage measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB / TOTP
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
WB / EAP
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
GDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
GDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
AGDP pc (TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
AGDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
-66 -68 -58 -48
5 31 28 20
4 29 24 21
-58 -60 -56 -43
4 27 23 17
3 25 20 19
-52 -70 -48 -26
3 20 21 19
2 18 19 20
-44 -64 -48 -23
2 15 16 16
2 13 14 17
-33 -62 -26 5
-0 1 14 16
-1 -0 13 16
-25 -57 -30 3
-0 -3 8 12
-1 -4 7 12
291 2,724 2,214 195
83 179 155 94
83 158 157 95
238 2,476 1,944 231
71 161 138 97
70 143 140 100
210 1,290 1,785 295
65 96 126 110
65 87 128 113
157 1,118 1,498 324
52 82 107 110
51 74 108 115
127 870 892 267
41 64 67 91
41 58 68 94
79 709 701 275
28 50 52 86
28 45 53 90
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The amount of labour leaving the source regions varies depending on the 
measure used to calculate average wages (see Table 4.10). For example, when these 
are measured as WB/TOTP, 49% of the labour endowment of developing regions 
migrate to developed regions; when the average wage rate is measured as 
AGDPpc(EAP), this percentage reduces to 36%. On the other hand, when both 
skilled and unskilled labour migrate in the heterogeneous labour case, the percentage 
of labour leaving the source regions varies from 34% (average wage rate measured as 
AGDPpc(EAP)) to 47% (average wage rate measured as WB/TOTP). When only 
skilled labour migrates, between 58% and 72% of the skilled labour endowment of 
developing regions migrate, depending on how the average wage rate is calculated.
Table 4.10: Migration flows
(as a percentage of developing regions’ labour endowment)
Heterogeneous Labour
Wage measures: Homogeneous
Labour
Both skilled and 
unskilled labour 
migrate
Only skilled 
labour migrates*
WB / TOTP 49 47 72
WB / EAP 48 46 71
GDP pc (TOTP) 46 44 69
GDP pc (EAP) 44 42 67
AGDP pc (TOTP) 38 36 61
AGDP pc (EAP) 36 34 58
’ Migration as a percentage of developing regions’ skilled labour endowment.
In summary, migration leads to factor reallocation, and during this process 
there are winners and losers. In the source regions, labour becomes more scarce 
relative to capital (between 36% and 49% of the labour endowment of developing 
regions migrate to developed regions, depending on the wage measure used), and 
capital owners lose. However, not all workers are better off, since labour is a
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heterogeneous factor. Emigration will benefit workers whose skills are substitute to 
those of migrant labour, whereas it will hurt those workers whose skills are
A
complementary to those of migrant workers. On the other hand, in the destination 
regions, labour becomes more abundant (less scarce) relative to capital, so that 
capital owners benefit. However, not all workers are worse off, because labour is a 
heterogeneous factor. Immigration will benefit those workers whose skills are 
complementary to those of the immigrant worker, whereas immigration will hurt 
those workers whose skills are substitute to those of immigrant workers.
Finally, the removal of global restrictions on labour mobility leads to an 
improvement in global income distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient." In 
the benchmark case, the calculated coefficient was 0.41; once the restrictions to 
labour mobility were eliminated this coefficient reduced, suggesting a move toward 
equality. The coefficient varied from 0.30 to 0.37, depending on the measure of 
wages used.
4.4.1 S e n s it iv it y  a n a l y sis
Some of the elasticities used in the model play an important role in the results. In 
what follows sensitivity analysis is performed on the key elasticities of the model. 
First, the elasticity of labour-labour substitution was varied from 0.5 to2.5. This is a 
very important elasticity in the model since the model has a segmented labour 
market, and the degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour 
determines the change in relative wages once a policy change is introduced. 
____________ I___________
" The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of income distribution. As is well known, 
this coefficient has a maximum value of one (absolute inequality), and a minimum of zero (absolute 
equality); see e.g. Sen (1997).
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Assuming that both skilled and unskilled labour migrate, the welfare gains from the 
removal of immigration controls change little with respect to the initial specification 
(see Table 4.11). When only skilled labour migrates, welfare gains increase with the 
elasticity and in some cases considerably; in fact, the efficiency gains more than 
double as the labour-labour substitution elasticity increases from 0.5 to 2.5. 
Regarding the distributional impact (see Appendix 4.3), as the elasticity increases the 
average wage of skilled labour reduces more in the destination regions, and increases 
less in the source regions. The remuneration of unskilled labour increases more in the 
source regions, and reduces less in the destination regions.
Table 4.11: Sensitivity analysis -  Welfare effects of the removal of 
immigration controls: Heterogeneous labour 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Wage measures:
Labour-labour substitution elasticities in all regions 
0.50 0.75 1.00 1.50 1.75 2.50
Both skilled and unskilled labour migrate:
WB / TOTP 54 54 55 55 56 56
WB/ EAP 43 44 44 44 44 45
GDP pc (TOTP) 36 37 37 37 37 38
GDP pc (EAP) 29 29 29 30 30 30
AGDP pc (TOTP) 16 16 16 16 16 16
AGDP pc (EAP) 12 12 12 12 12 12
Only skilled labour migrates:
WB / TOTP 7 10 12 14 14 16
WB/EAP 6 8 10 11 12 13
GDP pc (TOTP) 5 7 8 10 10 11
GDP pc (EAP) 5 6 7 8 9 9
AGDP pc (TOTP) 3 3 4 5 5 6
AGDP pc (EAP) 2 3 3 4 4 5
2 0 0
Second, the elasticities of substitution in the production of value added were 
set at values between 0.5 and 1.5 in all regions. In the homogeneous case, this 
substitution elasticity corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour; in the heterogeneous labour case, this elasticity corresponds to the elasticity 
of substitution between the aggregate labour input and capital.
Table 4.12 presents the welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls 
when the elasticities of substitution in production in all regions are varied at values 
between 0.5 and 1.5. In general terms, the removal of immigration controls produces 
considerable welfare gains, and these tend to be greater the larger the elasticity of 
substitution. For example, in the initial specification, when the average wage rate was 
calculated as WB/EAP and labour was homogeneous, the efficiency gains amount to 
49% of world GDP; when the elasticity of substitution is increased 1.5, efficiency 
gains increase to 54% of world GDP. The distributional impacts of the removal of 
immigration controls are also similar to those described for the initial specification 
(see Appendix 4.4). For example, with heterogeneous labour and lower values of the 
elasticity of substitution, the losses of skilled workers in the destination regions are 
bigger, and the gains of skilled workers in the source regions are smaller. The wage 
rates of unskilled labour increase less in destination regions, and more in source 
regions.
I
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Table 4.12: Sensitivity analysis -Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Elasticities of substitution in production in all regions
0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50
Homogeneous labour
WB / TOTP 49 57 62 65 68
WB/EAP 40 46 50 52 54
GDP pc (TOTP) 33 39 42 44 45
GDP pc (EAP) 27 31 33 34 36
AGDP pc (TOTP) 15 16 18 19 19
AGDP pc (EAP) 11 13 14 14 15
Heterogeneous labour 
Both Ls and Lu migrate
WB / TOTP 44 51 55 58 60
WB/EAP 36 41 44 46 48
GDP pc (TOTP) 30 35 37 39 41
GDP pc (EAP) 24 28 30 31 32
AGDP pc (TOTP) 13 15 16 17 17
AGDP pc (EAP) 10 12 12 13 13
Heterogeneous labour 
Only Ls migrates
WB/ TOTP 10 11 11 11 11
WB/ EAP 9 9 9 9 9
GDP pc (TOTP) 7 8 8 8 8
GDP pc (EAP) 6 6 6 7 7
AGDP pc (TOTP) 4 4 4 4 4
AGDP pc (EAP) 3 3 3 3 3
2 0 2
In general, the main predictions of the model remain unaltered, in the sense 
that the elimination of immigration controls generates world-wide efficiency gains. In 
addition, in the destination regions capital owners benefit from labour immigration, 
and workers lose because of lower wages; in the source regions, capital owners are 
worse off relative to labour and workers benefit. When the labour market is 
segmented, the sensitivity analysis also confirms that migration of skilled labour 
hurts unskilled labour in the source regions.
4.5 Model extensions
In this section three new features are introduced to the model: a) transaction costs; b) 
international capital mobility; and c) selective labour mobility. For brevity I shall 
only focus on the results of two out of the six measures of average wages considered: 
WB/TOTP, and AGDPpc(EAP). These two measures were chosen as they provided 
the extreme results.
4.5.1 Transaction costs
The first elaboration of the model is the introduction of transaction costs. This 
extension of the model seems appropriate, since migration is a costly process. There 
are costs involved in the process of moving from one region to another, such as 
transport costs, the costs of settling in other region, the costs of finding a new job, 
and the costs of leaving friends and family behind. With the elimination of
restrictions to labour mobility, labour will move until the marginal product of labour
I
equals the cost of hiring labour. However, in the presence of transaction costs wages 
fail to equalise across regions, so that a single market clearing wage no longer
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characterises the equilibrium. Transaction costs thus drive a wedge between wages in
developed and developing countries. This can be illustrated in Figure 4.3, where the
»
removal of barriers to labour mobility lowers the wage rate in the rich country from 
WR to Wr' and increases the wage rate in the poor country from WP to Wp'. 
Migration flows are now given by the distance Li -  L 2*, which is smaller when 
compared to the case without transaction costs (Lt -  L2).
Figure 4.3: The effects of migration in the presence of transaction costs
*■ <-------------------
Lr LP
• -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- — •
Total Labour Endowment, L
In the literature on general equilibrium with transaction costs, the assumption 
of a fixed transactions technology is usually used (see e.g. Foley, 1970; Maechler and 
Roland-Holst, 1997).12 In this model transaction costs were modelled as a tax 
(without revenue), whose rate is exogenously determined. The price received by
12 Nguyen and Whalley (1986) present an equilibrium model for an exchange economy with fixed 
prices and endogenously determined transaction costs.
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owners of labour in each region corresponds to a percentage of the market clearing
price when restrictions to labour mobility are eliminated. That is, the price of labour
»
in each region is given by
Pi = W ( l - T C r), [4]
where W corresponds to the world price of labour, and TCr corresponds to regional 
transaction costs.
Transaction costs are difficult to quantify since’ there are no measures 
available. As mentioned earlier, there are costs associated with migration from low- 
wage to high-wage regions. In the case of developing regions, these costs could be 
very high. Taking into account the substantial differences in relative wages among 
the regions, the following values for TCr were assumed: 0.9 for DAF and DAS; 0.8 
for DAM; and 0.7 for DE. The transaction costs for developed regions (USA, JAP, 
EU, and ODC) are assumed to be much smaller (i.e. 0.1), and reflect the fact that 
workers in these regions have little or no incentive to move to low-wage regions.
As can be seen from Table 4.13, the introduction of transaction costs reduces 
migration flows. For example, when the average wage is measure as WB/TOTP, and 
labour is homogeneous, migration reduces from 49% of the developing regions’ 
endowment of labour to 35%. In the heterogeneous labour scenario, migration 
reduces from 47% of the developing regions’ endowment of labour to 29% when the 
two types of labour are allowed to migrate, and from 72% of the developing regions’ 
endowment of skilled labour to 65% when only skilled labour migrates.
I
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Table 4.13: Migration flows in the presence of transaction costs 
(Migration as a percentage of developing regions’ labour endowment)
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Labour
Labour Both Ls and Lu Only Ls
Migrate Migrates*
Without transaction costs
WB / TOTP 49 47 72
AGDP pc (EAP) 36 34 58
With transaction costs
WB / TOTP 35 29 65
AGDP pc (EAP) 5 1 16
* Migration as a percentage of developing regions’ skilled labour endowment.
The welfare gains as a result of the removal of immigration controls are 
smaller in the presence of transaction costs (see Table 4.14). Regarding the 
distributional effects, the main conclusions remain unaltered. That is, labour benefits 
(loses) relative to capital in the source (destination) regions. When the labour market 
is segmented, skilled labour benefits relative to unskilled labour in the source 
regions; in the destination regions the two types of labour lose, but unskilled workers 
are hurt even more when both skilled and unskilled labour migrate.
I
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Table 4.14: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls in 
the presence of transaction costs
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Labour
Labour Both Ls and Lu 
Migrate
Only Ls 
migrates
Without transaction costs
WB/ TOTP 62 55 11
AGDP pc (EAP) 14 12 3
With transaction costs
WB/ TOTP 27 20 6
AGDP pc (EAP) 1 1 1
Finally, it is not surprising that migration and welfare gains increase as the 
transaction costs for the developing regions are reduced (these results are not 
reported here). This is the case since transaction costs distort the labour market, 
specially in developing regions, and as the distortion is reduced, efficiency increases 
and wage gap reduces.
4.5 .2  C a p it a l  m o b il it y
In the second elaboration of the model international capital mobility is introduced. 
Although this feature is usually ignored in global models (see e.g., Whalley, 1985; 
Shoven and Whalley, 1992), it seems interesting to include it in the model since 
capital markets are becoming more integrated internationally. In this case, the return
to capital equalises across regions. Therefore, a single market clearing rental rate
l
characterises the equilibrium; that is, the market clearing condition for the market of
the capital factor is given by,
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i ± K \ = ± K t , [5]
i=l r=l r=l
that is the sum of factor use across all industrie* and regions must equal the global 
endowment of the factor.
The simulations were carried out for the scenario in which labour is a 
heterogeneous factor and only skilled labour migrates, since a fixed factor (in this 
case unskilled labour) is needed. If all factors of production are allowed to move 
freely, the concept of region is no longer clear.
When restrictions to skilled labour mobility are removed, labour moves from 
regions with low wages (DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE) to regions with high wages 
(USA, JAP, EU, and ODC). Capital moves from regions where it is abundant relative 
to labour (USA, JAP, EU, and ODC) to regions where it is scarce relative to labour 
(DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE). The effects over the remuneration of the factors of 
production are similar to those obtained when capital is not internationally mobile. A 
substantial increase in the remuneration of skilled labour in the source regions is 
observed, since this factor is not abundant in these regions, whereas unskilled labour 
and capital owners are worse off. In the destination regions, the remuneration of 
skilled labour falls and unskilled labour and capital owners are better off (see Table 
4.15). The effects of capital mobility on the return to capital are smaller than the 
effects of skilled labour mobility on wages. This is explained by the fact that capital 
flows from developed to developing regions are smaller than labour flows from 
developing to developed regions. In particular, when wages are measured as 
WB/TOTP, migration flows account for 54% of the world endowment of labour 
whereas capital flows account for only 8% of the world endowment of capital.
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In addition, aggregate welfare improves compared with the scenario without
capital mobility (see Table 4.16). The improved welfare is the result of a better 
«
resource allocation with smaller distributional effects.
Table 4.15: Distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls 
in the presence of capital mobility 
(% change in factor prices)
Regions 1
Wage measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB / TOTP 
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
AGDP pc (EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour 
Wage rate unskilled labour 
Return to capital
-70 -72 -64 -55
0 11 10 5
18 18 18 18
-30 -59 -34 -2
-1 -0 3 5
7 7 7 7
238 2,343 1,901 156
30 78 72 36
18 18 18 18
70 664 656 254
10 22 24 39
7 7 7 7
Table 4.16: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls 
in the presence of capital mobility 
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Wage measures
Only Ls 
Migrates
Without capital mobility
WB / TOTP 11
AGDP pc (EAP) 3
With capital mobility
WB / TOTP 12
AGDP pc (EAP) 4
The previous results should be taken with caution since they are ruled by the 
specification of the capital market. That is, since a competitive market is assumed, 
capital will respond to variations in its rate of return. However, as indicated by
2 0 9
Layard et al (1992), developing regions have low productivity, and it is possible that
migration from DAM, DAF, DAS, and DE to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC would divert 
»
capital to developed regions that could be instead invested in developing regions.13
4.5.3 S e l e c t iv e  l a b o u r  m o b il it y
The third elaboration of the model is the introduction of selective labour mobility. 
This extension seems interesting since some countries have signed bilateral labour 
agreements with other countries that cover project-link work, seasonal work, work in 
border areas, and guest workers.14 I focus on the case where individuals in some 
particular regions in the developing world are allowed to migrate to developed 
regions. The following seven possibilities are considered:
• Workers in DAM migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
• Workers in DAF migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
• Workers in DAS migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
• Workers in DE migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC.
• Workers in DAM migrate to USA.
• Workers in DAS migrate to JAP.
• Workers in DAF and DE migrate to EU.
Each of these seven possibilities is analysed when labour is homogeneous, 
when labour is heterogeneous and both skilled and unskilled workers migrate, and 
when labour is heterogeneous and only skilled workers migrate.
13 Lucas (1995) provides an alternative explanation.
14 For example, Germany have signed labour agreements with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic. Also Belgium, France and Switzerland have signed labour agreements with East European 
countries (Weyerbrock, 1995).
2 1 0
Under this elaboration, the average wage equalises across the regions
involved, whereas each of the excluded regions will have a market clearing condition
*
for the labour market.
An aggregate welfare improvement is observed in all seven cases (see Table 
4.17). The magnitude of the welfare gains depends on the size of the source region in 
terms of the labour endowment. In particular, the highest welfare gains are obtained 
when workers in DAS are allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU, and ODC, since 
DAS is the most densely populated region, and has one of the lowest average wages. 
Conversely, the lowest welfare gains are obtained when DE is allowed to migrate to 
USA, JAP, EU, and ODC; this result is not surprising since DE is the third region in 
terms of population in the developing world, and the region’s average wages are, in 
some cases, the highest in the developing world.
I
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Table 4.17: Welfare effects of the removal of immigration controls in the presence of
selective labour mobility
(Equivalent variation as a percentage of world GDP)
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Labour
Migration Scenarios Labour
Both Ls and Lu 
Migrate
Only Ls 
migrates
DAM -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• WB / TOTP 5 11 3
• AGDP pc (EAP) 2 2 1
DAF -» USA, JAP, EU, ODC 
• WB / TOTP 12 36 5
• AGDP pc (EAP) 17 3 1
DAS -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• WB / TOTP 54 66 13
• AGDP pc (EAP) 13 12 4
DE -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• WB / TOTP 3 6 3
• AGDP pc (EAP) 4 3 3
DAM -> USA
• WB / TOTP 4 16 4
• AGDP pc (EAP) 2 1 1
DAS -> JAP
• WB / TOTP 25 37 4
• AGDP pc (EAP) 9 8 2
DAF, DE -> EU
• WB / TOTP 11 11 3
• AGDP pc (EAP) 4 3 1
Note: —» indicates the direction of the migration flow.
2 1 2
In terms of the amount of labour that moves between regions, the largest
movement occurs when workers in DAS are allowed to migrate to USA, JAP, EU,
»
and ODC. In the homogeneous case, the proportion of labour that moves out of DAS 
varies between 15% and 34% of the world endowment of labour; in the 
heterogeneous labour case, the proportion of labour that moves out of DAS varies 
between 12% and 34% of the world endowment of labour. Conversely, the smallest 
amount of migration occurs when the work force in DE1 is allowed to migrate to 
USA, JAP, EU, and ODC. These results suggest a positive relationship between the 
amount of migration and welfare gains.
As to the distributional impact of the removal of immigration controls (see 
Appendix 4.5), the introduction of selective labour mobility does not affect the main 
conclusions in the homogeneous labour case, that is workers in the source regions 
and capital owners in the destination regions benefit from migration. However, the 
magnitude of the distributional effects tends to be smaller in the destination regions, 
and larger in the source regions.
Let us now consider the heterogeneous labour case with skilled and unskilled 
labour migration. To begin with, when workers in DAM migrate to USA, JAP, EU, 
and ODC, skilled labour in ODC also migrates to the other developed regions 
because the remuneration of this factor is the lowest of the developed world.15 
Skilled and unskilled labour are better off relative to capital in the source regions, 
and in DAM unskilled labour is better off relative to skilled labour. This result 
contrasts with the findings in the central case, and can be explained by the fact that
more unskilled labour is migrating out of the region. In the other selective labour
I
l5ODC also becomes a source of skilled labour when only workers in DAF, and only workers in DE 
are allowed to migrate to the developed world.
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mobility cases, skilled labour is better off relative to unskilled labour and capital in 
the source regions, whereas in the destination regions unskilled labour is worse off 
relative to skilled labour, and capitalists benefit.
Lastly, when there is a segmented labour market and skilled labour migrates, 
skilled workers gain in the source regions relative to unskilled workers; in the 
destination regions, both unskilled and skilled labour lose relative to capital, although 
unskilled labour loses less than skilled labour.
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have computed world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of 
global restrictions on labour mobility. A general equilibrium model was used, since 
this is an ideal framework to analyse the effects of policy changes on resource 
allocation, the structure of distribution, and thus in economic welfare. Further, the 
general equilibrium framework takes account of the linkages among the eight 
regions, because in these models regions are not only linked though trade but also 
through labour flows (and capital flows in one of the extensions of the model).
One of the key features of the model is the introduction of a segmented labour 
market, as two types of labour are considered, namely skilled and unskilled. When 
labour is heterogeneous, two cases are considered: both skilled and unskilled labour 
migrate, and only skilled labour migrates. In the analysis, wages differ across regions 
because of the existence of barriers to labour mobility, and wage rates are equalised 
as a result of the elimination of restrictions to labour mobility rather than free trade.
The results of the model indicate that the elimination of global restrictions on 
labour mobility generates world-wide efficiency gains of considerable magnitude.
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ranging from 14% to 62% of world GDP. When only skilled labour is allowed to
migrate welfare gains are smaller, since skilled labour is a small proportion of the 
0
labour force in developing regions; in this case, efficiency gains range from 3% to 
11% of world GDP.
The removal of global restrictions on labour mobility also leads to an 
improvement in global income distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
With the removal of immigration controls the resulting Gini coefficient varied 
between 0.30 and 0.37 (depending on the wage measure used), which compared with 
the coefficient in the benchmark case (i.e. 0.41) suggests a move towards equality.
Migration also leads to a process of factor reallocation in which there are 
winners and losers. In the source regions, labour becomes more scarce relative to 
capital, and capital owners lose relative to labour. However, not all workers are better 
off since labour is a heterogeneous factor. Emigration will benefit workers whose 
skills are substitute to those of migrant labour, whereas it will hurt those workers 
whose skills are complementary to those of migrant workers. On the other hand, in 
the destination regions, labour becomes more abundant (less scarce) relative to 
capital, and capital owners benefit. Again, not all workers in the destination regions 
are worse off. Immigration will benefit those workers whose skills are 
complementary to those of the immigrant worker, whereas immigration will hurt 
those workers whose skills are substitute to those of immigrant workers.
In a subsequent stage of the analysis, three model extensions were considered: 
a) transportation costs; b) capital mobility; and c) selective labour mobility.
With the introduction of transaction costs, wages fail to equalise across 
regions, migration flows reduce and in consequence efficiency gains reduce as well. 
With the introduction of capital mobility, the return to capital equalises across
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regions; the removal of restrictions to skilled labour mobility makes labour move out
of the regions with low average wages, and capital moves out of the regions where it
*
is abundant relative to labour. Global welfare improves compared with the scenario 
without capital mobility, as a result of a better resource allocation and migrants 
benefit as well. With the introduction of selective labour mobility, an aggregate 
welfare improvement is observed, and the magnitude of the gain depends on the size 
of the region in terms of the labour endowment. As to the remuneration to the factors 
of production, the main conclusions remain unaltered: labour benefits in the source 
regions, and capital in the destination regions. With a segmented labour market, skill 
labour benefits from migration relative to unskilled labour in the source regions.
The results have shown that the elimination of global restrictions on labour 
mobility generates considerable world-wide efficiency gains. Despite these gains, the 
liberalisation of world-wide migration is far from realistic because of social and 
political tensions. High-income countries are very reluctant to open their borders to 
free migration because they do not want to become the destination of immigration of 
unskilled labour from low-income countries. In the short-run, countries regulate the 
flows of international migration by means of border controls, and work permits, 
among others. In the long-run, countries should concentrate their efforts in the 
reduction of income disparities among regions, which could reduce the incentive to 
migrate.
i
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Appendix 4.1: Methodology used to calculate the percentage of skilled and unskilled
labour in each region
Various issues of the Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the International Labour 
Office (ILO) are used to calculate the proportions of skilled and unskilled labour in 
each region. Information for as many countries as possible, and as close as possible 
to 1990, the base year of the benchmark data set, was obtained. In particular, data for 
the following countries and years were used:
• USA: 1991.
• JAP: 1990.
• EU: Belgium, 1990; Denmark, 1990; Germany, 1991; Greece, 1990; Ireland, 
1990; Italy, 1994; Luxembourg, 1991; the Netherlands, 1991; Portugal, 1990; 
Spain, 1991; and the United Kingdom, 1992.
• ODC: Australia, 1990; Austria, 1990; Canada, 1990; Finland, 1991; Iceland, 
1991; Israel, 1990; New Zealand, 1991; Norway, 1990; South Africa, 1991; 
Sweden, 1991; and Switzerland, 1991.
• DAM: Chile, 1991; Costa Rica, 1990; Ecuador, 1990; Mexico, 1990; Peru, 1991; 
and Venezuela, 1990.
• DAF: Botswana, 1991; Egypt, 1990; Morocco, 1991; and Nigeria, 1986.
• DAS: Indonesia, 1990; Korea, 1991; the Philippines, 1990; and Thailand, 1980.
• DE: Hungary, 1990; Poland, 1988; Romania, 1992; and Turkey, 1990.
Table 2C of the Yearbook presents economically active population (EAP) by 
industry and by occupation (major groups). Industries are classified, according to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), in nine broad categories. 
Primary commodities correspond to the first two categories, that is agriculture,
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hunting, forestry and fishing, and mining and quarrying. Manufactured goods include 
all the manufacturing sector. And services comprise the remaining six categories, that 
is electricity, gas and water; construction; wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels; transport, storage and communications; finance, insurance, real state and 
business services; community, social and personal services; and government services.
Occupations are in turn classified according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO -  1968). In particular,’the major groups 0/1 and 
2 were assumed to comprise “skilled” workers; these groups include professional, 
technical and related workers, and administrative and managerial workers. The major 
groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7/8/9 were assumed to comprise “unskilled” workers; these 
groups include clerical and related workers; sales workers; service workers; 
agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters; and 
production and related workers, transport and equipment operators and labourers.
Next, the number of workers involved in skilled and unskilled activities for 
every available country were calculated. Countries are then grouped by regions and 
industries in order to calculate the regional proportions of skilled and unskilled 
workers. These proportions are then used to split the wage bill (as taken from 
National Accounts) into remuneration to skilled and unskilled labour for each sector 
in each region.
/
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Appendix 4.2: Calculation of average wage rates in each region
1. Homogeneous labour
In the homogeneous labour case, it is only necessary to calculate the average wage 
rate in each region. Given that there is no agreement as to how an average wage rate 
can be calculated, six possible measures were considered.
First, the wage bill for each region, as taken from National Accounts, was 
divided by total population (TOTP), as taken from the UN Demographic Yearbook 
(1996), Table 5. The population figures correspond to 1990 for every country, and 
these were then aggregated in order to obtain the population for each region (see 
Table A4.2.1).
Table A4.2.1: Regional Indicators
Region TOTP " 
(millions)
EAP y 
(millions)
Wage Bill3/ 
($ millions)
GDP4' 
($ millions)
AGDP51 
($ millions)
USA 249.9 126.9 3,313,600 5,066,300 5,066,300
JAP 123.5 63.6 1,611,804 3,734,955 4,108,451
EU 344.3 149.2 3,116,515 5,390,057 5,336,156
ODC 121.2 54.7 1,169,361 1,779,828 1,762,030
DAM 421.9 152.1 391,611 1,064,429 2,024,544
DAF 535.1 203.9 70,948 310,538 620,041
DAS 2,767.8 1,020.3 534,407 1,413,541 3,744,313
DE 466.6 217.8 817,351 1,318,958 1,978,437
' TOTP corresponds to total population, as taken from the United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook (1996).
1J EAP corresponds to economically active population, as taken from several issues of the 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO).
v The wage bill was taken from the benchmark data set (see Appendix 3.2). 
v GDP corresponds to GDP at factor costs, as taken from the benchmark data set (see 
Appendix 3.2).
5/ AGDP corresponds to GDP at factor costs, adjusted using the exchange-rate deviation 
index by Kravis et. al. (1982).
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Total population, however, exceeds the workforce in each region. Therefore, 
as a second measure of the average wage rate, the wage bill divided by the 
economically active population (EAP), as taken from the Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics, was used. Data on EAP for USA, JAP, and every country in EU and ODC 
were found. It was not possible to find information for every country in the remaining 
regions. In order to overcome this difficulty, I calculated the ratio of EAP to TOTP 
for each available country, and then averaged these ratios. The resulting ratios were 
then applied to the total population of the corresponding region.
In particular, for DAM I used data for Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela 
(36% of the total population corresponds to EAP). For DAF. I used data for Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles 
and Swaziland (38.1% of the population corresponds to EAP). For DAS. I used data 
for Bahrain, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Philippines, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand (36.9% of the population corresponds to EAP). Finally, for DE I used 
data for Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and Ukraine (46.7% of the population corresponds to 
EAP). The figures of economically active population used in the model are reported 
in Table A4.2.1.
The third and fourth measures use GDP per capita using TOTP and EAP, 
respectively. The figures of GDP correspond to GDP at factor costs for 1990, as 
taken from the benchmark data set (see Table A4.2.1).
Some authors (e.g. Kravis et. al. 1982), argue that there are some
I
comparability problems when using GDP data, because of differences between 
official and purchasing power parity exchange rates. Therefore, as a fifth and sixth
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measures of average wage rates, I use GDP per capita using TOTP and EAP,
respectively, where the GDP has been adjusted by the exchange rate deviation index. 
»
This index is defined as “...the ratio of the real GDP per capita to the exchange-rate- 
converted GDP per capita” (Kravis et. al., 1982 p .ll), and uses the U.S. as the 
numeraire country.
In particular, the following indexes for 1975 (the latest available year), as 
taken from Kravis et. al. (1982), were used: for JAP the index is 1.1; for the EU and 
ODC the index calculated for Europe, which is 0.99, was used; for DAM the index is 
1.9, and corresponds to the average of the indices of Brazil (1.58), Colombia (2.83), 
Jamaica (1.23), Mexico(1.7), and Uruguay (2.17); for DAF the index is 2, and 
corresponds to the average of the indices of Kenya (1.95), Malawi (2.55), and 
Zambia (1.49); for DAS the index is 2.65, and corresponds to the average of the 
indices of Iran (1.7), Syria (2.5), India (3.23), Korea (2.54), Malaysia (1.98), Pakistan 
(3.12), Philippines (2.51), Sri Lanka (3.65), and Thailand (2.65); lastly, for DE the 
index is 1.5, and corresponds to the average of the indices of Hungary (1.68), Poland 
(1.39), Romania (1.37) and Yugoslavia (1.56). The adjusted GDP data are presented 
in Table A.4.2.1.
The resulting wages rates are presented in Table A.4.2.2.
I
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Table A.4.2.2: Average wage rates -  Homogeneous labour 
(1990 US$)
Wage Regions
measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB / TOTP 13,259 13,047 9,052 9,647 928 133 193 1,752
WB/EAP 26,119 25,345 20,892 21,373 2,575 348 524 3,753
GDP pc (TOTP) 20,272 30,233 15,656 14,684 2,523 580 511 2,827
GDPpc(EAP) 39,934 58,730 36,134 32,531 7,000 1,523 1,385 6,056
AGDP pc (TOTP) 20,272 33,257 15,499 14,537 4,798 1,159 1,353 4,240
AGDP ^ (EAP) 39,934 64,603 35,772 32,205 13,314 3,041 3,670 9,084
Source: Calculations from the author.
2. Heterogeneous labour
In the case where the labour market is segmented, the average wage rates of skilled 
and unskilled labour in each region are calculated. In practice such data are not 
available. To overcome this difficulty I calculate the ratio of the average wage rate of 
skilled to unskilled labour for every region, x ' ■ This ratio is then used to infer the 
average wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour in each region, such that the wage 
bill (W) in each region is equal to the remuneration of the two types of labour, i.e.: 
puLsr +P1L,Lur = Wr .
This equation has two unknowns, and P ^ , since L'u and L'^ were
calculated following the procedure stated in Appendix 4.1, and W ' can be obtained 
from National Accounts. This equation can be rewritten by multiplying the first term 
in the left hand side by (p^ /P ^ , ), resulting in:
p r  = _ W _
u  Lur + x rLsr ’
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where x ' is the ratio of the average wage rate of skilled to unskilled ratio, which is 
exogenously determined. Once is calculated, the corresponding value for is 
obtained.
For USA x ' was calculated using data on median annual earnings of year- 
round full-time wage and salary workers by occupation for 1990 (Handbook of U.S. 
Labour Statistics, 1997). For skilled labour I use managerial and professional 
speciality. For unskilled labour the remaining categories were used: technical sales 
and administrative support; service occupations; precision production, craft and 
repair; operators, fabricators, and labourers; and farming, forestry and fishing. Next, I 
calculated a weighted average of the median annual earnings (weighted by the 
number of workers in each activity) for skilled and unskilled labour. The resulting 
ratio was 1.6425.
For the remaining regions, I use wages by economic activity taken from the 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Since one would expect that the remuneration of 
skilled labour is higher than that of unskilled labour, I use average earnings per 
worker in financing, insurance, real state and business services as proxy for skilled 
labour wages, while average earnings per worker in wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels were used as proxy for unskilled labour wages.16
In the case of JAP, it was not possible to find the required data, so that I had 
to use the estimated value of %' for USA. For the EU, I used information for the 
United Kingdom (2.0304). For ODC, x' *s equal to 1.3374, which corresponds to the 
average of the ratios for Canada, Finland, and Australia. For DAM, x ' 's equal to
'‘Average earnings include “...the remuneration in cash and in kind paid to employees, as a rule at 
regular intervals, for the time worked or work done together with remuneration for time not worked, 
such as for annual vacation, other paid leave or holidays" (ILO, 1996 p.665).
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1.9568, which is the average of the ratios for Chile and Costa Rica. For DAF, x ' is 
equal to 1.8155, which is the average of the ratios for Botswana and Egypt. For DAS, 
X' is equal to 1.4575, which is the average of the ratios for Korea,, the Philippines 
and Thailand. Finally, for DE I used information for the Czech Republic (1.2546). 
The resulting wages rates are presented in Table A.4.2.3.
Table A.4.2.3: Average wage rates -  Heterogeneous labour 
(1990 US$)
Wage _________________________ Regions
Measures USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
WB/ TOTP 
Unskilled labour 11,189 11,795 7,376 8,937 820 123 189 1,692
Skilled labour 18,378 19,373 14,976 11,952 1,604 222 271 2,122
WB/EAP 
Unskilled labour 22,041 22,912 17,023 19,798 2,274 322 512 3,624
Skilled labour 36,203 37,633 34,564 26,479 4,450 584 736 4,546
GDP pc (TOTP) 
Unskilled labour 17,108 27,332 12,756 13,602 2,228 536 499 2,730
Skilled labour 28,100 44,892 25,901 18,192 4,359 974 718 3,425
GDPpc(EAP) 
Unskilled labour 33,700 53,093 29,442 30,134 6,181 1,407 1,354 5,848
Skilled labour 55,352 87,206 59,779 40,302 12,094 2,555 1,947 7,336
AGDP pc (TOTP) 
Unskilled labour 17,108 30,065 12,629 13,466 4,237 1,071 1,322 4,094
Skilled labour 28,100 49,382 25,642 18,010 8,290 1,944 1,901 5,137
AGDPpc(EAP) 
Unskilled labour 33,700 58,402 29,147 29,832 11,756 2,810 3,587 8,771
Skilled labour 55,352 95,926 59,181 39,899 23,003 5,102 5,156 11,004
Source: Calculations from the author.
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Appendix 4.3: Sensitivity analysis for labour-labour substitution elasticity q
Table A4.3.1: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Wage bill divided bv total DODulation tWB / TOTP1
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -29 -33 -13 9 710 5,751 4,693 512
q =0.75 -40 -43 -26 -7 592 4,902 3,998 423
q= 1 .0 0 -45 -47 -32 -15. 536 4,494 3,663 381
q =1.50 -49 -52 -38 - 2 2 482 4,108 3,347 340
q=1.75 -50 -53 -39 -24 468 4,003 3,261 329
q =2.50 -53 -55 -42 -27 443 3,824 3,115 311
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 -64 -6 6 -45 -55 395 3,201 2,048 140
<;=0.75 -62 -64 -42 -52 422 3,377 2,163 153
<5 = 1 .0 0 -61 -63 -41 -51 434 3,463 2,219 159
<5 = 1.50 -60 -62 -39 -50 447 3,566 2,271 165
<5=1.75 -60 -62 -39 -50 450 3,603 2,286 166
<5 =2.50 -59 -61 -38 -49 455 3,603 2,310 169
Return to capital <5 =0.50 80 82 70 97 307 910 795 209
q =0.75 80 83 71 97 310 917 806 207
q = 1 .0 0 81 84 72 98 311 921 812 207
<5 = 1.50 81 85 72 98 312 924 817 206
<5=1.75 81 85 72 98 312 925 818 206
q =2.50 81 85 72 98 313 926 820 206
Wage bill divided bv the economically active population (WB / EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 - 2 0 -23 -16 9 549 4,843 3,823 535
<5 =0.75 -31 -33 -27 -5 464 4,195 3,308 452
<5 = 1 .0 0 -36 -38 -33 - 1 2 422 3,881 3,059 411
<5=1.50 -41 -43 -38 -19 383 3,583 2,822 373
<5=1.75 -42 -44 -39 - 2 1 373 3,501 2,758 363
q =2.50 -44 -46 -41 -24 355 3,364 2,648 345
Wage rate unskilled labour <5 =0.50 -56 -58 -43 -51 325 2,901 1,787 167
<5=0.75 -54 -56 -40 -49 346 3,049 1,881 180
<5 = 1 .0 0 -53 -55 -39 -48 356 3,121 1,926 186
<5=1.50 -52 -54 -38 -46 366 3,190 1,969 192
<5=1.75 -52 -54 -37 -46 368 3,208 1,981 194
<5=2.50 -51 -53 -37 -46 373 3,240 2 , 0 0 1 197
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__________________________________________________________ I_________
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Table A4.3.1 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Wage bill divided bv the economically active population (WB / EAP)
Return to capital ç =0.50 66 67 58 82 255 809 699 217
ç =0.75 67 68 59 83 258 817 710 216
ç =1.00 67 69 60 83 259 822 715 216
ç =1.50 67 70 60 83 261 825 720 216
Ç =1-75 67 70 60 83- 261 827 722 216
ç =2.50 67 70 60 84 262 828 724 216
GDP Der capita using total DODulation (GDP oc fTOTPO
Wage rate skilled labour ç =0.50 -14 -46 -6 33 455 2,383 3,268 606
ç =0.75 -24 -52 -18 17 390 2,091 2,873 523
ç =1.00 -29 -56 -23 10 358 1,950 2,681 483
ç =1.50 -34 -58 -28 3 328 1,815 2,498 445
Ç =1-75 -35 -59 -29 1 320 1,779 2,448 434
ç =2.50 -37 -61 -32 -3 306 1,717 2,365 417
Wage rate unskilled labour ç =0.50 -49 -68 -32 -36 291 1,525 1,645 219
ç =0.75 -47 -67 -29 -33 308 1,597 1,723 233
ç =1.00 -46 -66 -27 -32 317 1,632 1,761 240
ç =1.50 -45 -65 -26 -30 325 1,666 1,797 247
Ç =1-75 -44 -65 -25 -30 327 1,675 1,806 248
ç =2.50 -44 -65 -25 -29 331 1,690 1,823 252
Return to capital ç =0.50 56 51 52 77 227 452 630 246
ç =0.75 56 53 53 78 229 458 641 246
ç =1.00 56 54 53 78 231 461 646 247
ç =1.50 56 54 54 78 232 464 651 247
<3 = 1-75 56 55 54 78 233 464 652 247
ç =2.50 56 55 54 78 233 465 654 247
GDP per capita using the economically active population (GDP pc iEAPU
Wage rate skilled labour ç =0.50 -7 -41 -14 27 324 1,905 2,531 598
ç =0.75 -17 -47 -23 14 280 1,700 2,262 523
ç =1.00 -22 -50 -27 8 259 1,600 2,130 492
ç=1.50 -26 -53 -31 2 239 1,504 2,005 459
ç = 1.75 -27 -54 -33 0 233 1,478 1,971 450
ç =2.50 -29 -55 -34 -3 224 1,435 1,914 435
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Table A4.3.1 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
GDP Der caDita usine the economically active nonulation (GDP nc (EAP))
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 -41 -63 -32 -34 222 1,314 1,369 240
q =0.75 -39 -61 -30 -31 234 1,369 1,426 253
q=1.00 -38 -60 -29 -30 240 1,396 1,454 260
q =1.50 -36 -60 -27 -29 246 1,421 1,481 266
q =1.75 -36 -59 -27 -29. 248 1,428 1,488 268
q =2.50 -36 -59 -26 -28 251 1,440 1,500 271
Return to capital q =0.50 44 35 38 62 176 382 528 247
q =0.75 44 36 39 62 179 387 537 248
q =1.00 44 37 40 62 180 390 541 249
q =1.50 44 38 40 63 181 392 545 249
=1-75 44 38 40 63 181 393 547 249
q =2.50 45 38 41 63 182 394 548 250
Adjusted GDP Der caoita usine total DODulation (AGDP nc (TOTPri
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -7 -47 2 45 224 1,240 1,270 407
q =0.75 -13 -51 -5 35 193 1,151 1,179 373
q =1.00 -16 -52 -8 30 183 1,108 1,135 357
q=1.50 -19 -54 -12 26 173 1,066 1,092 341
q=1.75 -20 -55 -12 25 171 1,055 1,081 337
q =2.50 -21 -55 -14 23 167 1,038 1,063 330
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 -30 -60 -6 -12 181 1,012 801 191
q =0.75 -29 -59 -3 -9 188 1,039 823 198
q =1.00 -28 -59 -2 -8 191 1,052 834 201
q=1.50 -27 -59 -1 -7 194 1,064 844 205
q =1-75 -27 -58 -1 -7 195 1,068 846 206
q =2.50 -27 -58 -0 -7 197 1,074 851 207
Return to capital q =0.50 20 1 33 43 134 285 322 189
q =0.75 20 2 34 43 136 288 326 190
q =1.00 20 2 34 43 137 289 328 191
q =1.50 20 3 35 43 138 291 330 191
q=1.75 20 3 35 43 138 291 331 192
q =2.50 20 3 35 43 138 291 331 192
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Table A4.3.1 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
„ (% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Adjusted GDP Der caoita usine the economically active DODulation (AGDP dc CEAPV)
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -4 -45 -10 33 131 949 930 383
q =0.75 -9 -48 -15 26 118 884 874 356
q =1.00 -12 -49 -17 22 112 857 847 344
q =1.50 -14 -51 -20 2Q 106 831 821 337
q=1.75 -15 -51 -20 18 105 824 814 328
q =2.50 -16 -51 -21 17 103 813 804 323
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 -24 -56 -12 -14 119 816 618 194
q =0.75 -22 -55 -10 -12 123 834 632 199
q =1.00 -21 -55 -9 -11 125 843 639 202
q=1.50 -21 -54 -8 -10 127 851 645 205
q =1.75 -21 -54 -8 -10 128 853 647 205
q =2.50 -20 -54 -8 -10 129 857 650 207
Return to capital q =0.50 14 -8 20 30 91 224 250 180
q =0.75 14 -7 20 30 92 227 253 181
<5 =1.00 14 -7 20 30 93 228 254 181
<5=1.50 14 -7 21 31 94 229 255 182
<5=1.75 14 -7 21 31 94 229 255 182
<5 =2.50 14 -6 21 31 94 229 256 182
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Table A4.3.2: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Wage bill divided bv total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -78 -80 -74 -67 147 1,685 1,362 87
q =0.75 -70 -72 -63 -54 244 2,284 1,935 160
q= 1 .0 0 -63 -65 -55 -44 318 2,922 2,376 216
5=1.50 -55 -57 -45 -31 415 3,622 2,949 289
5=1.75 -52 -55 -41 -26' 448 3,857 3,142 314
5  =2.50 -47 -49 -34 -18 512 4,319 3,520 362
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 19 36 29 23 28 48 55 40
5  =0.75 9 35 29 2 1 63 132 1 2 0 74
5 = 1 .0 0 2 28 26 19 96 207 175 105
5=1.50 -7 13 18 16 149 311 248 152
5=1.75 - 1 0 7 15 15 170 344 271 170
5  =2.50 -16 -5 7 13 218 401 309 2 1 0
Return to capital q =0.50 - 1 2 1 14 1 0 35 84 84 43
5=0.75 2 28 2 2 18 6 6 133 133 77
5 = 1 .0 0 4 29 26 23 93 172 171 106
5=1.50 8 27 29 30 132 223 218 147
5=1.75 1 0 26 29 32 147 240 233 162
5  =2.50 13 2 2 30 36 178 270 260 193
Wage bill divided by the economically active population (WB / EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -71 -72 -70 -61 133 1,679 1,311 128
5=0.75 -63 -64 -61 -49 205 2,224 1,744 199
5  = 1 .0 0 -56 -58 -54 -40 257 2,620 2,058 249
5=1.50 -48 -50 -46 -29 323 3,120 2,455 314
5=1.75 -45 -47 -43 -25 344 3,285 2,586 335
5=2.50 -40 -42 -37 -18 387 3,610 2,843 377
Wage rate unskilled labour 5  =0.50 16 32 28 2 2 27 48 54 46
5  =0.75 8 30 26 19 55 1 2 2 109 80
5 = 1 .0 0 2 24 2 1 16 81 185 154 108
5  = 1.50 -6 1 2 1 2 13 1 2 1 268 2 1 2 150
5=1.75 -8 7 8 1 1 137 294 229 167
5  =2.50 -13 -3 0 9 172 337 258 2 0 2
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Table A4.3.2 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Wage bill divided bv the economically active population (WB / EAP)
Return to capital ç =0.50 -1 20 14 10 33 84 82 52
ç =0.75 1 25 19 16 58 124 121 84
ç =1.00 4 25 21 20 78 154 150 109
ç =1.50 6 23 21 24 107 191 185 145
ç =1.75 7 21 21 26' 118 203 196 157
ç =2.50 9 18 20 28 141 225 216 185
GDP ner caoita usine total DODulation (GDP oc (TOTP))
Wage rate skilled labour ç =0.50 -64 -76 -61 -45 131 933 1,302 194
ç =0.75 -56 -72 -52 -31 186 1,180 1,636 264
ç =1.00 -50 -69 -45 -22 224 1,351 1,869 313
ç =1.50 -42 -65 -39 -12 267 1,537 2,023 364
Ç =1-75 -40 -63 -36 -8 282 1,604 2,112 383
ç =2.50 -35 -60 -31 -2 311 1,734 2,283 420
Wage rate unskilled labour ç =0.50 14 34 25 20 28 29 54 56
ç =0.75 7 27 24 20 52 74 102 91
ç =1.00 1 16 20 19 73 110 140 121
ç =1.50 -5 -5 11 17 103 154 170 158
<5=1-75 -7 -12 8 17 115 169 183 174
ç =2.50 -11 -25 2 17 144 193 203 210
Return to capital ç =0.50 -0 20 14 12 34 53 81 65
ç =0.75 2 20 18 18 54 76 113 97
ç=1.00 3 17 19 22 71 93 136 122
ç =1.50 5 8 20 26 93 113 162 157
ç =1.75 5 5 20 28 102 119 169 169
ç =2.50 7 -1 19 30 120 130 183 195
GDP Der capita using the economically active population (GDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour ç =0.50 -55 -72 -59 -39 104 866 1,167 236
ç =0.75 -47 -67 -51 -28 141 1,042 1,399 298
ç=1.00 -42 -63 -46 -20 166 1,160 1,553 339
ç=1.50 -35 -59 -40 -11 196 1,300 1,737 388
<5=1-75 -33 -58 -38 -8 205 1,345 1,796 403
ç =2.50 -29 -55 -35 -3 224 1,432 1,910 433
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Table A4.3.2 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
, (% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
GDP ner caDita usine the economically active nonulation (GDP nc (EAP))
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 11 28 23 18 25 26 48 61
q =0.75 5 20 19 17 42 64 88 94
q =1.00 1 10 14 16 57 93 117 120
q =1.50 -4 -6 6 14 80 131 153 159
q =1.75 -6 -11 3 14' 89 143 163 173
q =2.50 -9 -22 -4 13 110 162 179 205
Return to capital q =0.50 -0 16 12 11 29 49 73 72
q =0.75 1 15 14 15 44 67 98 101
q =1.00 2 11 14 18 56 78 114 123
q =1.50 4 4 12 20 72 92 133 152
q =1-75 4 1 11 21 78 97 138 162
q =2.50 5 -4 10 23 90 104 147 185
Adjusted GDP Der caDita usine total DODulation fAGDP nc (TOTPU
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -41 -66 -35 -8 100 755 774 223
q =0.75 -35 -63 -29 1 120 836 857 254
q =1.00 -32 -61 -25 7 132 888 910 274
q =1.50 -27 -59 -21 13 146 949 972 297
q =1.75 -26 -58 -19 15 150 968 992 304
q =2.50 -23 -56 -15 21 162 1,019 1,044 324
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 6 15 17 14 22 21 31 54
q =0.75 2 7 16 15 34 50 56 79
q =1.00 -1 -2 14 17 45 72 73 98
q =1.50 -5 -16 10 19 60 100 94 125
q =1-75 -7 -20 8 20 67 109 100 135
q =2.50 -9 -27 6 24 83 126 113 162
Return to capital q =0.50 -1 6 11 11 26 42 50 65
q =0.75 -1 3 12 15 36 53 62 85
q =1.00 -1 -2 13 17 43 61 71 99
q =1.50 -0 -9 13 20 54 70 80 119
q =1.75 -0 -11 13 21 57 73 83 127
q =2.50 -0 -12 14 25 68 80 91 145
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Table A4.3.2 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Adjusted GDP Der capita usine the economically active ooDulation (AGDP p c  (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour q =0.50 -32 -61 -36 -6 64 634 630 242
q =0.75 -27 -58 -32 1 75 689 680 266
q=1.00 -24 -56 -29 5 82 720 711 280
q =1.50 -21 -54 -26 9 90 756 747 297
q =1.75 -20 -54 -25 11- 92 767 758 302
q =2.50 -18 -53 -23 14 97 789 780 312
Wage rate unskilled labour q =0.50 5 10 13 11 16 15 24 54
q =0.75 1 2 10 12 24 39 43 76
q =1.00 -1 -6 7 12 31 57 57 93
q =1.50 -4 -17 2 14 41 79 73 117
q=l 75 -5 -21 0 14 44 86 78 126
q =2.50 -7 -29 -4 16 53 97 86 147
Return to capital q =0.50 -1 2 7 9 19 34 40 65
q =0.75 -1 -2 7 11 25 42 49 82
q =1.00 -1 -6 7 13 30 47 55 95
q =1.50 -0 -12 5 14 36 53 62 111
q=i-75 - 0 -14 5 15 39 55 63 118
q =2.50 - 0 -18 3 16 44 58 67 131
I
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Appendix 4.4: Sensitivity analysis for elasticity of substitution in production o
Table A4.4.1: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Homogeneous labour
(% change in factor prices)
«
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Waee bill divided bv total Dooulation (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate 0=0.50 -82 -82 -74 -76 157 1,690 1,133 36
0=0.75 -66 -60 -54 -57 350 3,037 2,062 138
0=1.00 -56 -56 -36 -41 522 4,242 2,892 230
0=1.25 -46 -46 -22 -27 665 5,235 3,577 305
0=1.50 -38 -37 -10 -16 782 6,052 4,139 367
Return to capital 0=0.50 100 115 64 79 80 255 265 57
0=0.75 100 100 75 97 226 664 625 155
0=1.00 96 90 84 111 372 1,134 1,018 246
0=1.25 91 82 90 118 503 1,598 1,396 321
0=1.50 87 77 93 122 617 2,034 1,748 383
Waee bill divided bv the economically active nonulation (WB / F.AP1
Wage rate 0=0.50 -75 -74 -68 -69 156 1,796 1,159 76
0=0.75 -60 -59 -50 -52 302 2,873 1,874 176
0=1.00 -49 -47 -36 -37 420 3,748 2,455 257
0=1.25 -40 -38 -24 -26 513 4,437 2,913 321
0=1.50 -32 -30 -15 -17 588 4,991 3,281 372
Return to capital O =0.50 88 101 66 78 85 275 277 81
0=0.75 84 85 68 88 201 627 580 174
0=1.00 79 76 69 93 307 999 885 253
0=1.25 75 69 70 96 397 1,351 1,166 317
0=1.50 71 65 70 96 473 1,675 1,423 369
GDP per capita using total population (GDP pc (TOTP))
Wage rate o =0.50 -67 -78 -57 -54 167 1,061 1,218 138
0=0.75 -53 -68 -39 -35 281 1,556 1,780 240
0 = 1.00 -42 -61 -25 -20 366 1,926 2,200 315
0=1.25 -34 -56 -15 -9 430 2,207 2,518 373
0=1.50 -28 -52 -6 -0 481 2,428 2,769 419
Return to capital o =0.50 78 122 59 74 94 176 292 115
0=0.75 71 80 60 82 189 369 547 209
1 0=1.00 65 55 61 87 270 557 789 284
0=1.25 61 40 62 90 335 726 1,005 343
o=1.50 57 30 63 91 389 879 1,198 390
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Table A4.4.1 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Homogeneous labour
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
GDP ner caDita usine the economically active population (GDP pc (EAP1)
Wage rate 0=0.50 -57 -70 -52 -47 148 1,039 1,153 149
0=0.75 -43 -61 -37 -30 224 1,388 1,537 226
0=1.00 -34 -55 -27 -19 277 1,632 1,806 279
0=1.25 -27 -50 -19 -10 316 1,813 2,003 319
0=1.50 -22 -47 -13 -4 347 1,952 2,157 349
Return to capital o=0.50 64 97 54 68 87 172 279 120
0=0.75 56 60 48 69 155 326 480 193
0=1.00 51 40 45 69 209 468 660 248
0=1.25 47 28 43 69 252 593 817 290
0=1.50 45 20 42 68 286 703 955 323
Adjusted GDP Der caDita usine total DODulation (AGDP nc (TOTP))
Wage rate 0=0.50 -40 -64 -22 -17 152 942 793 185
O =0.75 -32 -58 -11 -5 189 1,097 925 227
0=1.00 -26 -55 -3 3 213 1,195 1,009 254
0=1.25 -22 -53 2 9 229 1,263 1,067 273
0=1.50 -19 -51 6 13 242 1,315 1,112 287
Return to capital O =0.50 36 49 42 48 87 158 204 136
o =0.75 28 20 40 49 129 258 310 185
0=1.00 23 5 39 49 158 342 397 218
0=1.25 20 -4 38 49 180 414 469 242
0=1.50 18 -9 37 49 197 475 531 260
Adiusted GDP ner capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate 0=0.50
0=0.75
0 = 1.00
0=1.25
0=1.50
0=0.50
0=0.75
0 = 1.00
0=1.25
0=1.50
-31 -58 -23 -15 106 800 646 201
-24 -53 -16 -6 127 893 723 232
-20 -51 -11 -1 140 950 770 252
-17 -49 -7 3 149 990 803 265
-15 -47 -5 6 156 1,020 828 275
27 30 32 38 65 132 168 137
20 8 27 37 91 208 246 180
17 -4 24 36 109 270 309 208
15 -10 22 35 122 322 360 227
13 -15 21 34 131 367 403 242
Return to capital
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Table A4.4.2: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Waee bill divided bv total Dormlation fWB / TOTPÌ
Wage rate skilled labour a  =0.50 -73 -74 -67 -58 212 2,158 1,749 136
0=0.75 -53 -56 -43 -28 434 3,759 3,061 304
O=1.00 -37 -40 -22 -2 627 5,152 4,203 449
0=1.25 -23 -27 -5 19 786 6,299 5,142 569
0=1.50 -11 -16 9 3 7 . 917 7,250 5,921 669
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -80 -81 -70 -75 172 1,711 1,078 32
0=0.75 -67 -69 -51 -59 344 2,862 1,828 115
0=1.00 -57 -59 -34 -46 489 3,829 2,457 186
0=1.25 -48 -51 -22 -35 605 4,603 2,960 242
0=1.50 -41 -44 -11 -27 700 5,231 3,370 288
Return to capital o =0.50 94 114 63 79 91 270 273 68
0=0.75 92 92 71 93 230 653 597 158
0=1.00 87 78 78 102 362 1,072 934 236
0=1.25 83 68 82 106 476 1,476 1,252 299
0=1.50 79 62 85 108 575 1,852 1,544 350
Waee bill divided bv the economicallv active population (WB / EAP)
Wage rate skilled labour o =0.50 -64 -65 -62 -50 197 2,160 1,694 190
0=0.75 -44 -46 -41 -24 355 3,367 2,651 345
0=1.00 -29 -31 -25 -2 482 4,331 3,446 469
0=1.25 -16 -19 -12 15 582 5,093 4,021 567
0=1.50 -6 -10 -2 28 663 5,713 4,513 647
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -73 -74 -64 -69 166 1,780 1,083 67
0=0.75 -59 -61 -47 -55 2293 2,677 1,646 147
0=1.00 -49 -51 -34 -44 391 3,368 2,081 208
0=1.25 -42 -44 -24 -35 466 3,899 2,445 255
0=1.50 -35 -38 -16 -28 526 4,322 2,681 293
Return to capital o =0.50 81 97 63 77 92 282 277 90
0=0.75 76 77 62 82 200 605 545 173
0=1.00 71 64 62 84 294 933 804 240
0=1.25 67 56 63 84 372 1,237 1,039 293
0=1.50 64 51 63 83 438 1,515 1,252 335
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Table A4.4.2 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
GDP Der capita usine total iDODulation fGDP nc (TOTP»
W age rate sk illed  labour 0 = 0 .5 0 -55 -72 -51 -3 0 193 1,213 1,682 273
0 = 0 .7 5 -36 -60 -31 -2 311 1,738 2 ,393 423
0 = 1 .0 0 -23 -52 -16 19 398 2 ,127 2,921 533
0 = 1 .2 5 -13 -45 -5 35 4 6 4 2 ,4 2 4 3 ,324 618
0 = 1 .5 0 -4 -40 4 48' 517 2 ,661 3 ,646 685
W age rate unsk illed  labour 0 = 0 .5 0 -64 -78 -52 -55 173 1,035 1 ,120 123
0 = 0 .7 5 -52 -70 -35 -39 270 1,438 1,552 202
0 = 1 .0 0 -43 -64 -23 -28 339 1,726 1,862 259
0 = 1 .2 5 -36 -60 -14 -2 0 391 1 ,940 2,091 3 0 0
0 = 1 .5 0 -31 -57 -7 -13 431 2 ,1 0 6 2 ,2 7 0 333
Return to capital 0 = 0 .5 0 71 115 56 72 98 176 285 121
O = 0 .75 64 69 55 76 184 3 5 0 507 204
0 = 1 .0 0 58 43 55 79 255 513 711 267
0 = 1 .2 5 54 28 55 80 311 6 5 9 890 315
0 = 1 .5 0 51 19 56 80 357 7 9 0 1,050 354
GDP oer capita using the economically active population (GDP pc (EAP)i
Wage rate skilled labour 0=0.50 -44 -65 -48 -23 1,108 1,108 1,485 321
0=0.75 -28 -54 -33 -1 1,463 1,463 1,951 444
0 = 1.00 -16 -47 -23 15 283 1,712 2,278 531
0 = 1.25 -8 -41 -15 27 322 1,898 2,522 596
0=1.50 -1 -37 -8 36 353 2,045 2,714 647
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -55 -71 -48 -49 147 983 1,026 161
o =0.75 -43 -64 -35 -36 210 1,263 1,317 228
0=1.00 -35 -47 -23 -28 253 1,453 1,513 274
0=1.25 -29 -55 -19 -21 285 1,590 1,656 307
0=1.50 -25 -52 -14 -16 309 1,696 1,766 332
Return to capital 0=0.50 58 87 50 65 87 166 263 138
0=0.75 50 49 44 63 148 304 436 211
0=1.00 46 29 40 62 195 427 587 265
0=1.25 42 17 38 61 231 535 717 305
0=1.50 40 10 37 59 260 629 831 336
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Table A4.4.2 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour - Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Adjusted GDP Der caDita usine total oooulation CAGDP nc i 3 o 3 w"
Wage rate skilled labour a  =0.50 -30 -60 -23 10 138 915 938 284
0=0.75 -20 -54 -12 25 171 1,057 1,083 338
0=1.00 -14 -51 -5 35 193 1,148 1,176 373
0=1.25 -9 -48 -0 42 208 1,213 1,242 397
0=1.50 -6 -46 3 47' 219 1,262 1,293 415
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -39 -65 -17 -22 148 879 693 156
0=0.75 -31 -61 -7 -13 177 997 789 187
O=1.00 -27 -58 -1 -7 196 1,070 848 206
0=1.25 -24 -57 3 -3 208 1,120 888 219
0=1.50 -21 -55 7 -0 218 1,157 919 229
Return to capital o =0.50 31 40 38 45 83 148 186 130
0=0.75 24 12 36 44 119 236 275 171
0=1.00 20 -3 34 43 144 309 348 197
0=1.25 17 -11 34 43 162 370 408 216
0=1.50 15 -17 33 42 177 423 459 230
Adjusted GDP per capita usine the economically active Donulation (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour o =0.50 -22 -55 -27 8 87 745 736 292
0=0.75 -14 -51 -20 19 106 828 818 330
a  =1.00 -10 -48 -16 25 117 880 870 354
o=1.25 -6 -46 -12 30 126 917 906 371
o=1.50 -4 -44 -10 34 132 945 934 384
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -30 -60 -19 -21 101 741 559 169
0=0.75 -24 -56 -12 -14 118 810 613 192
0=1.00 -21 -54 -8 -10 127 852 646 205
0=1.25 -18 -53 -6 -8 134 880 668 214
0=1.50 -16 -52 -3 -6 139 901 685 221
Return to capital o =0.50 23 22 28 34 60 121 150 129
0=0.75 17 0 23 32 82 188 216 164
0=1.00 14 -11 20 30 97 242 268 187
0=1.25 12 -2 18 29 108 287 311 202
0=1.50 11 -21 17 28 116 326 347 214
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Table A4.4.3: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Waee bill divided bv total nonulation rwB / Term
Wage rate skilled labour 0=0.50 -70 -71 -63 -54 245 2,395 1,944 161
0=0.75 -67 -69 -60 -50 276 2,618 2,126 184
0=1.00 -66 -67 -58 -47 293 2,737 2,224 197
0=1.25 -65 -67 -57 -46 303 2,811 2,284 205
0=1.50 -64 -66 -56 -45 310 2,862 2,327 210
Wage rate unskilled labour 0=0.50 -10 14 11 5 74 207 153 77
0=0.75 0 26 22 15 80 191 156 88
0=1.00 6 32 28 20 83 177 155 94
0=1.25 9 36 32 24 85 168 155 98
0=1.50 11 39 35 26 86 161 154 101
Return to capital 0=0.50 16 35 29 25 58 110 119 71
0=0.75 7 31 26 23 74 141 144 87
0=1.00 3 29 24 21 84 160 158 96
0=1.25 0 28 23 20 90 172 167 102
0=1.50 -1 27 23 19 95 181 174 106
Wave bill divided bv the economically active DODulation (WB / EAP1
Wage rate skilled labour 0=0.50 -63 -64 -61 -49 205 2,227 1,747 199
0=0.75 -60 -61 -58 -45 228 2,396 1,881 221
0 = 1.00 -58 -60 -56 -43 239 2,486 1,952 232
0=1.25 -57 -59 -55 -42 247 2,541 1,995 239
0=1.50 -57 -58 -55 -41 252 2,579 2,026 244
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -8 13 10 5 65 193 140 84
0=0.75 -0 22 19 13 69 174 140 93
o=1.00 4 28 24 18 71 160 138 98
0 = 1.25 7 31 27 20 72 151 137 101
0=1.50 9 33 29 22 73 144 136 103
Return to capital 0=0.50 13 30 26 23 51 103 109 76
0=0.75 6 27 22 20 64 129 129 92
0=1.00 2 25 20 18 71 144 140 101
0=1.25 0 24 19 17 76 155 148 106
0=1.50 -1 23 18 16 80 162 154 110
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•  ______________________________________________________________________ *
____________________Regions________________
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM D'AF DAS DE
Table A4.4.3 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
GDP per capita using total population fGDP oc (TOTP)i
Wage rate skilled labour a  =0.50 -56 -72 -52 -32 186 1,179 1,635 264
0=0.75 -53 -71 -49 -28 203 1,254 1,737 285
0=1.00 -52 -70 -48 -25 211 1,294 1,790 296
0=1.25 -51 -69 -47 -24 217 1,318 1,823 303
0=1.50 -50 -69 -46 -23- 220 1,334 1,846 308
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -7 8 10 10 61 116 131 99
0=0.75 0 16 18 16 64 104 129 106
0=1.00 4 21 22 20 65 95 126 110
0=1.25 6 23 24 22 66 90 124 112
0=1.50 7 25 26 23 66 85 123 114
Return to capital o =0.50 11 27 23 22 48 63 102 89
0=0.75 5 21 20 21 59 78 118 105
0=1.00 2 18 19 20 65 88 128 114
0=1.25 0 16 19 20 69 94 135 120
0=1.50 -1 15 18 19 72 98 139 124
GDP oer capita usina the economically active population (GDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour o =0.50 -47 -67 -51 -28 141 1,040 1,396 297
0=0.75 -45 65 -49 -24 152 1,093 1,465 315
0=1.00 -44 -64 -48 -23 158 1,120 1,501 325
0=1.25 -43 -64 -47 -22 161 1,137 1,523 331
0=1.50 -42 -63 -47 -21 164 1,149 1,539 335
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -5 5 7 9 49 103 114 103
0=0.75 -0 11 13 14 51 90 110 108
0=1.00 3 15 17 16 52 82 107 111
0=1.25 5 17 18 18 52 76 105 112
0=1.50 6 18 20 19 52 72 103 114
Return to capital o =0.50 9 20 119 19 39 54 87 92
0=0.75 4 15 16 18 48 67 101 107
0=1.00 2 12 14 17 52 75 109 115
0=1.25 0 11 13 16 55 80 114 120
0=1.50 -1 10 12 16 57 84 117 124
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Table A4.4.3 (Continued): Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls
Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices) ,
Regions
Wage measures: USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
Adjusted GDP oer capita usine total population AGDP pc (TOTP))
Wage rate skilled labour a  =0.50 -35 -63 -29 1 119 835 856 254
0=0.75 -34 -62 -27 3 125 859 880 263
a  =1.00 -33 -62 -26 5 128 871 893 267
0=1.25 -32 -61 -26 6 129 878 900 270
0=1.50 -32 -61 -25 6 131 883 905 272
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -5 -5 9 13 41 84 74 88
0=0.75 -2 -1 13 15 41 71 70 90
o=1.00 -0 2 15 17 41 63 67 91
0=1.25 1 3 16 17 40 58 65 91
0=1.50 2 4 16 18 40 54 63 92
Return to capital o =0.50 4 7 16 16 33 44 56 78
o =0.75 1 2 14 16 38 53 64 89
0=1.00 -1 -0 13 17 41 56 68 94
0=1.25 -2 -2 12 17 43 62 71 98
0=1.50 -3 -3 12 17 44 65 73 101
Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDPpc(EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour o =0.50 -27 -58 -32 1 75 688 679 265
0=0.75 -26 -57 -31 3 78 702 694 272
0=1.00 -25 -57 -30 4 80 708 701 275
0=1.25 -25 -57 -30 4 81 714 706 277
0=1.50 -25 -57 -30 4 81 717 708 279
Wage rate unskilled labour o =0.50 -4 -7 4 10 28 69 59 85
0=0.75 -1 -4 7 11 28 57 54 86
0=1.00 -0 -3 8 12 28 50 52 86
0=1.25 0 -2 9 12 28 45 50 87
0=1.50 1 -1 10 13 28 42 49 87
Return to capital o =0.50 3 2 10 12 23 3 44 75
0=0.75 1 -2 8 12 26 42 49 85
0=1.00 -1 -4 7 12 28 46 53 90
0=1.25 -2 -6 6 12 30 49 55 94
0=1.50 -2 -6 6 12 30 51 58 96
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Appendix 4.5: Distributional impacts of the removal of immigration controls in the 
presence of selective mobility
TSble A4.5.1: Homogeneous labour 
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DAM -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -23 -22 13 5 1,001 25 23 71
Return to capital 7 -10 23 15 575 25 24 71
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate -17 -48 -7 3 150 -8 -17 0
Return to capital -16 -41 -6 -3 83 -8 -17 0
DAF -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -30 -29 2 -5 53 6,853 80 123
Return to capital 12 -10 53 28 53 1,606 84 123
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate 422 223 483 547 576 676 531 604
Return to capital 442 288 531 531 576 198 533 604
DAS -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -51 -50 -28 -33 162 176 3,290 237
Return to capital 106 134 89 135 162 167 1,055 238
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate 44 -11 60 78 132 144 1,464 197
Return to capital 72 73 103 125 132 140 578 197
I
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Table A4.5.1 (Continued): Homogeneous labour
(% change in factor prices)
•  Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DE -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -14 -12 26 17 66 62 47 553
Return to capital 7 -2 40 35 66 61 48 386
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate 122 37 148 175 241 206 194 875
Return to capital 134 71 170 187 241 204 194 665
DAM -> USA
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -34 81 109 79 844 91 74 135
Return to capital 5 81 109 79 510 90 76 135
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate -14 1 5 0 157 2 -1 11
Return to capital -16 1 5 0 91 2 -1 11
DAS -> JAP
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate -1 -97 1 -3 -5 -0 87 -1
Return to capital -1 -68 1 -4 -5 -0 15 -1
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate -10 -91 -7 -10 -15 -8 67 -8
Return to capital -8 -69 -7 -11 -15 -8 6 -8
DAF, DE -> EU
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate 3 -16 -83 -26 -18 1,063 -18 -12
Return to capital 3 -16 -63 -26 -18 210 -17 -18
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate -9 -23 -63 -27 -23 332 -24 45
Return to capital -7 -23 -51 -27 -23 48 -24 22
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Table A4.5.2: Heterogeneous labour -  Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DAM -» USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 30 23 59 100 1,388 92 88 164
Wage rate unskilled labour 22 16 85 53 ,1,562 93 89 164
Return to capital 42 37 93 78 901 93 89 164
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour -15 -51 -21 18 104 -7 -17 0
Wage rate unskilled labour -15 -51 -1 -3 145 -7 -16 0
Return to capital -14 -42 -5 -4 76 -7 -17 0
DAF -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 91 81 134 193 254 15,674 319 426
Wage rate unskilled labour 74 65 164 118 254 15,705 323 425
Return to capital 131 112 268 207 254 3,796 332 424
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 52 13 42 110 65 1,013 59 85
Wage rate unskilled labour 43 -18 65 61 65 1,057 60 85
Return to capital 48 -0 70 70 65 265 60 85
DAS -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 88 79 131 189 542 575 12,661 743
Wage rate unskilled labour 29 22 95 61 542 579 7,509 731
Return to capital 404 462 369 484 542 561 2,749 737
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 23 -29 15 71 75 84 1,223 124
Wage rate unskilled labour 14 -34 32 29 75 85 975 122
Return to capital 32 27 57 27 75 82 387 122
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Table A4.5.2 (Continued): Heterogeneous labour -  Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DE -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour -15 -20 4 30 54 57 39 634
Wage rate unskilled labour -10 -15 36 12 . 54 58 40 492
Return to capital -6 -6 39 32 55 57 40 361
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 24 -28 17 73 81 82 62 525
Wage rate unskilled labour 28 -27 47 44 82 82 63 387
Return to capital 40 -2 65 70 82 81 63 345
DAM USA
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour -57 15 30 13 393 20 10 45
Wage rate unskilled labour -58 15 30 14 474 20 10 45
Return to capital -6 15 30 14 265 20 11 45
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour -10 9 14 8 116 10 7 19
Wage rate unskilled labour -6 9 14 8 170 10 7 19
Return to capital 7 9 14 8 96 10 7 19
DAS -> JAP
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 88 -93 113 104 111 110 415 111
Wage rate unskilled labour 76 -94 112 104 111 110 292 111
Return to capital 80 -30 112 104 110 109 148 111
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour -5 -88 1 -3 -6 0 122 1
Wage rate unskilled labour -4 -89 1 -3 -6 0 77 1
Return to capital -4 -66 1 -3 -6 0 16 1
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Table A4.5.2 (Continued): Heterogeneous labour -  Both Ls and Lu migrate
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DAF, DE -> EU
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour -8 -22 -84 -31 -26 974 -25 12
Wage rate unskilled labour -3 -22 -82 -31 -26 962 -24 -23
Return to capital -3 -22 -64 -31 -26 184 -24 -23
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour -10 -18 -63 -23 -17 330 -19 99
Wage rate unskilled labour -6 -18 -57 -23 -17 348 -18 43
Return to capital -5 -18 -46 -23 -17 55 -18 29
Note: —> indicates the direction of the migration flow.
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Table A4.5.3: Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DAM -► USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 41 34 72 117 1,518 102 102 124
Wage rate unskilled labour 79 78 100 105 398 102 102 124
Return to capital 80 78 99 104 393 101 102 125
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 27 -27 18 76 205 29 27 34
Wage rate unskilled labour 27 8 29 41 68 29 27 34
Return to capital 25 7 28 40 68 29 27 34
DAF -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 33 26 63 104 124 1 0 ,9 0 7 125 150
Wage rate unskilled labour 75 83 132 117 124 795 125 149
Return to capital 77 82 130 117 124 622 127 149
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 10 -36 3 53 18 1,097 14 20
Wage rate unskilled labour 9 -5 16 25 18 73 14 20
Return to capital 10 -5 16 24 18 66 14 20
DAS -> USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 7 2 32 66 228 230 7,200 283
Wage rate unskilled labour 138 253 208 203 228 231 610 283
Return to capital 140 248 202 208 228 227 615 282
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 70 -2 -59 136 123 116 1,723 134
Wage rate unskilled labour 85 97 109 123 123 116 209 133
Return to capital 87 95 107 123 123 115 211 133
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Table A4.5.3 (Continued): Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DE -» USA, JAP, EU, ODC
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 26 19 54 93 110 102 95 988
Wage rate unskilled labour 57 62 92 96 110 102 95 316
Return to capital 58 61 91 95 110 101 95 320
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 51 -13 41 109 95 84 80 657
Wage rate unskilled labour 59 43 75 88 95 84 80 228
Return to capital 61 42 74 87 96 84 80 237
DAM -» USA
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 18 112 122 110 1,252 116 114 137
Wage rate unskilled labour 68 112 122 110 349 116 114 137
Return to capital 69 112 122 110 345 115 115 137
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 29 42 44 42 211 43 44 47
Wage rate unskilled labour 33 42 44 42 80 43 44 47
Return to capital 33 42 44 42 79 43 44 47
DAS -> JAP
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 6 -94 12 9 8 11 358 13
Wage rate unskilled labour 5 -20 12 9 8 11 23 13
Return to capital 4 -22 12 9 8 11 23 13
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour 84 -61 94 90 91 94 627 97
Wage rate unskilled labour 80 42 94 90 91 94 113 97
Return to capital 76 39 94 90 91 94 114 97
247
Table A4.5.3 (Continued): Heterogeneous labour -  Only Ls migrates
(% change in factor prices)
Regions
Migration scenarios USA JAP EU ODC DAM DAF DAS DE
DAF, DE -> EU
• Wage bill divided by total population (WB / TOTP)
Wage rate skilled labour 5 -2 -70 -6 -1 1,917 -1 111
Wage rate unskilled labour 4 -2 -20 -6 . -1 91 -1 23
Return to capital 3 -2 -22 -6 -1 77 -1 25
• Adjusted GDP per capita using the economically active population (AGDP pc (EAP))
Wage rate skilled labour -2 -7 -51 -9 -5 465 -6 162
Wage rate unskilled labour -2 -7 -20 -9 -5 12 -6 33
Return to capital -2 -7 -21 -9 -5 9 -6 35
Note: —» indicates the direction of the migration flow.
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C H A P T E R  5
C o n c l u s io n s
In this thesis three policy issues that have become of particular relevance in the 
economic debate have been analysed using multiregional’ CGE models. First, the 
welfare effects of the decentralised provision of quasi-private goods by the 
government were quantified. Second, the issue of the exportation of domestic taxes 
from developed to developing countries was examined. And third, the efficiency 
gains from the elimination of global restrictions on international labour mobility were 
computed.
The multiregional CGE modelling literature distinguishes between two types 
of models. The first type disaggregates the national economy into regions, taking into 
consideration the linkages between different markets and different sectors of the 
economy. The second type of multiregional models focuses on the interrelationships 
among countries or groups of countries. In this thesis I used both a subnational and a 
supranational approach to regional modelling.
Chapter 2 presented numerical results on the welfare effects of the 
decentralised provision of health and education in Colombia. That is, to what extent 
will the Colombian population be better off when these goods are delivered locally as 
against centrally. A multiregional CGE model for Colombia was used to compare 
two provision scenarios: one in which the provision of health and education is carried 
out by the central government, against one in which provision is carried out by 
regional governments. In this modelling exercise, a provision rule based on the
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median voter was considered, since the literature on the provision of quasi-private
goods by the public sector mainly focuses on the characteristics of possible provision
m
rules. In the median voter framework, each consumer is allocated the quantity 
demanded by the individual with the “median demand” for the good being publicly 
provided. In the model, consumers pay a fraction of the cost of the publicly provided 
quasi-private goods, and the government finances the remaining part with income 
taxes, either national, regional or both.
The results indicate that the decentralised provision of health and education 
improves the welfare of the Colombian population. With regional provision, each 
consumer group is allocated an amount of the goods that is closer to its preferences. 
More important is the magnitude of the gains; they vary between 1.3% and 2.3% of 
GDP, a substantial magnitude especially when compared with the efficiency gains 
associated to the tax reforms of the early nineties.
It is worth mentioning that the benefits from decentralised provision are not 
equally distributed among the regions. When the provision is financed by a national 
tax, regional provision leads to welfare losses in the Pacific, Atlantic and A&O 
regions, since these regions are subsidising the provision of the Andean region, 
which is the largest and most industrialised region in the country. In this case, there is 
redistribution among regions. When the provision is financed by regional taxes or a 
combination of national and regional taxes, all regions benefit from decentralised 
provision, and there is redistribution both within regions and among regions.
Chapter 3 presented some numerical results on the possibility that developed 
regions export domestic taxes to developing regions, particularly to those regions 
with which they have close commercial ties. A multiregional CGE model was used; 
this model incorporated domestic taxation and import tariffs of eight regions, chosfen
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to represent world trade. Two variants of the model were considered: one in which 
both labour and capital were assumed to be internationally immobile, and another in 
which capital was assumed to be internationally mobile.
The results of the model suggest that when factors of production are 
internationally immobile, import tariffs are more important than domestic taxes in 
their effects on both welfare and terms of trade. The results also suggest that there is 
no tax exporting of domestic taxes by USA and EU to developing regions. In the case 
of JAP, the results indicate that there is some degree of tax exporting, but the effects 
on both welfare and terms of trade appear small. Income taxes have a rather small 
impact on welfare and terms of trade. In addition, in some cases the replacement of 
domestic taxes and/or import tariff had a negative effect on welfare. This may occur 
because the adverse terms of trade effects are strong enough that the removal of 
distorting domestic taxes could lead to reductions in national welfare.
In the second variant of the model, when capital is assumed to be 
internationally mobile, the results supported the existence of tax exporting of capital 
taxes by USA and EU to some particular developing regions. In the case of labour 
and income taxes, the results indicated that there is tax exporting from JAP to 
developing regions, although the effects on both welfare and terms of trade were 
small. In this case, once again, import tariffs are more important than domestic taxes 
in their effects on both welfare and terms of trade.
The effects that differential factor tax rates might have on the results of the 
model were also examined. Stronger terms of trade effects and larger welfare gains 
(loses) were found, which suggests that intersectoral effects play a very important 
role for tax exporting. In particular, more taxes could be exported if a region taxes 
more heavily those industries that constitute their main exports, as appear to be the
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case of capital taxes in JAP and EU. The results also indicated that domestic tax 
policies in developed regions do not affect all developing regions in the same way. 
Policies will have stronger effects on those regions with which there are close 
commercial ties; for example, USA will mainly affect DAM, JAP will mainly affect 
DAS, and EU will mainly affect DAF and to a lesser extent DE.
In the light of these results, there is the possibility that “tax exporting” of 
domestic taxes will become an important part in trade negotiations in the foreseeable 
future. Throughout the years, commercial policies have been at the centre of trade 
negotiations, so that at the moment tariff levels are low in developed countries. 
However, the results of the model suggest that the benefits associated to further 
reductions in tariff levels in developed countries could be dampened by higher 
domestic factor taxes in these countries, since they can be exported to developing 
countries.
Chapter 4 computed the world-wide efficiency gains from the elimination of 
global restrictions on international labour mobility. In the analysis, wages differ 
across regions because of the existence of barriers to labour mobility, and wage rates 
are equalised as a result of the elimination of restrictions to labour mobility rather 
than free trade. One of the key features of this modelling exercise is the introduction 
of a segmented labour market, as two types of labour are considered: skilled and 
unskilled. When labour is heterogeneous, I considered the cases where a) both skilled 
and unskilled labour migrate, and b) only skilled labour migrates.
The results indicated that the elimination of global restrictions on labour 
mobility generates world-wide efficiency gains that could be of considerable 
magnitude, ranging between 15% and 67% of world GDP. When only skilled labour 
migrates welfare gains are smaller, since skilled labour is a small proportion of the
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labour force in developing regions; in this case, efficiency gains range from 3% to 
11 % of world GDP.
Migration leads to a process of factor reallocation in which there are winners 
and losers. In the source regions, labour becomes more scarce relative to capital, and 
capital owners lose. However, not all workers are better off. Emigration will benefit 
workers whose skills are substitute to those of migrant labour, whereas it will hurt 
those workers whose skills are complementary to those of migrant workers. On the 
other hand, in the destination regions labour becomes more abundant (less scarce) 
relative to capital, and capital owners benefit. Again, not all workers in the 
destination regions are worse off. Immigration will benefit those workers whose 
skills are complementary to those of the immigrant worker, whereas immigration will 
hurt those workers whose skills are substitute to those of immigrant workers.
Next, three extensions to the model were introduced: a) transportation costs, 
since migration is a costly process; b) capital mobility, because capital markets have 
become more international in scope; and c) selective labour mobility, because some 
countries have introduced immigration control policies that allow migration flows 
from some regions and not from others.
With the introduction of transaction costs wages fail to equalise across 
regions, migration flows reduce, and in consequence efficiency gains are smaller. 
With capital mobility the return to capital equalises across regions. The removal of 
restrictions to skilled labour mobility makes labour move out of the regions with low 
average wages, and capital moves out of the regions where it is abundant relative to 
labour. Global welfare improves compared with the scenario without capital mobility 
(as a result of a better resource allocation), and migrants benefit as well. Lastly, 
selective labour mobility improves aggregate welfare, and the magnitude of the gain
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depends on the size of the region in terms of the labour endowment. As to the
remuneration to the factors of production, the main conclusions remain unaltered:
»
labour benefits in the source regions, and capital in the destination regions. With a 
segmented labour market, skilled labour benefits from migration relative to unskilled 
labour in the source regions.
The results have shown that the elimination of global restrictions on labour 
mobility generates considerable world-wide efficiency gains. Despite these gains, the 
liberalisation of world-wide migration is far from realistic because of social and 
political tensions. Developed countries are very reluctant to open their borders to free 
migration because they do not want to become the destination of immigration of 
unskilled labour from developing countries. In the short-run, international migration 
flows are regulated by means of border controls and work permits. In the long-run, 
countries ought to concentrate their efforts in the elimination of the incentives to 
migrate, which could be accomplished by reducing income disparities among 
regions.
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